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Edward Walker, Durham University 
 
Political norms and rules, whether discursive or formally embodied in constitutions and laws, 
regulate and constrain the spectrum of legitimate political action for political actors. In the case 
of major political principles and constitutional law, these norms and rules are particularly 
difficult to challenge and change. For most political parties operating broadly within the 
boundaries of their respective domestic political system, this is seldom an issue. In recent years 
however, several countries across Europe have faced a significant challenge from minority 
nationalist parties seeking recognition, major constitutional reforms and, in some cases, 
political independence for the territory they claim to represent. In this thesis, I analyse the 
various ways in which minority nationalist parties seek to challenge the rules and norms that 
prevent the legitimate realisation of their political goals. Simultaneously, I also analyse the 
ways in which the normative framework within which these parties operate domestically 
affects the nature of their political discourse and demands, with various parties adopting 
different discourses and emphasising different demands depending on the nature of the political 
system within which they operate. To successfully challenge established norms and rules, 
minority nationalist parties have also drawn upon different tools to legitimate their demands, 
ranging from the pursuit of political recognition to domestic electoral success and international 
lobbying within European institutions. Looking at these various elements, and drawing on three 
major European case studies (Catalonia, Corsica and Scotland), I develop a framework to 
analyse and understand why minority nationalist parties ‘speak’ and ‘act’ the way they do, 
providing a starting point for further, norm-focused comparative research on the fundamental 
challenge brought forward by minority nationalist parties in Europe and in other regions of the 
world. 
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Introduction 
The start of the 21st century saw the emergence of several minority nationalist 
challenges to established nation-states across Western Europe. While, for many years, 
European observers questioned whether Belgium’s future a nation-state was secure in the face 
of growing linguistic divisions and growing nationalist feeling in Flanders (Morris, 2005), the 
Scottish independence referendum in 2014 brought about the first widespread public realisation 
that the breakup of established, western European states was no longer a fantasy desired by 
marginal political groups, but a concrete and potentially imminent reality. Since then, minority 
nationalist challenges to the established political order have become important within the 
political agenda of several European countries, and a recurring issue at the level of the 
European Union and other associated European institutions. 
Minority nationalist movements and their demands have been a subject in academia for 
several decades. Recent bodies of literature can be found analysing the issue of minority 
nationalism from a European perspective, including studies on how the issue is addressed at 
the European level (Keating, 2004), others on the nature of minority nationalism and its 
interactions with Europe and the nation-state (Keating, 1996, 1998; Müller-Rommel, 1998). 
Other academics have focused either on case-specific analyses or small-number case 
comparisons between geographically or politically similar cases (Olivesi, 1998; Guibernau, 
2000; Hepburn and Elias, 2011; Guibernau, 2013). Finally, others have focused on providing 
broader comparative studies of minority nationalist party stance on given issues (see Elias, 
2008b for an example of this). 
Building on this literature, this study seeks to provide a conceptual framework through 
which the actions, motivations and strategies of minority nationalist parties can be understood 
and analysed. Focusing on a small number of highly significant cases in western Europe, the 
conceptual tools used here provide a potential explanation as to why minority nationalist parties 
‘do what they do’, how they do it and how they rationally adopt strategies to handle the 
sometimes significant political, constitutional and legal obstacles they face in implementing 
their aims. Starting from the idea of self-determination as the foundational concept behind all 
minority nationalist parties, the conceptual framework used in this study can explain party 
strategy, rhetoric, agenda-setting as well as potential divergences and convergences between 
minority nationalist parties in different domestic contexts.   
Edward Walker – School of Government and International Affairs, Durham University 
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Minority Nationalism 
Before describing the purpose and aims of the study in detail, however, it is important 
to address the question of definition: while the term ‘minority nationalist’ is sometimes used 
in academic work, it is by no means the only term used. Other studies prefer terminology such 
as ‘ethnoregionalist party’ (Müller-Rommel, 1998; Türsan, 1998), or simply ‘regionalist party’ 
(Lynch, 1998; Olivesi, 1998) Other, more comprehensive terms such as ‘stateless nationalist 
and regionalist party’, have also been used in sections of the academic literature on the subject 
(Elias and Mees, 2017). All of these terms are broadly used to categorise the same parties in 
each of these studies. The definition of an ‘ethnoregionalist’ party, provided by Müller-
Rommel, highlights some important elements and provides a good starting point: 
 ‘Ethnoregionalist parties are defined as referring to the efforts of geographically 
concentrated peripheral minorities which challenge the working order and sometimes 
even the democratic order of a nation-state by demanding recognition of their cultural 
identity’ (Müller-Rommel, 1998) 
This definition, as Müller-Rommel points out, excludes other forms of nationalist parties, 
notably those situated on the far-right of the political spectrum and those whose nationalist 
discourse is principally concerned with immigrant populations (Müller-Rommel, 1998). There 
are, however, several ways in which the definition above can be reworded to provide a clearer 
understanding of the fundamental principles that underpin minority nationalism, and the ways 
in which these are expressed politically. Minority nationalist do, perhaps more so than most 
other party families in Western Europe, seek to ‘challenge the working order and sometimes 
even the democratic order of a nation-state’. This, however, as I will describe in the third 
chapter of this study, can quite simply be understood as self-determination. While, as I will 
analyse, self-determination is complex and multi-layered both in its definition and in its 
political expressions, there are several characteristics that permeate most understandings of the 
concept: ascribed to a territorially bound group with a common identity (a ‘people’), self-
determination is understood as a fundamental right through which a ‘people’ can determine 
both their political status and the terms of their economic and cultural development1. In many 
countries, including in the three studied here, this often requires a change in the ‘working’ and 
‘democratic’ ‘order’ of the nation-state. 
                                                          
1 The United Nations Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples 
understands self-determination exactly in those terms. (United Nations, 1960a) 
Edward Walker – School of Government and International Affairs, Durham University 
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 The notion of common identity, referred in chapter three as ‘peopleness’, also echoes 
the element of the definition focusing on the recognition of cultural identity. In many respects, 
the recognition of a given cultural identity is an essential pre-requisite for minority nationalist 
parties to claim self-determination as a right that applies, legitimately, to the ‘people’ they seek 
to represent. 
 Self-determination, therefore, is the fundamental principle that characterises minority 
nationalist parties. Drawing upon this, I propose the following definition for the purpose of this 
study: minority nationalist parties are political parties seeking self-determination on behalf of 
stateless, historically present, territorially-bound cultural or ethnic minorities within or across 
the boundaries of established states. Extending this definition, this pursuit of self-determination 
often takes the form of demands for cultural and political recognition, as well as demands for 
political control over cultural, social and economic matters. 
 
With this definition and the ‘minority nationalist’ terminology in mind, a few additional 
points of definition need to be addressed before proceeding. The use of the word ‘minority’ to 
describe the type of nationalism espoused by the minority nationalist parties analysed here 
warrants a small clarification. The term ‘minority’ is used in this context to refer to the overall 
position of the population which parties seek to embody politically in contrast to the overall 
population of the state in which the population resides. As is hinted at in the definition, many 
of these ‘minorities’ at the scale of the state are, in fact, not minorities within their respective 
territories, a fact that emerges in the literature on self-determination, where opponents of 
secession caution against the risk of creating new minorities within newly created states 
(Buchanan, 2003). It is also important to highlight that the term ‘minority’ is not used in a 
dichotomous context here. The existence of minority nationalism within a given territory does 
not inherently imply the existence of an opposing ‘majority’ nationalism. While debates on 
matters such as identity, ‘peopleness’ and secession often develop into an opposition between 
‘minority nationalism’ and a form of ‘state nationalism’ espoused, at least punctually, by 
political parties opposing the claims of minority nationalists, opposition to minority nationalists 
can also come from an anti-nationalist perspective, something for instance highlighted by 
Scottish National Party (SNP) Member of the European Parliament (MEP) Alyn Smith 
(Appendix A, interview 7) to explain the reason why many European-level politicians and 
officials are fundamentally sceptical of minority nationalist demands. 
Edward Walker – School of Government and International Affairs, Durham University 
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 The definition also makes no assumption as to what form the pursuit of self-
determination will take. Throughout the study, and throughout pre-existing academic literature 
on minority nationalist parties, the importance of context and the impact this has on the actions 
of these parties is paramount. It is unlikely that any definition fixing the forms in which self-
determination is pursued (for instance limiting it to the pursuit of full, political independence) 
can satisfactorily cover the broad variety in which parties decide to draw upon and express self-
determination in concrete policy (Elias and Mees, 2017). While I argue that self-determination 
is the fundamental element that drives minority nationalist parties, the forms in which this 
demand is expressed is heavily influenced by the political and historical context in which 
parties operate and varies almost certainly on a case-by-case basis. 
 
Purpose of the study, conceptual tools and methodological approach. 
For the purpose of this thesis, a theoretical framework was built drawing primarily on 
constructivist social theory and on the various iterations of it in different bodies of academic 
literature. Drawing from international relations constructivism as a starting point, I then 
supplement the constructivist social theory found in IR constructivism with concepts drawn 
from the study of norm diffusion, a body of work that shares many common principles with IR 
constructivism and drawn, broadly, from the same social theory. Finally, I also introduce 
concepts from historical institutionalism, to address the fact that many of the norms and rules 
challenged by minority nationalist parties are very well established and hard to challenge, a 
fact already recognised in social constructivism. However, in addition to this, historical 
institutionalism allows me to introduce the notion of critical junctures, which enables us to 
analyse why very long-standing and established norms can, in periods of exceptional crisis, be 
undermined and replaced by normative alternatives. 
Echoing constructivism, this thesis focuses on three fundamental concepts: agency, 
norms and rules, and structure, all of which are interrelated through an ongoing process of 
mutual constitution. Mutual constitution, as the wording indicates, is a two-way process. 
Firstly, structure is understood as a set of institutions, rules, norms and practices that frame the 
spectrum of legitimate and ‘possible’, activity in the political realm (Wendt, 1999; Onuf et al., 
2013). Within structure, rules (understood here as legal, codified rules) and norms (understood 
as non-codified, political rules) constrain the spectrum of legitimate political action (and who 
can legitimately in political activity) in specific areas. Within each area, agents, who are 
Edward Walker – School of Government and International Affairs, Durham University 
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empowered to act as such within their respective areas of activity, draw legitimacy for their 
political actions from the rules and norms that regulate their behaviour.  
While this top-down understanding of the relationship between structure, norms and 
agents is relatively uncontroversial, the notion of mutual constitution also conceptualises the 
ability of agents, through their political actions or discourse, to challenge, undermine and 
change existing established norms and structures. This notion conceptualises each political 
space as an area in which dominant norms and rules co-exist with an unlimited number of 
potential challenging norms brought forward and adopted by agents seeking to change the 
normative structure within which they operate. 
This, in turn, does not inherently imply instability or constant change. Constructivism 
frequently theorises change as a slow, difficult and uncertain process. While change is indeed 
a possibility, established normative frameworks, because they regulate legitimacy in political 
action, are particularly difficult to challenge and undermine. Normative frameworks are subject 
to what is understood in historical institutionalism as ‘path dependency’, a concept according 
to which the longer an institution exists, the stronger its position and the degree of acceptance 
and legitimacy it enjoys becomes. Change, as a result, is frequently ‘slow’ and ‘costly’ (Onuf 
et al., 2013, p. 17) 
Although path dependency can be a significant factor in promoting stability and 
continuity in normative frameworks, historical institutionalism also accounts for situations in 
which external crises, or the emergence and growing adoption of challenging norms, can lead 
to what is termed ‘critical junctures’ (Pierson, 2004), which can be understood as periods of 
time, or events, where long-established norms are suddenly challenged, discussed, assessed 
and in some cases replaced by alternatives. Change, while difficult, can also be brought about 
in a relatively brief period of time, causing what is often seen as the sudden collapse of 
established norms, ideologies, and sometimes the institutions and relations of power these 
norms underpin. 
The theoretical framework described briefly above allows us to address a range of 
questions. In this thesis, constructivist conceptual tools are used to address the following issues: 
• What principles, if any, characterise minority nationalist parties? 
• To what extent are minority nationalist parties impacted by the domestic and 
international normative, legal, constitutional and political environment in which 
they operate? 
Edward Walker – School of Government and International Affairs, Durham University 
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• To what extent do minority nationalist parties affect and change that environment? 
• Through what avenues do minority nationalist parties seek change? 
• How do minority nationalist parties attempt to legitimise their demands? 
Many of these questions are already widely addressed in the literature. However, mostly due 
to the constructivist theoretical framework used here, the way in which these questions are 
treated in this thesis differs, sometimes substantially, from the way this has been addressed in 
the literature so far. 
 Self-determination, and the role it plays at the heart of minority nationalist party 
rhetoric and ideology, is a good example of this. The centrality of self-determination, at the 
very least in its territorial dimension, is well recognised in the academic literature on minority 
nationalist parties. The relationship between territorial demands and other demands, including 
discussions about the primacy of one or the other and the ways in which territorial and 
economic demands are related, form an important part of the existing literature seeking to 
understand the electoral strategy of minority nationalist parties (see Elias and Tronconi, 2011; 
Alonso, Cabeza and Gómez, 2015; Elias and Mees, 2017; Elias, 2018).While territorial issues 
tend to dominate economic issues in the discourse of minority nationalist parties (Alonso, 
Cabeza and Gómez, 2015), academics have drawn highlight three different ways in which these 
two types of issues are related: blurring, in which economic rhetoric is vague and secondary, 
subsuming, in which economic issues are tied and subordinated to territorial issues, and two-
dimensional, in which both issues are simultaneously and equally discussed by minority 
nationalist parties (Rovny, 2015; Elias, 2018). 
 The distinction between territorial issues and economic issues is one made in this thesis. 
In chapter three, institutional and economic grievances are identified, alongside identity-based 
grievances, as being important in the discourse and policy platforms of minority nationalist 
parties in Catalonia, Scotland and Corsica. It is argued, however, that all three types of 
grievances, rather than being fundamentally distinct, are normatively connected to the broader 
principle of self-determination. In all three cases analysed here, economic and institutional 
grievances are ‘subsumed’ in the rhetoric of minority nationalist parties, with economic 
grievances often depending on institutional solutions to be satisfied. While the distinction 
between these two types of grievances is clear in the rhetoric of minority nationalist parties, it 
is argued that all these grievances, whether territorial, institutional, economic or identity-based, 
Edward Walker – School of Government and International Affairs, Durham University 
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are rooted in the broader normative principle of self-determination, which is presented here as 
the fundamental principle underpinning minority nationalist parties today. 
 
 Drawing upon the idea of mutual constitution, it is expected that minority nationalist 
parties are both influenced, and influence, their political, normative and legal environment. 
This potential two-way relationship is also well discussed in the literature, however the 
approach taken here presents a few fundamental differences. Existing studies of minority 
nationalist party electoral strategy highlight the importance of internal and external factors 
influencing the positions taken up by these parties. External factors include, as is also evident 
in this thesis, the institutional structure of the state in which they operate, the structure of the 
party system and public opinion (Elias and Mees, 2017). This thesis, however, broadly 
disregards internal factors (understood as ideological debates or contests within parties) when 
discussing the rhetoric, strategy and policies of minority nationalist parties. This is done for 
several reasons: parties, in this thesis, are understood as unitary and single agents, following 
the widely accepted notion of ‘corporate agency’ (Klotz and Lynch, 2007, p. 67) according to 
which agency can be ascribed to institutions, groups of people and, in this case, parties as 
opposed to simply being a feature of single individuals. Secondly, there was little evidence, in 
the period analysed, of internal conflicts being visible in public rhetoric and policy statements: 
even in cases where internal debates existed and shaped the position of minority nationalist 
parties, the discursive output emanating from minority nationalist parties remained broadly 
consistent and was rarely contradicted from within.  
 Secondly, although internal debates frequently focus on questions of strategy and issue 
prioritising, there is little evidence, either here or in the literature, of internal pressures to 
abandon self-determination as a fundamental principle. While differing opinions exist on the 
extent to which self-determination should be pursued, and the forms this should take 
rhetorically and electorally, the potential for a fundamental shift in the normative 
underpinnings and stance of minority nationalist parties was understood to be minimal. 
 Finally, the thesis poses some questions as to the relevance of the distinction between 
external and internal factors affecting minority nationalist parties. Although not addressed 
significantly in this thesis, there is significant evidence in this thesis that minority nationalist 
party stances are strongly, and mostly, affected by external factors. It is likely, therefore, that 
internal divisions within a party emerge themselves because of differing interpretations of the 
Edward Walker – School of Government and International Affairs, Durham University 
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political, legal, and institutional framework within which these parties find themselves. In this 
case, internal factors are inherently tied, and subordinate, to broader external factors. 
  
 The question of the extent to which parties influence their own environment is less 
addressed in existing literature. While existing studies have argued, convincingly, that minority 
nationalist parties as political actors have often had little impact in major territorial reforms in 
various European states (Elias and Tronconi, 2011), the norm-centric approach adopted by this 
thesis provides a slightly different approach. Here, the potential normative success of minority 
nationalist parties, whether it is the broad acceptance of ‘peopleness’ or the acceptance of the 
legitimacy of decentralisation or devolution, or even the acceptance of the legitimacy of 
independence as a potential political option, is differentiated from their immediate influence 
on the environment in which they operate.  
 While, for instance, Massetti and Schakel (Massetti and Schakel, 2013) highlight the 
potential difficulties faced by minority nationalist parties following territorial reforms, this is 
still understood, from this thesis’ perspective, as a success: while minority nationalist parties 
are often not involved directly in the policy-making process reflecting their normative stances, 
the fact that these normative stances find themselves adopted by parties and governments not 
primarily focused on self-determination is, in many ways, a greater mark of influence and 
success than direct implementation through government power. A good example of this is also 
found in Hepburn’s study of the ‘failure’ of the Partito Sardo d’Azione, a major Sardinian 
nationalist party. One of the reasons highlighted to explain the electoral weakness and growing 
failure of the party is the adoption, by other competing parties, of similar territorial aims 
(Hepburn, 2009a). The adoption of territorial reform as a goal by other parties is, understood 
through the lens of this thesis, a fundamental evidence of success by the Partito Sardo 
D’Azione, even if this eventually is simultaneously an explanation for its relative and 
subsequent failure as political party. 
 Other examples of this are found throughout the thesis. While minority nationalists in 
Corsica have had little direct, policy-making impact in shaping the institutional framework in 
place currently in Corsica, very few studies neglect the fundamental normative influence these 
parties, and Corsican nationalism more broadly, has had in providing an incentive for the 
French government to consider these reforms. The broad adoption, within local political 
parties, of key Corsican nationalist proposals and demands reflects more a broad acceptance of 
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Corsican nationalist normative principles, rather than a ‘conversion’ to Corsican nationalism 
and to the centrality of self-determination by these political parties. While often connected, the 
electoral fortunes, and even the survival of minority nationalist parties in the long run, is not 
the primary way in which minority nationalist impact on their legal, institutional and normative 
framework is measured. 
  
 The study of the various avenues in which minority nationalist parties try to legitimise 
their demands also highlights a nuance between this thesis and existing academic literature. 
While the literature itself is broad and very diverse, and important body of work has emerged 
focusing on minority nationalist parties as electoral agents, drawing upon a well-established 
academic body of work focusing on party competition within democratic systems. Many of the 
existing works cited above adopt this position, studying the various ways in which minority 
nationalist parties strategize their participation in elections, with accession to government 
understood as their fundamental aim (see Zuber, 2012; Elias, 2018 for examples of this). As 
will be seen in chapter four of this thesis however, a norm-centric approach as adopted in this 
thesis presents democracy, and elections, as a means to an end, albeit a central one, rather than 
an end in itself for minority nationalist parties. Participation in elections here is understood as 
one of the most important ways in which minority nationalist parties can secure legitimacy for 
their demands in the face of opposition. Elections also inherently act as a measurement tool to 
assess the extent to which the norms put forward by minority nationalist parties are adopted by 
their local and state-wide electorates. In either case however, democracy is understood as a 
major source of legitimacy, rather than as the primary purpose, of minority nationalist parties 
as embodiments of broader minority nationalist movements in all three territories studied here. 
 All things considered, the approach adopted in this thesis differs from that adopted in 
existing literature. In most cases, differences are subtle, and the study conducted in this thesis 
is broadly compatible and complementary with the work carried out in existing academic 
literature on the subject of minority nationalist parties. What this thesis provides, however, is 
an additional avenue to study minority nationalist parties not just as political parties 
participating in elections, but as important norm entrepreneurs yielding a significant degree of 
normative influence in the domestic, and European spheres they find themselves in. 
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 Methodologically, this thesis draws most of its empirical evidence and data from the 
analysis of minority nationalist party public discourse in all of its forms. While the use of 
discourse analysis is frequent within constructivist academic work (Klotz and Lynch, 2007), it 
also presents us with several advantages for this study, which will be detailed further in the 
second chapter. First and foremost, if we are to develop any kind of understanding as to ‘why’ 
minority nationalists act and ‘speak’ the way they do in response to political developments and 
within their respective political environments, it is essential to see exactly ‘what’ they are 
saying, both to analyse rhetoric itself but also to understand the type of actions these parties, 
as political agents, think they are undertaking.  Understanding how minority nationalist parties 
navigate such a complex process requires us to focus on how these parties themselves, as 
political agents, understand these processes, their place and their ability to act within them and 
on them. Throughout this study, we provide an interpretation of their actions, whether these 
appear reasonable, rational and likely to succeed from the perspective of the central state and 
observers or not. Understanding why a minority nationalist party might, at any given time, 
consider a specific course of action over another, allows us to not only better understand what 
they hope to achieve, but also better understand why, in some cases, minority nationalist parties 
engage in behaviours and espouse rhetoric that appears counter-productive to the achievement 
of their aims. 
Overall, minority nationalist parties, when in a position power, often have strong and 
lasting effects on the polity they represent. Understanding this, aside from the inherent rewards 
of understanding a major contemporary political phenomenon, can be beneficial for several 
reasons. Firstly, the framework developed here is well suited to understand the actions of most, 
if not all, minority nationalist parties, at the very least in Europe. Secondly, understanding the 
motivations and rationale behind minority nationalist party rhetoric and activity can provide a 
better understanding of the demands these parties, and the populations who vote for them, are 
formulating. This can help observers and policymakers alike engage more fruitfully with these 
major political actors. Finally, focusing on this process as a normative process encourages 
engagement with, rather than hostility towards, minority nationalist parties. Although demands 
for independence can, from the perspective of the public, emerge quite suddenly, the normative 
processes that lead minority nationalist parties to prefer such an option over alternatives are 
often very slow and rooted several decades, if not more, further in the past. Understanding what 
these motivations are, and what norms minority nationalist parties seek to establish through 
independence, can provide tools for policymakers to address, one way or the other, the 
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normative challenge presented by minority nationalism in a growing number of territories in 
Europe today. 
While the framework developed here aims to be applicable to all minority nationalist 
parties at least within a European context, three specific cases were selected for this study: 
Catalonia, Scotland, and Corsica. 
 
Case Selection 
Catalonia, Scotland and Corsica are all territories with distinct cultural (and sometimes 
linguistic) identities, underpinning strong, minority nationalist political movements. While in 
many regions of Europe minority nationalism is embodied by peripheral micro-parties (Lynch, 
1998), minority nationalist parties in Catalonia, Scotland and are all significant political forces 
at the scale of the territory they claim to represent (and, sometimes at the national scale, as in 
Catalonia) (Müller-Rommel, 1998, p. 20). 
The emergence of these minority nationalist parties as primary political actors and 
forces within their respective political environment occurred in different ways across all three 
of our cases, and all three minority nationalist movements, although they all share the 
specificity of being major, if not primary political actors at the sub-national and even the 
national level (as far as agenda setting is concerned, at the very least), the historical trajectory 
these parties have followed to get to this point varies significantly across all three cases. 
However, despite the varying historical trajectories, the position these parties are currently in, 
in Corsica, Catalonia and Scotland, is unprecedented. 
 Modern Corsican nationalism can be traced back to the 1950s, and the emergence of a 
succession of relatively small regionalist or pro-autonomist groups such as the Front 
Regionaliste Corse (FRC) or Action Regionaliste Corse (ARC), often in response to specific 
political concerns such as the high cost of living, the management of French-Algerian 
‘returnees’ following Algerian independence in 1962 or environmental concerns (Elias, 2008b; 
Poggioli, 2016). The occupation of a vineyard in Aleria, owned by a French-Algerian 
businessman, by members of the ARC looking to highlight what was perceived as structural 
unfairness in land ownership for Corsicans (Poggioli, 2016), is often considered the starting 
point of a decades-long violent campaign led by clandestine nationalist group Front de 
Libération Nationale de la Corse (FLNC). During the period of violent conflict, Corsican 
nationalism was broadly separated between a radical branch, supportive of violence and 
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independence, and a moderate branch, focused on electoral gains and greater autonomy for 
Corsica (Olivesi, 1998). This division continued to characterise Corsican minority nationalism 
throughout the latter half of the twentieth century and continues to be used frequently in 
academic literature to understand Corsican minority nationalism (Elias, 2008a; Hepburn and 
Elias, 2011). 
However, several developments in recent years have led to a weakening of this division. 
Starting around 2011, minority nationalists in Corsica shifted their focus towards the 
construction of a ‘prugettu cumunu’, or ‘common project’ around which a broad consensus 
could be reached between different nationalist factions and, eventually, political actors outside 
of what is commonly termed the ‘mouvement national’ or ‘national movement’ encompassing 
all nationalist political actors (Alta Frequenza, 2015e; Corse Matin, 2015). 
This process was further bolstered by the FLNC’s decision, in 2014, to cease all violent 
actions and to support the new consensus-building process initiated a few years before. A year 
later, the two major nationalist parties currently representing both ‘sides’ of the divide, Femu 
a Corsica (moderates) and Corsica Libera (radicals) joined forces in the second round of 
France’s territorial elections in 2015 and secured an overall majority in the Corsican assembly, 
the representative body associated with the Collectivité Territoriale de Corse, Corsica’s 
‘regional’ government. Although divisions remain (and parties still refuse to consider merging 
or standing together in elections on a regular basis) (Mari, 2016), the consensus built around 
issues such as political amnesty, new planning rules and fiscal devolution for Corsica show 
that, if not completely obsolete, the clear divide between radical and moderate nationalists 
appears to be weakening. 
From a movement characterised by severe division and a multiplicity of weak, and 
sometimes marginal political structures (Olivesi, 1998), Corsican nationalism today has 
emerged as a dominant political force within the island’s politics (Poggioli, 2016). While the 
emergence of Femu a Corsica and Corsica Libera remains a relatively recent event and may 
prove to be as fleeting as many other attempts to embody Corsican nationalism’s many nuances 
and factions into effective political parties, the commitment to electoral politics, followed by 
the unprecedented success in the 2015 elections followed by accession to government for the 
very first time, undoubtedly represents a potential critical juncture for Corsican nationalists. 
The presence of Corsican nationalists in sub-national government for the first time placed 
Corsican nationalist normative demands within the state-wide French political agenda, and 
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enabled Corsican nationalists to engage in a long, albeit unfruitful (at the time of writing) 
negotiated process in an attempt to secure further institutional change from the French 
government (Corse net Infos, 2016; France 3 Corse Via Stella, 2016). The level of public 
attention and central government engagement, which only occurred previously in Corsica as a 
result of significant waves of political violence (Hoffbauer, 2011), justifies understanding the 
Corsican election result of 2015 and subsequent exercise of government by Corsican 
nationalists as not just a historic success for minority nationalist parties, but also a wider critical 
juncture challenging the normative understandings underpinning France’s identity and 
constitutional order. 
 
Minority nationalism in Scotland, as embodied by the Scottish National Party (SNP), 
has also risen to significant political prominence in recent years following decades of gradual 
development and occasional setbacks. Originating from several nationalist organisations and 
founded in 1934, the SNP recorded its first significant political successes in Scotland as early 
as 1945 with the election of its first Member of Parliament (Thiec, 2017). Subsequent political 
success would only occur throughout the 1960s, during which the SNP established itself both 
as a significant political party within Scottish politics and as an electoral force. Despite this 
however, internal debates regarding the party’s position on a wide range of issues, but most 
notably devolution in the late 1970s, prevented the SNP from being perceived as an 
ideologically coherent political force, leading to a period of stagnation in growth and electoral 
support throughout most of the 1980s, even leading some academics to begin discussing the 
‘decline’ of the Scottish National Party over that period (Kauppi, 1982; Thiec, 2017). 
 The emergence of Alex Salmond as party leader throughout the 1990s, and the success 
of devolution in the 1997 referendum, marked the beginning of an upwards trend for the SNP 
which continues to this day. While the SNP gradually emerged as a significant political threat 
to the more established state-wide parties at the newly-created devolved level, the SNP’s first 
major success can be dated back to 2007, a year of unprecedented success in local and Scottish 
parliamentary elections (Sutherland, 2012). The SNP’s success in 2007, where it was able to 
establish a minority government after becoming the largest party in the Scottish Parliament by 
a single seat, was followed by further success in 2011 where the party secured an overall 
majority in the Scottish Parliament (Dardanelli and Mitchell, 2014). The SNP 2011 success 
marked the starting point of a political process and negotiation with the central UK government, 
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which culminated in the Edinburgh Agreement in 2012 (Guibernau, Rocher and Adam, 2014), 
which marked a joint commitment between the Scottish  and UK governments to hold an 
independence referendum before the end of 2014. The SNP’s victory in 2011 on a manifesto 
pledging an independence referendum, followed by the referendum itself in 2014, marked the 
first, clear normative critical juncture that the SNP was able to create, challenging established 
understandings of Scotland’s constitutional, political and legal place in the United Kingdom.  
Despite a narrow loss in the 2014 independence referendum, the SNP’s electoral 
fortunes continued to grow, culminating in the SNP’s dominance in Scottish parliamentary 
seats at the May 2015 United Kingdom general election (BBC News, 2015c). This electoral 
success, which it was able to leverage for a further negotiated process with the UK government 
starting with the Smith Commission reviewing existing devolution arrangements and 
establishing further devolution (Smith Commission, 2014; Page, 2015), has placed the SNP in 
a unique position of electoral and political strength, through which the SNP’s normative 
preferences are almost always considered a major and legitimate part of public debate, and 
through which every electoral success appears to trigger, or at least create the potential for, an 
additional critical juncture putting into question the UK’s constitutional arrangement and the 
place and status given to Scotland within it. 
 
Catalan minority nationalist parties, on the other hand, have had a slightly different 
historical trajectory to the ones experienced by Corsican and Scottish minority nationalist 
parties. Unlike Corsican nationalism or the SNP, Catalan minority nationalist parties emerged 
as significant political and electoral forces soon after Spain’s transition to democracy in the 
late 1970s, and have been in government for the majority of the years since the re-establishment 
of the Catalan Generalitat (government) in 1977 (Robles, 2016). In Catalonia, the minority 
nationalist movement is represented by two major strands: the Esquerra Republicana de 
Catalunya (ERC), a left-leaning political organisation that has historically supported 
independence for Catalonia, and a centre-right ‘Catalanist’ political tradition represented by 
the Convergència i Unió (CiU) political party and its most recent embodiment, the Partit 
Demòcrata Europeu Català (PDeCAT), which had until recently adopted a more moderate 
stance on the matter of independence (Keating, 2004; de Laguérie, 2014). In addition to these 
political parties, many observers and actors also highlight that Catalan nationalism is also 
embodied by several, significant civil society organisations such as the Assemblea Nacional 
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Catalana (ANC), which is often understood as the ideological ‘beating heart’ of Catalan 
nationalism (de Laguérie, 2014, Appendix A interview 8). 
Although Catalan minority nationalist parties have enjoyed greater electoral success 
and significant influence throughout the past few decades, the current period, and the period 
analysed in this thesis, still represent a significant and historically unique normative ‘moment’ 
for minority nationalism in Catalonia, a moment which has led to the emergence of a number 
of significant critical junctures challenging the norms and rules underpinning Spain’s national 
constitutional order. 
There are two major related ways in which recent years have represented a significant and 
unique period for Catalan minority nationalism. While much of the decades preceding the 
2000s were characterised by broad popular and political acceptance of the practice of autonomy 
in Catalonia (Elias and Mees, 2017), the perceived refusal by the Spanish government of José 
M. Aznar from 2000 onwards to entertain further demands for greater autonomy for Catalonia 
began a slow shift in the CiU’s position from a pro-autonomist party to a pro-independence 
party (Guibernau, 2013; Elias and Mees, 2017). The rejection of a new Catalan Statute of 
Autonomy by the Spanish Constitutional Court in 2010, followed by an upsurge in popular 
support for Catalan independence (which, by most accounts, doubled up to between 45% and 
55% in the years following 2010), convinced the CiU to adopt a clearer, pro-independence 
platform, leading to a split in the CiU along pro-independence lines in 2015  (de Laguérie, 
2014; Nationalia, 2015). 
 As a result of the ideological realignment within Catalan nationalism, the period 
analysed in this thesis represents a unique period in recent Catalan political history, during 
which a succession of critical junctures occurred challenging the very normative basis of 
Spain’s constitutional order. These critical junctures have emerged in two significant ways: 
unilateral actions by minority nationalist parties in government, and an electoral success based 
on policy platforms that appeared incompatible with the normative framework underpinning 
Spain’s Constitution. The first significant critical juncture was driven by the unilateral conduct 
of an unofficial consultative referendum on independence in 2014, which yielded an 80.4% 
result in favour of Catalan independence. This consultation, although unofficial, paved the way 
for the pursuit of independence as the primary electoral goal of Catalan minority nationalist 
parties, united a single pro-independence banner (Junts Pel Si) in the October 2015 Catalan 
parliamentary elections (Junts Pel Sí, 2015k, 2015m; Elias and Mees, 2017). The electoral 
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success of Junts Pel Si, which obtained an overall majority of seats in the Catalan Parliament 
(Vilaweb, 2015), and the subsequent commitment by all components of Junts Pel Si to actively 
pursue Catalan independence as a matter of Catalan government policy, provided another major 
critical juncture, during which the well-established constitutional order of the Spanish state as 
a ‘state of autonomies’ (Keating and Wilson, 2009) came under significant pressure and public 
scrutiny, both in Catalonia and across Spain. The process, which started following the electoral 
victory in 2015, culminated in the 2017 Catalan independence referendum crisis, during which 
minority nationalist parties in government sought to conduct an official independence 
referendum, which yielded over 90% in favour of independence in a context of significant 
tensions and extremely low turnout from anti-independence voters (Russel, Slawson and 
Greenfield, 2017). In an attempt to implement the referendum result, Catalan minority 
nationalists in government published an official declaration of independence, which was 
promptly rejected by the Spanish government and triggered the forceful dissolution of the 
Catalan government and assumption of temporary direct rule by the Spanish central 
government (Badcock and Crisp, 2017). 
 
Despite strong, albeit varying electoral fortunes (Lynch and De Winter, 2008, pp. 595–
603), minority nationalist parties such as the CiU coalition as well as the ERC have played a 
major part in Catalan (and sometimes Spanish) politics for a significant period of time. This, 
in many respects, places Catalan nationalism as the strongest, and perhaps longest-established, 
political and electoral force of the three minority nationalisms analysed in this thesis. However, 
the recent shift in public opinion in support of independence, as well as the convergence of 
both main minority nationalist parties in support of independence still means that despite the 
important position Catalan minority nationalist parties have occupied in regional and 
sometimes national politics in the previous decades, the period analysed in this thesis is a 
unique, historical, critical juncture for Catalan nationalism.  
 
 Aside from differing historical backgrounds, minority nationalist parties in each of the 
three territories have also developed different relationships with, and face different responses 
from the national governments under which they operate. In Scotland, the UK government has, 
in recent years, shown a degree of openness towards constitutional change in Scotland, creating 
the devolved Scottish parliament in 1998, allowing an independence referendum in 2014 and 
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proposing further devolution in the aftermath of the independence referendum (Scottish 
National Party, 2015k, 2015f). This openness, although often combined with a degree of 
hostility and opposition to the proposals and policy stances of the SNP, has enabled to SNP to 
actively push for significant political changes in Scotland, drawing upon the legitimacy 
afforded by electoral success in both UK-wide and Scottish elections.  
 Relations between minority nationalists and central government in Catalonia and 
Corsica however can broadly be characterised as hostile. Although Catalonia does indeed enjoy 
significant devolution through the Catalan Generalitat, the rejection of a new statute for 
Catalonia voted by the Catalan parliament by the Spanish Constitutional Tribunal in 2010 is 
broadly attributed to triggering a new wave of pro-independence support in Catalonia. This 
phenomenon was then further enhanced by the refusal of the Spanish government to hold and 
independence referendum, making the respect of democracy a key policy point and argument 
for minority nationalists going into the September 2015 Catalan parliamentary elections 
(Convergents - CDC, 2015f; Esquerra Republicana, 2015c, 2015j). The continued invalidation 
of several laws passed by the Catalan government, as well as indictments for ‘insubordination’ 
against several high profile Catalan elected officials, have continued to mar relations between 
the Spanish government and minority nationalists while crippling their ability to act in 
government (Ara.cat, 2016). 
 
Relations between Corsican minority nationalists and the French government are 
similarly strained. Many of the core demands put forward by minority nationalists in recent 
years, such as making Corsican a co-official language in Corsica, creating a new fiscal status 
for the island or passing an amnesty law for FLNC militants imprisoned in France, have been 
firmly rejected by the French government (AFP, 2013) 
Despite recent negotiations following the nationalist victory in the December 2015 
elections, early optimism has been replaced by frustration and a growing sense of pessimism, 
even among leading minority nationalist representatives (Corse net Infos, 2016). Although 
several changes have been secured by minority nationalists, including the creation of a single-
tier regional government for Corsica in 2018(Corse Matin, 2016), many of the changes that 
have been accepted are deemed to fall far short of expectations. 
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Although, as detailed above, all three minority nationalist movements studied here have 
had different historical trajectories and face different domestic constraints on their political 
action rooted in different institutional frameworks and different levels of central government 
indifference or hostility, the period analysed here represents a key period for minority 
nationalist parties in Corsica, Catalonia and Scotland. The period analysed here is a period of 
unprecedented opportunity for minority nationalist movements to promote and to attempt to 
pursue aims and goals rooted in self-determination, even though these goals can take and have 
taken different forms depending on the institutional and historical context the parties operate 
in. 
One of the main driving factors behind this unprecedented period of opportunity, and 
behind the unprecedented salience minority nationalist party issues and demands gained in 
public debate, is a series of significant electoral successes that was interpreted by minority 
nationalist parties, in large part, as a legitimising factor. While the driving factors behind these 
electoral successes are various (and many will be explored in the fourth chapter of this thesis), 
the legitimacy granted by the electoral process and the democratic support expressed by a 
majority of the voting population within the territories these parties claim to represent has given 
minority nationalist parties unprecedented confidence in the pursuit of self-determination, and 
unprecedented exposure through which these ideas could be communicated to the wider public 
and form part of the ‘legitimate’ political agenda within their respective states. Beyond this, 
the institutional legitimacy that results from minority nationalist party rule in regional 
institutions, coupled with the democratic legitimacy mentioned above, enabled minority 
nationalist parties to pursue their goals increasingly forcefully and, in some cases, unilaterally, 
as in the case of the Catalan independence referendum in 2017. This attempt by minority 
nationalist parties to create ‘critical junctures’, through which established constitutional orders 
and even understandings of identity are challenged and replaced, is one of the defining 
characteristics of all three minority nationalist movements in Catalonia, Corsica and Scotland 
in that period. Very few, if any, other minority nationalist movements in Europe were in a 
similar position during the period analysed, and the simultaneous nature of these challenges 
across the three cases analysed here provided a useful comparative perspective for the analysis 
conducted in this thesis. 
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Catalonia, Corsica and Scotland are all strong cases to help develop our theoretical 
framework. All three territories provide us with a fruitful political context, in which minority 
nationalist parties are, through their electoral successes and their position as major political 
actors within their given territory, able to act on their demands and their aspirations. 
Understanding how minority nationalist parties adapt to setbacks and successes, and how these 
affect their strategy and their rhetoric over time, is essential to provide a theoretical framework 
that allows for dynamic analysis, as opposed to providing a snapshot of minority nationalist 
party actions at any given point in time. The differences in political and historical context 
highlighted above allow us to isolate, in greater detail, the importance of self-determination as 
the central motivation behind minority nationalist party action and rhetoric regardless of 
domestic context, and how the historical and political context faced by each party affects the 
ways in which this central motivation is expressed and used. 
 
To analyse all three cases, the decision was made in this thesis to develop a thematic 
analysis, as opposed to providing three, distinct chapters containing a comprehensive analysis 
of each of the three cases separately. One of the primary reasons was the cross-cutting nature 
of most, if not all, of the research questions detailed above. Although substantive empirical 
contributions to each of the three cases are an important outcome of this study, the three cases 
were primarily seen as the best cases to analyse broader questions that go beyond individual 
cases. Whether it is the centrality of self-determination (chapter 3), the pursuit of legitimacy 
and change through democratic processes (chapter 4) or the existence of the European political 
arena as an additional avenue for the pursuit of change for minority nationalist parties (chapter 
5), all three cases contribute significantly to the answers this thesis provides. A thematic 
approach, focusing on self-determination, democracy and Europe was seen as the best way to 
draw from these cases to support the empirical and theoretical analysis conducted to provide 
answers to the research questions highlighted above. The thesis structure, which reflects the 
thematic nature of the analysis, is what we turn our attention to now. 
 
Thesis structure 
 The first chapter of this thesis focuses on the development of the theoretical framework 
used to analyse the rhetoric, actions and strategy of minority nationalist parties. Drawing upon 
the social theory behind several bodies of ‘constructivist’ literature, the framework draws upon 
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notions of constructivist mutual constitution, agency, rules and norm diffusion to explain the 
complex context within which these parties operate, and the ways in which they interact with 
that context. Path dependence, a concept drawn from historical institutionalism, is also drawn 
upon to provide a counterpart to the slow, progressive change described by several 
constructivist academics. At critical junctures, entrenched norms are often suddenly thrown 
into question, leading to the emergence and potential adoption of previously ‘unthinkable’ 
norms and principles in response to a crisis or a new development. 
The second chapter focuses on methodology. In this chapter, the data collection process 
through which most of the empirical data for this thesis was gathered is described in detail, as 
well as the rationale behind case selection and how this affected the data collection process.  
The following two chapters, chapters three and four, focus on what is described above as 
the fundamental motivation of minority nationalist parties: self-determination. The third 
chapter focuses primarily on definitions of self-determination, and how these drive every aspect 
of minority nationalist party action and rhetoric. Identifying three major types of grievances 
displayed by parties in Catalonia, Scotland and Corsica, the chapter serves as the first 
application of the theoretical framework developed in the first chapter. While parties adopt 
very different kinds of demands and grievances, all these demands are rooted in the pursuit of 
‘peopleness’, or recognition as a distinct ‘people’, a pre-requisite of self-determination as a 
right. The variations observed between cases, and the relation these variations have with the 
differing political context faced by respective political parties, highlight the impact the 
normative political environment can have on minority nationalist actions. 
As described above, not only are minority nationalist parties impacted by their 
environment, they are also able to change their normative environment through their actions. 
Chapter four analyses the importance of democracy as a legitimising process for all minority 
nationalist parties, and the ways in which these parties assess democracy as the primary 
pathway for normative change in their favour. The chapter discusses limitations with that 
assessment and highlights the various ways in which it has impacted on the relationship 
between minority nationalist parties in government and their respective central governments. 
Chapter five analyses an additional dimension that is of particular interest to minority 
nationalist parties: Europe. The chapter provides an overview of European-level institutions, 
and the various ways in which these parties have sought to take advantage of these institutions 
to challenge their respective central governments. The chapter assesses the extent to which 
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these attempts have been successful and discusses the relative importance of Europe as an 
additional source of political legitimacy for minority nationalists. 
    
Edward Walker – School of Government and International Affairs, Durham University 
28 | P a g e  
 
1. Constructivism: agency, rules, structure, mutual 
constitution. 
As with most political actors, minority nationalist parties operate in a complex 
environment characterised by the presence of a multitude of relevant actors, institutions, laws 
and conventions. To understand how these actors, institutions, conventions and laws interact 
which each other and how they affect (and are affected) by the actions and rhetoric of minority 
nationalist parties, I draw heavily on the ‘social theory’ (Barnett, 2014) of constructivism, 
building upon the various in which this social theory is expressed in different fields of 
constructivist thought.  
Before detailing the various conceptual tools I draw from constructivism for the 
purpose of this study, it is important to understand what exactly is understood as 
‘constructivism’ in this thesis and how, if at all, it relates to the various approaches labelled as 
‘constructivism’ that have emerged in a wide range of disciplines and areas of study. 
Constructivism as a theory used to analyse political phenomena is sometimes divided into two 
distinct forms of theory: first-order theories, which are described as theories that develop 
hypotheses about specific agents within specific structures, and second-order theories that 
underpin first-order theories by providing the conceptual tools, the ontological assumptions 
and the social theory to analyse agents and structures in the first place (Wendt, 1999). This 
chapter, and therefore this thesis, draws primarily from the latter to create a conceptual toolkit 
through which minority nationalist parties can be analysed. While much, if not all, of the 
literature drawn upon here does relate to first order theories in a variety of fields (most notably 
international relations), the contribution these theorists have made to their respective field of 
study is less relevant than the social theory, the second-order theory, upon which their ‘first 
order’ contributions were made.  
 Constructivism, with its focus on actions (Onuf, 1989, p. 36) and on the importance of 
the ‘social’ dimension of politics, provides the right tools to analyse whether minority 
nationalist party behaviour is rule-driven, and whether the rules that dictate political activity 
within the context of Western Europe (both within states and at a European level) affect the 
ways in which minority nationalist parties present, and pursue their aims. However, this is not 
a one-way process – with its emphasis on mutual constitution of structure and agency, 
constructivism enables us to analyse not only how current rules are influenced by the actions 
of minority nationalist parties, but also how long-standing rules and institutions can be 
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changed. To supplement constructivism, in the final section of this chapter, I also bring in two 
concepts from historical institutionalism, namely path dependence and critical junctures, to 
explain both the durability of established rules and institutions but also how minority nationalist 
parties can, through sudden, spectacular successes or thanks to external shocks, trigger periods 
of uncertainty and debate that can challenge even the most established rules and institutions 
that regulate the politics of western European states. 
 Drawing on such a framework is, as we have established in the introduction of this 
thesis, essential to understanding the potential motivations underpinning minority nationalist 
party demands and actions. Many of the fundamental demands put forward by minority 
nationalist parties in all three of the territories analysed here (and in many other cases) directly 
challenge sometimes firmly established constitutional, political, societal and international 
rules. Whether through a demand for independence or political autonomy, language 
recognition, and even in debates surrounding future membership of international organisations 
post-independence, minority nationalist parties frequently have to undermine and challenge 
constitutions, laws, and some well-established rules in the domestic and international spheres 
within which they operate to legitimate their proposals and ideas. This legitimation, in the 
democratic societies analysed here, is essential for minority nationalist parties to accede to 
positions of power through which they can attempt to implement the ideas they put forward.  
 The creation of an analytical framework, drawing upon conceptual tools rooted in 
broader bodies of study, in line with much of the emerging practice in pre-existing literature 
on minority nationalist parties.  There have been several attempts throughout the literature to 
draw upon empirical data to develop mid-level theories that are applicable to a broader range 
of cases. Elias, for instance, analyses the party ideology of the Bloco Nacionalista Gallego 
(BNG) and Plaid Cymru to suggest that nationalist parties develop policy platforms that move 
beyond strict territorial goals, an idea that is echoed in my own description of the variety of 
grievances that minority nationalist parties can put forward at any given time (Elias, 2009).  In 
a similar study, Elias and Mees analyse the differing territorial goals put forward by Basque 
and Catalan minority nationalists, highlighting the central importance of the economic, 
political, constitutional and ideological constraints in shaping different territorial responses to 
similar problems across different minority nationalist parties (Elias and Mees, 2017). Other 
studies however, drawing from a broad body of work on party competition, have focused on 
developing, and subsequently testing, more extensive analytical frameworks in the form of 
conceptual toolboxes that enable us to analyse, and understand, minority nationalist party 
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behaviour more broadly. One of the most recent examples of this is the analytical framework 
developed by Elias, Szöcsik and Zuber (2015), which draws upon literature on party 
competition to theorise that minority nationalist parties, simultaneously operating on an 
economic and a territorial dimension, have various strategic options available to them including 
changes in their policy positioning, emphasising one dimension over the other, framing issues 
in terms of a given dimension, issue blurring and issue subsuming. Another attempt to create 
an analytical framework to understand an aspect of minority nationalist parties is the 
framework created by Elias and Tronconi to understand the impact of government exercise on 
minority nationalist parties (2011). The attempt presented in this thesis, rather than being 
specifically focused on building empirical knowledge or testing a pre-existing analytical 
framework, draws from a previously underutilised body of literature (constructivism and norm 
diffusion) to provide an alternative interpretive framework for the rhetoric, and actions of 
minority nationalist parties. Far from being a refutation of existing analytical frameworks, this 
framework seeks to provide an alternative analytical lens for the study of minority nationalist 
parties not fundamentally as political parties, but primarily as norm entrepreneurs and agents 
within an ongoing process of norm contestation and diffusion. While these two categorisations 
are in no way incompatible, analysing minority nationalist parties are norm entrepreneurs 
allows us to understand the normative impact of minority nationalist parties beyond strict 
electoral success, which is understood here as a means to an end, and beyond direct policy 
making. In other words, understanding minority nationalist parties as norm entrepreneurs 
allows us to see that parties as agents can succeed in norm diffusion while also, paradoxically, 
failing as office-seeking and election-winning political parties, something that can clearly be 
seen in Hepburn’s analysis of the ‘failure’ of the Partito Sardo d’Azione in Sardinia (Hepburn, 
2009a).  
Although as we will see throughout the thesis, many of the empirical findings presented 
here correspond, in large part, to findings encountered in other analyses, the framework 
presented here does provide some important empirical nuances and provides a strong basis for 
further fruitful research. 
 Throughout this chapter, in addition to the theory, I include multiple brief examples 
drawn from the case studies analysed in this thesis. Rather than seeking to be exhaustive (many 
of the examples will be revisited further on in the thesis), these examples seek to show the 
extent to which this theoretical framework is applicable to an exploration of minority 
nationalist party-political action within the context of present-day western Europe. 
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 In this chapter, I begin by providing an overview of structure and agency, two core 
concepts within constructivism. I then draw upon Nicholas Onuf’s own understanding of 
constructivism to add an intermediate ‘level’ between structure and agency: rules. I then 
continue to analyse the main way in which rules and agency interact, namely mutual 
constitution. I then consider the various ways in which change has been theorised by 
constructivist academics. To supplement this, I introduce conceptual tools from the literature 
on norm diffusion, which I argue can be understood as one of the many expressions of 
constructivist social theory in political analysis. Finally, while much constructivist thought 
emphasises change as a slow, costly, and often difficult process, I draw upon concepts from 
historical institutionalism to explain how, in particular circumstances, processes of change can 
be dramatically accelerated by significant crises that undermine previously well-established 
rules and ideas.  
 
Constructivism: agency, rules, structure, mutual constitution. 
 
Agency 
 One of the common threads running through most, if not all, constructivist scholarship 
is the study of the ‘mutual constitution’ of agency and structure (Wendt, 1999, pp. 77–8; Klotz 
and Lynch, 2007, p. 3; Onuf, 2013, p. 6). Before describing, and assessing the idea of ‘mutual 
constitution’, it is important to provide a brief overview of the way agency and structure have 
been conceptualised and understood in constructivist scholarship, before assessing which, if 
any, approach is most suitable to analyse the political activity of minority nationalist parties in 
western Europe. 
Throughout constructivist scholarship, agency has been understood to cover a wide 
range of actors within social contexts. On a basic level, an agent can be an individual – 
however, agency is not restricted to individuals. Nicholas Onuf, for instance, argues that agency 
can be held by institutions, while Alexander Wendt’s Social Theory of International Politics 
relies on the idea that agency is held by states in the international system (Wendt, 1992, 1999; 
Onuf, 2013), similar breadth of agency can be found in the more practical applications of 
constructivism found within European studies. Aalberts, in her discussion on the continued 
relevance of sovereignty within the process of European integration, also grants agency to 
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individual states, while Risse, in his discussion on European identity, grants agency to 
individual citizens within European Union member states (Aalberts, 2005; Risse, 2009). 
 All individuals, however, are not simultaneously agents in all social contexts. 
According to Onuf, rules (a concept to which we will return in much greater detail further on) 
establish who is an active participant within a specific socio-political context (Onuf, 2013, p. 
4). Agency can also be delegated by individuals to institutions or vice-versa(Onuf, 2013, p. 9). 
Zehfuss, in her critique of constructivism as developed by Wendt, argues that Wendt’s 
constructivism takes agents as given, ignoring all the processes in which agents are constituted 
as relevant agents in the first place (Zehfuss, 2006, p. 112). Different social contexts constitute 
different individuals or institutions as agents. 
Two further interrelated assumptions permeate constructivist scholarship with regards 
to agency: rationality, and goal-driven behaviour. Agents are assumed to always pursue their 
aims and are assumed to always act rationally to try and achieve their aims. This, in simple 
terms, means that agents, given a specific understanding of their goals and the context in which 
they must seek to achieve them, will attempt, relying on a cost-benefit analysis, to act in a way 
that helps them achieve those goals. However, this assumption of rationality must not be 
mistaken for an assumption of perfect information: agents do not always secure their preferred 
outcome. Agents act rationally within the parameters of the information they possess about 
their social and material conditions, and the notion of human fallibility is also accounted for to 
explain potentially unwanted, or imperfect, outcomes: parties in this case can misunderstand 
their position and make mistaken decisions (Wendt, 1999, pp. 181–182; Klotz and Lynch, 
2007, p. 45; Onuf, 2013, p. 5). However, in the words of Onuf, human beings acting as agents 
always have ‘goals in mind, even if we are not fully aware of them when we act’ and ‘agents 
do the best they can to achieve their goals with the means that nature and society (together – 
always together) make available to them’ (Onuf, 2013, p. 5).  
 
   Aside from being central to much constructivist scholarship, these assumptions are 
similarly found across much of the literature on minority nationalist parties, whose political 
activity is often assumed to be carried out in pursuit of a set of goals (see Elias, 2008a or 
Sutherland, 2012 for examples of this). Rational, goal-driven behaviour, admittedly grounded 
in imperfect and incomplete understandings of an agent’s social and material circumstances, 
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provides a strong enough basis on which to understand the political activity of minority 
nationalist parties. 
 This assumption of rationality, however, must be qualified. Assuming that political 
actors act rationally in pursuit of a goal does not imply, in any case, that the goals themselves 
are rational or perceived as rational by all. Accusations of irrationality are, to varying degrees, 
frequently part of the discourse put forward by opponents of minority nationalist parties 
(Maddox, 2014; Amaro and Bercetche, 2017). Academics such as Closs Stephens also for 
instance highlight the importance of understanding nationalism as an ‘affective atmosphere’, 
with nationality ‘often – if not mostly – experienced as a feeling’ through varieties of events, 
activities and cultural or linguistic bonds (Closs Stephens, 2016). This is particularly evident 
in the rhetoric of minority nationalists in Corsica, Catalonia and Scotland, for which sport, 
language, music, ‘the land’ and other cultural practices all connect to create a strong feeling of 
‘otherness’ with regards to the culture of the overarching state (France, Spain or the United 
Kingdom), as well as a strong bond between ‘Catalans’, ‘Scots’ or ‘Corsicans’. Politicising this 
feeling of shared distinct nationality, as we will see in the following, is fundamental to 
everything minority nationalist parties seek to achieve. This potential ‘irrationality’ of 
nationalist sentiment however does not preclude a rational approach to the pursuit of minority 
nationalist party goals. For instance, as we will see many times throughout the following 
chapters, minority nationalist political failures (imperfect outcomes) can convincingly be 
understood as ‘rational decisions gone wrong’: rational decisions carried out with incomplete, 
and perhaps with hindsight erroneous, beliefs and understandings about the social 
circumstances within which these parties operate. As we will see, both Catalan and Scottish 
attempts at securing an independence referendum from 2016 onwards are good examples of 
this. 
 
Finally, as we have seen above agency can also be ascribed beyond individuals to 
institutions, groups, bodies of people. In this study, my focus on political parties as ‘single’ 
agents, as opposed to being a collection of distinct individual agents represented by party 
leaders and officials, means that he notion of ‘corporate’ agency (Klotz and Lynch, 2007, p. 
67), a notion compared to the ‘commonplace acceptance’ of corporate personality by 
constructivist author Kratochwil (2006, p. 30) is central to my purpose here. Treating minority 
nationalist parties as unitary entities, as opposed to collections of individuals, allows us to 
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ascribe specific examples of rhetoric and strategy to a single party and therefore a single agent 
– allowing us to avoid an unnecessary analysis of the individual rhetoric and strategic 
preferences of individual party leaders. Aside from practical aspects, very little in my own 
analysis of minority nationalist party rhetoric in Corsica, Catalonia and Scotland warranted the 
establishment of a clear distinction between individual party leaders as separate, although 
interrelated, agents. The treatment of political parties as single unitary agents is also an 
common, albeit untheorised, practice throughout the literature on minority nationalist parties 
(Lynch, 1996; de Winter and Türsan, 1998; Müller-Rommel, 1998).  
 
This, however, does not mean excluding, or denying the importance of, internal policy 
discussions within political parties or the importance of individual, charismatic leaders or party 
officials in determining the overall positioning of a given political party over time. Instead, this 
study focuses on what is considered to be the ‘second’ stage in a two-stage process: firstly, 
policy ideas emerge from internal debates, or from the efforts of individual leaders within 
parties. Secondly, policies are then adopted as party policy, and political parties then, 
understood as a unitary agent, attempt to implement these policies.  This study focuses 
primarily on the latter stage: what occurs once a policy is adopted by a party, how its legitimacy 
from the perspective of the parties can be understood, and how they use various avenues to try 
and implement that policy within their political environment. This allows us to focus on how 
party actions and rhetoric impact on the broader political environment within which they 
operate, rather than on the exact processes through which a given policy is adopted by the party. 
  
Rules and/or norms? 
Rules are undoubtedly the single, most significant concept in Onuf’s constructivism. 
Onuf defines rules as: ‘statements that tell people what we should do’ (Onuf et al., 2013, p. 4). 
As statements dictating what one ‘should’ do, rules are also often paired with consequences for 
ignoring, or deliberately violating, a given rule: if an agent fails to follow a rule, Onuf argues 
that this agent can ‘expect consequences some other rule will bring into effect when other 
people follow the rule calling for such consequences’(Onuf et al., 2013, p. 4). In other words 
rules, according to Onuf, carry with them consequences for agents that fail to follow them – 
consequences that are then implemented by other agents following a rule that legitimises the 
enforcement of the rule that the first agent failed to follow. Consequences however, are not 
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inherently coercive, and rules do not always result in coercively imposable obligations for 
agents (Onuf, 1989, p. 204). In many cases, consequences for ignoring a given rule can result 
in various degrees of shunning or exclusion, or in the event of interpersonal rules can result in 
mockery or ridicule. 
 Beyond the definition provided by Onuf above, rules play an important role throughout 
Onuf’s constructivist theory. Drawing from Wittgenstein’s own work on the rule-governed 
nature of language, Onuf argues that many social theorists, including himself, have expanded 
this notion and argued that all social activity is rule-governed (Onuf, 1989, p. 49). This gives 
rules a very broad role in Onuf’s own understanding of structure and its relation to agency. 
Rules, first and foremost, establish who is an agent in society in a given context – they give 
agents choices, either on behalf of themselves or on behalf of institutions or other social 
constructions (Onuf et al., 2013, pp. 4–5). In that respect, rules enable and facilitate rational, 
goal-driven behaviour. According to Onuf, agents adhere to rules in the belief that it will help 
them achieve their goals; rules enable agents to act in the world, and make resources available 
for agents’ use in pursuing their goals (Onuf, 2013, pp. 5–8). Beyond this, and perhaps more 
fundamentally, Onuf argues that rules establish which means and ends are legitimate, providing 
a choice to agents in the form of a simple follow or transgress dichotomy. The consequences 
of transgression, as we have seen above, usually clear to the agent in question (Onuf et al., 
2013, pp. 5, 10). 
For Onuf, all rules simultaneously have a constitutive and a regulative effect (Onuf, 
1989, p. 52).  One way to illustrate this would be to briefly take an example from one of the 
cases analysed in this study. If we take, for example, a rule that we can state as ‘targeted 
political violence is a legitimate tool of political activity’. This rule which underpinned much 
of the political violence witnessed in Corsica throughout the latter part of the twentieth century 
(Olivesi, 1998), is seen to have both regulative and constitutive effects. It legitimised very 
specific, targeted political violence as a political activity carried out by sections of the Corsican 
nationalist movement (and prohibited broader mass-casualty violence) (Olivesi, 1998), while 
constituting, for instance, the category of ‘political prisoners’, which is central to the rhetoric 
of Corsican nationalist parties and has enabled, and legitimised, political agency from 
organisations representing the interests of these prisoners and their families (Sulidarità, 2016). 
This brief example shows how a rule can constitute relevant agents, namely violent political 
activists (and, upon arrest, ‘political prisoners’) and the organisations acting on their behalf, 
while regulating the behaviour of these agents to a certain extent. 
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In order to have the influence and the role described above, Onuf argues that all rules 
are rooted in language and must therefore, in principle, be either stated or, if they are not, a 
statement of them must be possible (Onuf, 1989, p. 79). The importance of language in Onuf’s 
characterisation of rules does not end here. Drawing from speech act theory, Onuf establishes 
what he terms an ‘inclusive classificatory scheme for all social rules’ (Onuf, 1989, p. 91). The 
three categories of rules established by Onuf are instruction-rules, directive-rules and 
commitment-rules (Onuf, 1989, p. 87; Onuf et al., 2013, p. 11).  
Firstly, instruction-rules are rooted in assertive speech acts. Onuf defines these as 
statements of belief intended to be accepted (Onuf, 1989, p. 87). The instruction-rule which 
emerges from such a speech act provides agents with information on adequate courses of 
action. Onuf notably includes principles within his category of instruction-rule (Onuf et al., 
2013, p. 11). An example of such a rule could be, for instance, the rule stated above in the 
example regarding political violence in Corsica. ‘Targeted political violence is a legitimate tool 
of political activity’ is an excellent example of a statement of belief intended to be accepted by 
the hearer, providing information on adequate courses of action to agents. 
Secondly, directive-rules are rooted, according to Onuf, in directive speech acts. 
Directive speech acts are defined as statements putting forward, for the attention of the hearer, 
the intention of the speaker with regards to an action the speaker would like to see realised. 
The directive-rules that stem from such speech acts are understood to be clear normative 
statements, often with a clear statement of consequences for transgression (Onuf, 1989, p. 87; 
Onuf et al., 2013, p. 11). In keeping with the examples used above, a good example of a 
directive-rule in the context of this study would be ‘do not engage in political violence’, a clear 
normative statement which prohibits the use of political violence with, if we explicitly state the 
implied ‘… or you will be arrested, prosecuted and imprisoned’, a clear statement of 
consequences for transgression. 
Finally, commitment-rules are rooted in commissive speech acts. These speech acts 
present to the hearer the speaker’s intention of committing himself to an action. Commitment-
rules, therefore, are best described as promises which commit agents to (reciprocated) actions 
towards other agents, something exemplified for instance in the notion of rights and duties 
(Onuf, 1989, p. 87; Onuf et al., 2013, p. 12).  
Again, to continue within the theme developed in previous examples, a commitment-
rule can be inferred directly from the statement by Corsican nationalist paramilitary group 
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Front de Libération Nationale de la Corse (FLNC). In a statement announcing the end of the 
group’s violent campaign, the group stated that it ‘unilaterally began a demilitarisation process 
and a gradual end to the group’s clandestine actions’. (Corsica Infurmazione, 2014). As a result 
of this statement, the group committed to a rule that can be stated as: ‘we commit to ending the 
use of political violence’. Further in the statement, this commitment to ending political violence 
is made with the understanding that this draws a commitment from another agent, in this case 
the French Government, to allow for a political discussion on Corsican nationalist demands.   
As a final comment on rules, it is important to note that all three categories of speech 
acts are understood to interact and reinforce each other in the production of rules. Rules also 
vary in the extent of their formality, and are often linked with each other in both content & 
function – not least when certain rules are established to support and enforce other rules (as 
described at the beginning of this section)(Onuf et al., 2013). These points, although briefly 
described, are an important part of the way in which the concept of rules is understood, and 
then applied, in this thesis. 
 
Onuf’s conceptualisation of rules already provides significant tools for the analysis of 
minority nationalist party activity and rhetoric. However, other bodies of academic literature 
have drawn on very similar ideas to develop further, now widespread, concepts. The most 
important of those is the literature on norm diffusion, which, as we will see, draws on 
constructivism and the concepts explained above to create a mid-level theory on creation, 
diffusion and acceptance of norms across space and time. 
Academics working with the concepts of norms and norm diffusion have applied these 
to a wide range of fields. International relations is one of the fields in which norms, norm 
creation and norm diffusion has been used most widely, notably to understand how 
international norms (such as a prohibition on torture or chemical weapons usage) are created, 
adopted, and sometimes contested by states (the agents of the international system). Examples 
of this work include studies on the Responsibility To Protect (R2P) concept (Acharya, 2013), 
the normative power of ASEAN (Allison-Reumann, 2017) and a very broad literature on the 
normative power of the European Union (to which we will return in more detail below). 
However, international relations is not the only domain in which these concepts have been used 
fruitfully to analyse policy decisions and norms. Studies of domestic politics drawing upon 
norm diffusion have included a study of the different stances adopted by Turkish parties in 
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relation to the issue of EU accession (Baudner, 2012), a study on the impact of policy 
entrepreneurs during the nuclear weapons test ban debate in the United States in the early days 
of the Cold War (Macdonald, 2015) and a study on political participation on university 
campuses (Shulman and Levine, 2012). Norms and norm diffusion have also been called upon 
to analyse lower-level phenomena within individuals and society, analysing the emergence of 
trends, social conventions within societies and among communities (Bicchieri, 2005).  
Unsurprisingly, the different areas in which norms and norm diffusion have been used 
for analysis mean that giving a simple, self-contained definition of norms is a difficult task. 
Bicchieri, for instance, defines norms as ‘a variety of behaviours and accompanying 
expectations’ that only truly exist when a sufficient number of people adopt the norm and 
perceive it as ‘pertaining to a given type of situation’, which leads to varying degrees of 
compliance to the norm (Bicchieri, 2005). More importantly, Bicchieri creates a clear 
distinction between norms and codified rules, while rules are always enforced, informal norms 
need not be (Bicchieri, 2005).  On a more detailed level, Bicchieri describes three kinds of 
norms: descriptive norms, who are often short-lived and require a perception of widespread 
adoption within a relevant social group to encourage actors to adopt them (fashions, fads, trends 
fall under this category). A second type, conventions, emerge when expectations about 
conformity crystallise sufficiently to create a belief among actors that conformity is not only a 
given from other actors but also strongly expected of themselves by other actors. Under this 
category, Bicchieri places norms such as rules of etiquette or signalling systems (Bicchieri, 
2005).  
Finally, the third type of norm introduced by Bicchieri are social norms. While similar 
to conventions in that they entail a strong expectation of conformity on behalf of other actors, 
social norms also include a normative dimension: they ‘prescribe or proscribe behaviour; they 
entail obligations and are supported by normative expectations. Not only do we expect others 
to conform to a social norm; we are also aware that we are expected to conform’ (Bicchieri, 
2005).  
Bicchieri’s understanding of norms as briefly described here appears particularly 
relevant to the analysis of informal norms as applied and perceived by individuals and smaller 
social groups within a given society. However, there are several limitations here for the use of 
this approach in the context of minority nationalist parties. Firstly, it is unlikely that descriptive 
norms and even conventions fundamentally affect the core ideology of a given party – while 
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conventions can strongly shape the way in which parties and their representatives act in a given, 
convention-heavy political environment (such as parliaments), there is little evidence to suspect 
that the fundamental ideology and policy platform of a given party is significantly, if at all, 
shaped by conventions or descriptive norms. 
The notion of expected conformity and the clear distinction between social norms as 
informal norms and codified rules are equally problematic. In the context of this analysis, while 
minority nationalist parties adhere to norms and believe that they and others should behave in 
the way prescribed by the norm, the conflictual nature of the politics they frequently engage in 
means that often, there is no expectation of conformity on behalf of other relevant agents within 
the political sphere. While the vocabulary of expectation can be used to delegitimise the 
position of political opponents, this is frequently paired up with a clear expectation of non-
conformity from other agents. An example of this is the notion of political involvement of 
governing minority nationalist parties in a negotiated process with the central government. 
While no codified rule exists in France or the United Kingdom for the involvement of sub-
national governments in major decisions such as the UK’s post European Union membership 
relationship or on the regional status of Corsica, minority nationalist parties in government 
have frequently formulated a normative position according to which they ought to be 
participating in discussions with the central government and be a part of the decision-making 
process as equal partners. While the notion of expectation is used in discourse to delegitimise 
central government opposition to such a norm, this does not mean that minority nationalist 
parties expect central government to agree – in most cases, the contrary is true.  
However, rather than flaws in Bicchieri’s approach to norms, the difficulties can be 
understood as a ‘fit’ problem between Bicchieri’s object of study and mine. Within a given 
society, where frequently groups of individuals often adhere and sometimes congregate around 
the same norms (sub-cultures are a strong example of this), the approach to norms described 
by Bicchieri applies well. While there might not be an expectation of conformity across all 
individuals in society, at the very least within the social group that has adopted a given norm 
such an expectation can exist. However, problems arise when a single individual adopts a norm 
– in this case, no such expectation of conformity is possible. In our case, because we understand 
a political party to be a single agent, parties can find themselves in a far more conflictual and 
isolated normative environment than an individual within a social group. 
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Similarly, established norms as defined by Bicchieri frequently do not regularly appear 
in the discourse of political parties. Political parties, by virtue of their pursuit of change (to 
varying degrees), often emphasise non-established norms in their political discourse. As we 
will see in the case of language, issues on which there is an almost complete normative 
consensus often fade into a secondary position within minority nationalist party rhetoric, while 
conflictual issues often find themselves at the forefront.  
The study of norms and norm diffusion within the international system can provide a 
different perspective on norms as applied to ‘collective’ agents such as states. In a seminal 
article from 1998, Finnemore and Sikkink set out many of the fundamental building blocks for 
a norm-driven research agenda in international relations. Finnemore and Sikkink identify three 
types of norms as described in the norm diffusion academic literature: regulative norms, that 
constrain behaviour, constitutive norms, that establish new actors or interests, and prescriptive 
norms that establish what is considered as ‘appropriate’ behaviour (Finnemore and Sikkink, 
1998). While, broadly, regulative norms are similar to those described by Bicchieri, it is the 
addition of constitutive and prescriptive norms that is of particular interest for this thesis. Both 
echo many of the characteristics attributed to rules by Nicholas Onuf, where rules establish 
what an agent ought to do, prescriptive norms fulfil a similar role; where rules can establish 
who is a relevant agent – and, through the process of mutual constitution, help shape what 
interests and what identity a given agent will adopt. Constitutive norms again fulfil a similar 
role. Both constitutive and prescriptive norms are central to the contestation between minority 
nationalist parties and other relevant political agents: as we will see across this thesis, 
fundamental disagreements often focus on what minority nationalist parties in government 
represent (constitutive question) and what legitimate behaviours and decision stem from this 
(prescriptive question). 
Both the similarities between Onuf’s approach to rules, and the characteristics of norms 
as defined in parts of the norm diffusion literature, as well as the clear dichotomy that arises in 
that literature between informal norms and codified rules require to address an important 
question before proceeding: are norms and rules the same? 
 
Are norms and rules the same?  
With both literatures using different terminologies to describe the ‘things’ that regulate 
or shape social life, the extent to which the concept of ‘rules’ and ‘norms’ differ will affect our 
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ability to combine the insights from both rules-centred constructivism and norm diffusion into 
a single explanatory framework shedding light upon what regulates behaviour or actions and 
how these regulations both constrain, and are shaped by, an agent’s actions (establishing mutual 
constitution between agents and the rules or norms that shape their behaviour). 
As we have seen above, different studies address different types of norms, from the 
almost inter-personal behavioural norms discussed by Bicchieri (Bicchieri, 2005) to the 
international, global norms analysed by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998). However, regardless 
of the ‘level’ at which these norms are identified and operate, and despite a great analytical 
variety and complexity in the different ways in which norms are perceived to impact human 
behaviour, in most cases norms as understood in the norm diffusion literature can be understood 
exactly in the same terms as Onuf’s definition of rules: statements about what one should do 
(Onuf, 1989). However, in many cases, the ‘rules’ terminology is frequently used to describe 
a very explicit kind of legal rule, as set out in laws, constitutions, treaties. 
While the difference between ‘norms’ and ‘rules’ appears to be semantic rather than 
substantial, in the case of this analysis there is significant value in using both terms in a similar 
way to what is encountered in some of the norm diffusion literature. By restricting the use of 
‘rules’ to legal, codified rules as opposed to simple ‘statements about what one should do’, one 
can differentiate the ‘norm’, as it exists, grows and is contested within society, and ‘rules’, as 
expressed in legal and constitutional frameworks both domestically and internationally. In 
cases where the societal norm matches the legal rule, this is relatively unproblematic, and at 
best the rule and the norm can be seen as reinforcing each other. An example of this for instance 
would be the use of political violence in Corsica. By describing Corsican political violence as 
simply ‘crime’ and refusing to recognise any kind of political justification for it, the French 
government was able, by drawing on both legal rules prohibiting violent crime and widespread 
societal support for the norm prohibiting violent crime, to discredit the actions of Corsican 
minority nationalists as entirely illegitimate in the eyes of French society, to the extent than the 
‘violent’ stereotype attributed to Corsican nationalists remains far stronger in French national 
political discourse than any discussion of the actual political motivations that arguably led to 
the violence in the first place (see, for instance, the tendency to portray Corsicans as balaclava-
wearing ‘terrorists’ in French satirical drawings (Corse Matin, 2017)). 
 However, it is far more frequent for minority nationalist parties in Corsica, Catalonia 
and Scotland to promote policies and act in areas in which the norm they, in some cases, have 
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successfully established within the political society of their respective territories, clashes with 
legal and constitutional rules established at the central government level. The importance of 
creating a distinction between norms and rules becomes clear when we look at two concrete 
examples: the Scottish independence referendum in 2014, and the Catalan referendum in 2017. 
 The Edinburgh Agreement in 2012, which created the legal basis for the Scottish 
independence referendum in 2014, can be understood as an example of legislation (legal rules) 
being brought in to match a strong societal norm (Page, 2015). The Scottish National Party, 
through its long-standing commitment to the promotion of Scottish independence as a viable 
and legitimate political alternative for Scotland, has continuously attempted to promote and 
establish a norm in Scottish political society which can be stated in these terms: 
‘It is legitimate for Scotland to become an independent country if a 
majority of Scots express a wish for this to happen’.  
Following the success of the SNP in the 2011 Scottish Parliamentary elections having 
stood on a clear pro-independence platform (Scottish National Party, 2011), the SNP argued 
that the above norm had become accepted by a majority of the Scottish electorate. With the 
norm gaining further legitimacy through its apparent majority support within the electorate, the 
British Government began a negotiation process, of which the Edinburgh Agreement was the 
primary output, to provide a legal basis for the expression of that political norm through an 
independence referendum; the assumption being that, if independence is a legitimate option, 
then asking the Scottish electorate about it is equally legitimate. 
 In the case of Catalonia, the gap between societal norms and legal rules is equally 
important in explaining the ongoing crisis and tensions between the Catalan minority 
nationalist government and the Spanish central government. While Catalan minority nationalist 
parties and organisations have successfully established majority support in Catalonia for a 
norm almost identical to the one stated above for Scotland, the Spanish government’s response 
has focused on emphasising the impossibility of independence and independence referendums 
within the legal, constitutional framework of the Spanish state. It argues both that independence 
is fundamentally illegitimate insofar as Spain is a united, indivisible nation, and that an 
independence referendum in a single region of Spain cannot be legitimate for a number of legal 
reasons, including the notion that, with sovereignty resting with the Spanish people as a whole, 
a subsection of that people cannot decide on such a matter (Comella, 2014). 
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 Whether the outcome is conciliatory, or leads to significant tensions and crises, the 
potential for a gap to exist between norms with strong social implantations and legal rules 
warrants the dichotomy between these two terms. While this strays somewhat from Onuf’s own 
understanding of rules, the similarities in the ways norms and rules are understood in academic 
literature allows us to continue drawing upon the concept of ‘rules’ as described by Onuf, albeit 
with the different terminology used in norm diffusion literature. 
 
Structure 
 Although the vocabulary used differs across constructivist authors, all tend to see 
structure in a similar way. Klotz and Lynch, in a heavily discursive approach to constructivism, 
describe ‘dominant meanings’ as being the foundation of structure (Klotz and Lynch, 2007, p. 
7). Alexander Wendt defines structure as being composed of three key elements: material 
conditions, interests and ideas (Wendt, 1999, p. 139). In addition to these three elements, 
Wendt highlights two types, or levels of structure: micro and a macro level. According to 
Wendt, the micro level focuses notably on interaction between agents within a structure, 
explaining the behaviour of individual agents as well as overall outcomes from these 
interactions (Wendt, 1999, pp. 147–150). On the other hand, the macro-level of analysis of 
structure does not seek to explain the behaviour of individual agents but instead focuses on 
overall outcomes that cannot be reduced to the actions of specific agents. To illustrate what he 
means by macro-level structures, Wendt uses the example of the neorealist scholar Waltz, who 
argues that both the balance of power and the functional similarity between states cannot be 
explained by looking at the specific attributes or interactions of agents (Wendt, 1999, pp. 151–
152). 
 According to Wendt, the relationship between these two levels of structure is one of 
supervenience, which he defines in this way: 
It describes a non-causal, non-reductive relationship of ontological dependency of one 
class of facts on another (mental on physical, social on individual, etc.). It comes in 
various forms, but, in each form, one class of facts (macro) is said to “supervene” on 
another class of facts (micro) when sameness with respects to micro-states entails 
sameness with respect to macro-states. (Wendt, 1999, p. 156).  
In other words, if one assumes two structures with identical micro-level elements, one can 
safely say that the macro elements of these two structures will also be identical. Macro-level 
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structure here depends on micro-level structure but cannot be reduced to it (Wendt, 1999, p. 
156). It is important however to note that the definition of supervenience does not imply that 
this relationship functions both ways. To re-use Wendt’s words, he argues that sameness with 
respect to macro-structures does not entail sameness with respect to micro-structures. This 
concept, which he names ‘multiple realizability’, establishes that similar macro-level structures 
can be achieved through different micro-level structural elements (Wendt, 1999, p. 154).  
  This approach, however, is unsatisfactory for our purposes. Wendt’s preference for 
macro-structural focus, rooted in his attempt to create a systemic theory of international 
relations, neglects the micro-level structure. His definitional statement of micro-structure is 
remarkably close to what this project is seeking to explore: the behaviour of individual minority 
nationalist parties and the structural outcomes of these behaviours. However, although Wendt’s 
approach is potentially well suited to an analysis of an international system whose 
characteristics cannot be simply reduced to the actions of actors within it, Onuf’s understanding 
of structure, and his broader constructivism rooted in social theory, provides some of the tools 
needed to lead a fruitful analysis of the behaviour, rhetoric and aims of minority nationalist 
parties in relation not just to the political context in which they operate, but in relation to other 
agents within the same ‘structure’. 
Nicholas Onuf defines structure as being a ‘stable pattern of institutions, rules, and 
unintended consequences’ (Onuf et al., 2013, p. 6). In my attempt to develop a micro-level 
understanding of structure that would help us to understand the context in which minority 
nationalist parties act, a closer analysis of all three of these elements, as well as the ways in 
which they will contribute to the theoretical framework of this project, is warranted. 
 
In addition to rules, described above, the two other elements of structure proposed by 
Onuf, institutions and unintended consequences, are also worthy of a brief overview. Firstly, I 
argue that Onuf’s inclusion of unintended consequences as an element of structure is merely a 
logical consequence of both the (imperfect) rationality assumption inherent to much of 
constructivism and of the core idea of mutual constitution. If indeed, agency and structure are 
‘mutually constituted’ and agents are able to bring about unintended outcomes through 
imperfect understandings of their social and material conditions, it is logical that these 
unintended consequences brought about by agents would proceed to form a part of the structure 
in which agents operate. 
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 Institutions, on the other hand, are also important to both Onuf’s theory and this thesis’ 
theoretical framework. Institutions are defined by Onuf as stable patterns of rules and practices 
suiting agents’ intentions, with ‘practices’ understood as ‘all of the ways in which people deal 
with rules – whether we follow the rules of break them, whether we make the rules, change 
them or get rid of them’ (Onuf et al., 2013, pp. 4–5). Aside from the broad definition provided 
above, Onuf further refines his understanding of institutions, describing them as being formed 
by ‘families of rules and related practices’ (Onuf et al., 2013, p. 13). Rules themselves can be 
institutionalised, limiting their exercise to a few agents tasked with enforcing and implementing 
the rules (Onuf et al., 2013, p. 18). In practical terms, Onuf’s understanding of institutions 
covers a very broad range of possible entities. From what he terms ‘cognitive universals’ such 
as methods of reasoning like deduction and induction to what is more commonly understood 
as institutions such as the institutions of the state (see chapter 3 in Onuf, 1989).  
Although Nicholas Onuf does apply his theory of rules primarily to methods of 
reasoning, or activities, that have shaped and defined human behaviour across all times and 
places, his definition of rules and institutions, and the way in which they are theorised in his 
work, enables us to look not only at what he calls ‘cognitive universals’, but also at rules and 
institutions regulating the behaviour of specific agents in a particular spatiotemporal and 
sociopolitical context. This reasoning is echoed by Klotz and Lynch in their practical guide to 
constructivist research, arguing that although rules and institutions are all part of what is termed 
‘structure’, they can be understood as different levels of analysis and different degrees of 
aggregation (Klotz and Lynch, 2007, p. 25). Although the approach taken by Klotz and Lynch 
does seem to lead to a clearer separation between structure, rules, and institutions as opposed 
to understanding rules and institutions as categories of structure, Onuf’s approach does allow 
for more detailed, small-scale, context specific analyses. 
Two examples can be brought forward here to highlight the impact of rules and 
institutions on the political activities of minority nationalist parties. In both France and Spain, 
constitutional rules, which fundamentally set what is deemed to be possible and legitimate in 
terms of political action within the boundaries of the state, are a significant obstacle to some of 
the core demands put forward by minority nationalist parties in Catalonia and Corsica. In the 
case of Catalan nationalist parties, their demand for independence is rendered unconstitutional 
and therefore ‘illegitimate’ (in terms of what is allowed by the Spanish constitution as a body 
of rules regulating political activity within Spain) by article 2 of the Spanish constitution, that 
sets out the ‘indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation, shared and indivisible homeland of all 
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Spaniards’ (Cortes Generales, 2011). A similar notion is present in the French constitution, 
covering not only political indivisibility but also linguistic indivisibility, with article 2 stating 
‘the language of the Republic is French’ (Assemblée Nationale, 2017). In both cases, 
(constitutional) rules appear to contradict, and therefore render illegitimate, some of the core 
demands of minority nationalist parties, whether that be political independence in Catalonia or 
linguistic recognition in Corsica, for instance. In this case, the constitutional document and its 
rules, the agents tasked with enforcement as well as the ways in which most other national 
parties (and the electorate) understand the importance and centrality of ‘the Constitution’ all 
form part of an ‘institution’ understood in Onuf’s terms against which minority nationalist 
parties find themselves in opposition through their aims and actions. In both Catalonia and 
Corsica, constitutional discussions, reform and interactions with the constitutional courts 
consequently occupy a major place in the rhetoric and political activity of minority nationalist 
parties (Guibernau, 2013; Emmanuelli, 2015). In comparison, the lack of formal, legal, 
institutionalised constitutional rules in the United Kingdom can be seen to have facilitated both 
the holding of the 2014 independence referendum and subsequent attempts at further 
devolution for Scotland. 
 
 The conceptualisation of agency and structure put forward by constructivism, notably 
that of Nicholas Onuf, provides a clear and fruitful theoretical framework to analyse both the 
activity and the interconnectedness of minority nationalist parties in Western Europe. However, 
constructivism cannot be fully understood, and its potential fully appreciated, without an 
understanding of the key concept at the heart of most, if not all constructivist thought: that of 
‘mutual constitution’. 
 
The concept of ‘mutual constitution’. 
Although there are few succinct definitions, an overview of the way in which different 
constructivists understand the effects of mutual constitution provides a good starting point to 
understand the importance of the concept in constructivist thought. A description of what that 
process entails is provided by Risse:  
The social environment in which we find ourselves, defines (constitutes) who we are, 
our identities as social beings. “We” are social beings, embedded in various relevant 
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social communities. At the same time, human agency creates, reproduces, and changes 
culture through our daily practices (2009, pp. 145–6).  
Wendt, in his own discussion on the constitutive effects of structure, introduces the dichotomy 
between internalist and externalist philosophies of the mind. This allows us to further 
understand what is meant, in practice, by mutual constitution. According to him, internalist 
philosophies of the mind broadly argue, according to Wendt, that because individuals have 
privileged access to their thoughts, it is those thoughts that matter primarily when trying to 
explain agent actions (Wendt, 1999, p. 173). On the other hand, externalist philosophies of the 
mind argue that the content of some mental states is constituted by factors external to the mind. 
Meanings depend on practices and are communally set, rather than individually held. Applied 
to his primary discipline, Wendt highlights legitimacy in international relations as an example 
of structure impacting agency. According to Wendt, two international systems with the same 
beliefs can follow different courses of action if legitimacy, and what is and is not legitimate, is 
understood (or constituted) differently at the structural level (Wendt, 1999, pp. 176–178). 
Another important illustration of the concept of mutual constitution found in Wendt’s work is 
perhaps the sentence for which Wendt is most known in international relations: ‘anarchy is 
what states make of it’ (Wendt, 1992). In this particular sentence we clearly see the idea that 
anarchy, a structural feature, is constituted by the agents within the system, in this case states.  
 In addition to these considerations on mutual constitution, Wendt’s approach allows us 
to address the issue of causality within constructivist thought. Constructivism, by having 
‘mutual constitution’ of agency and structure as a core concept, enables us to analyse 
constitutive relationships in addition to the causal relationships central to rationalist and 
individualist approaches in mainstream international relations and social science as a whole. 
This contribution is recognised by Wendt, who then proceeds to describe the difference 
between causal and constitutive relationships (1999, pp. 165–178). 
 According to Wendt, for a causal relationship between structure and agency to be 
possible, the two must be conceptually independent, something which Wendt later describes as 
a relationship of co-determination (Wendt, 1999, p. 180). Constitutive relationships between 
agency and structure are described by Wendt as being based on meanings, perceptions that 
make certain actors possible. Wendt uses the example of ‘doctor’ and argues that the meanings 
underpinning the categorisation of ‘doctor’ define what agents are when they ‘are doctors’. In 
other words, the meanings that underpin ‘doctor’ as a social category do not cause the existence 
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of ‘doctors’, but make it possible instead (Wendt, 1999). Wendt and other constructivist 
scholars often summarise the difference between causal and constitutive relationships as a 
difference in the type of questions asked: a causal analysis answers the question “how?” 
whereas a constitutive analysis focuses on “how-possible?” and “what?” questions (Wendt, 
1999, pp. 77–8). It seems however, drawing from the ‘doctor’ example, that constitutive 
relationships violate the requirement of conceptual and logical independence central to 
causality. 
In the course of his analysis, Wendt does indeed highlight that the conceptual 
independence required for causal relationships inherently prevents the possibility of 
constitutive relationships, which backs the argument that constitutive and causal relationships 
between agency and structure cannot overlap or co-exist (Wendt, 1999, p. 169). Wendt 
however, develops a different position which allows for both causal and constitutive 
relationships between agency and structure to co-exist. To do this, Wendt introduces the 
concepts of ‘individuality’ and ‘terms of individuality’ described above, arguing that without 
a self-constituting individuality: ‘culture would have no raw material to exert its constitutive 
effects upon, nor could agents resist those effects’ (Wendt, 1999, p. 182). 
As a solution to this issue, Wendt introduces the concepts of ‘individuality’ and ‘terms 
of individuality’. Building upon the assumption of rationality highlighted above, Wendt 
borrows a split in agency introduced by the philosopher George Herbert Mead. Mead splits 
agency into two categories: individuality and the terms of individuality (Wendt, 1999, pp. 181–
2; Kratochwil, 2006, p. 31). Wendt defines ‘individuality’ in this way: 
[…] The former refers to those properties of an agent’s constitution that are self-
organizing and thus not intrinsically dependent on a social context. Some of these 
properties are material […] Others are cognitive: agents exist partly in virtue of their 
own thoughts, which they can continue to have even if they are marooned on a desert 
island. (Wendt, 1999, p. 181)  
He then defines the ‘terms of individuality’ as: 
[…] those properties of an agent’s constitution that are intrinsically dependent on 
culture, on the generalized Other. (Wendt, 1999, p. 182)  
In other words, ‘individuality’ can be understood to be the elements of an agent that are 
not the product of his or her social context, notably his ability to think and act rationally. The 
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‘terms of individuality’, on the other hand, are all the socially constructed meanings, 
understandings and self-perceptions within which the individual’s ability to think and act 
rationally operates. 
 The distinction between individuality and the terms of individuality in Wendt’s 
approach allows him to argue that causal and constitutive relationships can and do overlap and 
co-exist. ‘Individuality’ represents the elements within agency which are not subject to a 
relationship of mutual constitution with structure – in other words, ‘individuality’ is the part of 
agents which is indeed conceptually independent from structure. The ‘terms of individuality’ 
on the other hand, are what develops from the process of mutual constitution with social 
structures – it is the aspect of agency which is not independent from structure. By separating 
these two elements of agency, Wendt allows for both causal and constitutive relationships 
between structure and agency to exist. 
 Nicholas Onuf, on the other hand, adopts a slightly different position with slightly 
different implications. Describing the process of mutual constitution as a ‘continuous, two-way 
process’ through which ‘constructivism holds that people make society, and society makes 
people.’ (Onuf et al., 2013, p. 4), Onuf rejects any distinction between the material and the 
social world, arguing that such a distinction is not required to recognise the existence of an 
independent, natural reality of individuals as ‘materially situated biological beings’. According 
to Onuf, people and society construct each other, but not ‘wholly out of mind’ (Onuf, 1989, p. 
40). Although this seems to reject the ‘cognitive’ aspects of individuality put forward by Wendt 
above, Onuf does, slightly later in his book, include the notion of ‘inner nature’: ‘society 
constructs human beings out of the raw materials of nature, whether inner nature, or, less 
problematically, the outer nature of their material circumstances.’ (Onuf, 1989, p. 46). 
 Although it is important to recognise these distinctions within constructivist thought, 
the theoretical framework which I am building to analyse minority nationalist party activity 
and rhetoric does not require me to address the question of ‘individuality’ or ‘raw materials’. 
An analysis of the impact of agency (parties) and structure (rules, institutions, unintended 
consequences) on each other would seem sufficient. In addition to this, as Onuf recognises, 
although it is possible to provide interpretations of the ways in which rules, institutions affect 
and are affected by agency, it is considerably more problematic to analyse, empirically, the 
individuality or the inner nature of political parties and of the people representing them. Even 
if such a task were possible, it is unclear whether it would contribute in any way to the purpose 
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of this study, or whether political parties, which are social constructs bringing together a variety 
of individuals, can in fact have an ‘inner nature’ at all.  
 This, however, does not negate the importance of ‘material circumstances’ when 
considering the capability of a party to act or spread its ideas within a political arena. It is 
commonly accepted that a party’s financial resources, activist numbers, access to media and 
electoral support levels will affect their ability to interact with and challenge rules and 
institutions. The question of material resources is, for instance, crucial to understand the limited 
impact most minority nationalist parties have in their respective countries: most minority 
nationalist parties in Western Europe are very small groups with limited resources, no reliable 
access to traditional media and small activist numbers which in turn limits their ability to spread 
their message and gain support within the local and national electorate.  
 In the case of Scotland, Catalonia and Corsica, the material circumstances also clearly 
affect the way in which minority nationalist parties go about promoting their ideas and how 
they envisage implementing them. The relative geographic, economic and demographic size of 
the territories which these parties seek to represent played a crucial part in their ability to 
promote their ideas and challenge national-level policies and rule. Geography and demography 
are two elements through which a given minority nationalist party’s potential influence is 
inevitably capped: while Catalonia and Scotland have a significant weight either politically, 
economically, geographically and demographically (often a combination of all these factors), 
Corsican parties find their ability to occupy the national-level political agenda limited: with a 
population representing 0.4% of the total French population and four members of parliament 
in the National Assembly (out of 577), Corsican nationalist parties find themselves drawing 
upon ‘material circumstances’ to build their political action and rhetoric (Emmanuelli, 2017; 
France 3 Corse Via Stella, 2017). 
    Whether one looks at the ‘terms of individuality’ or what society constructs in 
human beings out of the ‘raw materials of nature’, neither terminology adequately describes 
what, exactly, is being constituted by structure in agency. Constructivist social theory offers 
two answers to that question: what is being constituted in agency are both identities, and 
interests. 
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Identities and interests 
  An important distinction Wendt makes is the one between agent behaviour and 
agent properties, namely their identities and interests. Although according to him structures 
have effects on both, property effects tend to be deeper because they imply behavioural effects 
too, whilst merely behavioural effects do not necessarily imply property effects. In other words, 
structure can affect behaviour through identity and interests or behaviour alone, but it cannot 
affect identity and interests through behaviour (Wendt, 1999, pp. 26–27). It is therefore 
important to look at how interests and identities are conceptualized as two of the key elements 
of agency upon which the process of mutual constitution with structure has an important effect.  
 A good starting point to analyse the conceptualisation of identity in constructivism is 
to look at the way the concept is discussed and presented in Alexander Wendt’s work. 
According to him, actor identities emerge from their participation in the collective meanings 
which frame and guide their actions (Wendt, 1992). First defining identities as ‘social 
relationships’ (Klotz and Lynch, 2007, p. 65), a similar conceptualization of identity as 
collective or shared meanings emerges when Klotz and Lynch conceptualise identity in the 
context of state sovereignty, arguing that sovereignty as an identity is rooted in self-perception 
and, more importantly, external recognition (2007, p. 67). Wendt however, goes one step 
further and attaches the notion of institution to his conceptualisation of identity, defining 
institutions in a slightly different way to Onuf’s definition. Institutions, for Wendt, are stable 
sets of roles and identities that can be formalised through rules and norms and depend on agent 
participation in collective knowledge (Wendt, 1992). This is the stage at which mutual 
constitution occurs in Wendt’s understanding of identity: agents, participating in the collective 
meanings that are the basis of institutions, develop specific role identities rooted in theories 
which actors collectively hold about themselves and one another (Wendt, 1992). Agents, 
participating in a variety of institutions and holding a variety of understandings of both self and 
Other, will develop several specific identities which will increase or decrease in salience 
depending on the context of agency. Drawing on similar examples used by Wendt (Wendt, 
1992), here is another example that might help clarify this point. An individual’s identities as 
a voter, a professional sportsperson or a neighbour will not be all equally as relevant at all 
times. Depending on which context the agent is acting in, different identities will be salient at 
different times. An individual’s identity as a professional sportsperson or a neighbour is less 
salient than his identity as a voter when he is acting within the context of political or electoral 
institutions. 
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 As with structure and agency, identity within constructivism is subject to change and 
cannot be considered to be a permanently fixed or given variable. Klotz and Lynch highlight a 
number of elements which can lead to identity change, focusing primarily on discursive 
challenges and interpellation (Klotz and Lynch, 2007). Firstly, and more broadly, individuals 
and groups are able to challenge the dichotomies on which established identities are built to 
open up new potential alternative identities.  
 However, according to Klotz and Lynch, identity changes do not always necessarily 
come from individuals’ actions or decisions. Identity can also be imposed by social elites upon 
individuals, through a process they call ‘interpellation’ (Klotz and Lynch, 2007, p. 80). They 
define interpellation as: 
The process through which people accept or adopt an identity articulated by elites. 
Publics are “hailed” into specific identities through the reiteration of characteristics of 
selves and others. People presumably acquiesce to, or actively embrace, representations 
when they recognize themselves in these tropes. Drawing on cultural references and 
common vocabulary, elites try to speak in a language that resonates with their 
audiences. (Klotz and Lynch, 2007, p. 80). 
In this process, leaders promote representations and identities which make certain policies 
possible and acceptable, whilst marginalising alternative conceptions of identity and alternative 
policy agendas. Interpellation, as well as being an explanation for potential identity changes, 
also contributes to an explanation of the strength and resilience of state backed discourses and 
identities, by highlighting the power elites and leaders have over public discourse and how this 
affects both agents’ identities and their ability to bring forward alternative discourses (Klotz 
and Lynch, 2007, p. 81).  
 Both aspects of identity are visible when analysing minority nationalist parties. While, 
for instance, the Scottish National Party has used its position as governing party in Scotland, 
as well as Scotland’s historically-rooted distinctiveness and its newfound institutional strength 
following several stages of devolution since 1997, to establish itself almost as an equal partner 
to the ‘national-level’ United Kingdom government, to be consulted on most major decisions 
affecting Scotland. In contrast, while minority nationalist parties in Catalonia and Corsica also 
claim a similar status, central governments in both France and Spain impose, constitutionally 
and through day-to-day rhetoric, a hierarchical relation between the central government and 
the minority nationalist-led governments at the sub-national level. This central government-led 
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identification of both the Catalan and Corsican authorities as subordinate sub-national bodies 
contributes to the delegitimization of minority nationalist identification within these territories. 
In short, both the identity adopted by minority nationalist parties and the extent to which it is 
accepted, embraced or denied by other relevant political actors are important elements to 
understand minority nationalist party action and rhetoric. 
 
 Interests are the other main way in which mutual constitution manifests itself in agency. 
Different constructivist scholars conceptualise interests in slightly different ways, emphasising 
different aspects of the mutual constitution process and defining interests in ways that highlight 
different points. Alexander Wendt, using a definition by Rosenberg, defines interests as beliefs 
agents have about meeting their needs, needs which are split between identity needs which 
emerge from beliefs and understandings and material needs, which all humans share (Wendt, 
1999, p. 130).  
 Onuf, on the other hand, focusing more on the practical element of interests, defines 
them as recognisable patterns in agents’ goals and resource use, resources made available by 
the rules that frame agents’ action (see above) (Onuf et al., 2013, p. 9). From a practical 
perspective, Onuf and Wendt’s approaches appear to be complementary rather than competing. 
In the same chapter, Onuf argues that one can guess the rules that regulate action by looking at 
agents’ practices (Onuf et al., 2013). The ability to guess rules and the collective 
understandings that underpin them by analysing agent processes means that, through analysing 
stable patterns in agent goals and resource use one can at least guess at the beliefs agents have 
about fulfilling needs. By defining interests with regards to agent practices rather than beliefs 
Onuf provides an easier avenue for empirical research than trying to delve immediately into 
agent beliefs, without undermining the conceptualisation of interests provided by Wendt. 
 Klotz and Lynch focus primarily on opposing the constructivist understanding of 
interests to that found in most mainstream international relations theories. Rather than define 
interest as the pursuit of material resources, they define interests as: ‘the product of constitutive 
processes that lead people, as individuals and members of collectivities, to synthesize a wide 
range of needs and desires’ (Klotz and Lynch, 2007, pp. 103–4). This definition, broader in 
scope, encompasses the variety of needs and desires identified by Wendt, whilst recognising 
the importance of mutual constitution in the development of individual and group interests.  
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Inequality and change 
Understanding the process of mutual constitution of agency and structure is insufficient 
for the purpose of this study. Taken alone, the concept of mutual constitution does create the 
impression of a social world in which all agents in a given context are equally impacted by that 
context and equally able, through their practices, to alter it. Once we are able to understand the 
mechanisms through which minority nationalist parties develop a particular identity and 
interests, it is important to complement this by adding both Onuf’s concept of ‘rule’, to 
conceptualise the ways in which minority nationalist parties might (or might not be) in a 
disadvantageous or subordinate position within the sociopolitical context they operate in, and 
constructivism’s potential for change, which will allow us to explain how, if at all, minority 
nationalist can aspire to, and in practice attempt to, bring about change to the structure in which 
they act. 
 
Rules yield rule  
 One of the characteristics of Onuf’s interpretation of constructivism is its emphasis on 
inequality. This is best understood through the lens of his ‘rules yield rule’ concept. The idea 
is rooted in agents’ responses to rules, using resources. When, for instance, an agent violates a 
rule, other agents can mobilise resources to enforce the rule (often using other rules that 
legitimise this). This ability to use resources in response to rules, according to Onuf, grants 
some agents greater control over the content of rules than others. This is what Onuf describes 
as the ‘condition of rule’ (Onuf et al., 2013, pp. 16–18). A condition of rule, if sufficiently 
institutionalised, can lead to certain agents being recognised as rulers (Onuf et al., 2013, p. 7); 
an example of this for instance can be drawn from our previous considerations over institutions 
and more specifically regarding the importance of constitutional courts in France and Spain – 
as we argued above, the constitutional court, as an agent, exercises the exclusive right over the 
enforcement and interpretation of constitutional rules, placing them in the position of rulers in 
that specific context. 
 The condition of rule extends, according to Onuf, to all types of political society, which 
he understands as being grounded in relations of super- and subordination, or ‘relations 
maintained through rules and obtaining in rule’ (Onuf, 1989, p. 196).  Conditions of rule are 
deemed to be stable, because rulers limit the capacity of the ruled to imagine alternatives that 
could undermine the ruling position of the rulers. The position of the ruled is therefore accepted 
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as being natural (Onuf, 1989, p. 211). The concept of rule, however, is not a monolithic one: 
much like the rules that maintain relations within a political society, rule itself is divided up 
into three main categories: hegemony, hierarchy and heteronomy. Onuf describes hegemony 
as a condition where superordinate actors (or rulers) monopolise meaning, and subordinate 
actors (who are unable to comprehend their position as being subordinate) have no alternative 
but to passively accept this. The second form of rule that Onuf identifies is that of hierarchy, 
which can be broadly understood as a system resting on directive-rules which are coercively 
enforced by the agents at the top of the hierarchy (Onuf, 1989, pp. 211–2). This is most closely 
associated with pyramidal command structures, in which each level of the hierarchy, excluding 
the top and the lowest level, is simultaneously coerced by and coercing other agents into 
engaging in specific types of behaviour or, to re-use some of the terminology developed in the 
previous section, coercively enforces an identity and interests within the hierarchical structure. 
The final type of rule described by Onuf is that of heteronomy, best described as: 
‘the actual situation of people relating available means to particular ends. Nevertheless, 
when people are self-conscious about their individual behaviour, they are inclined to 
see themselves as rational and autonomous’ (Onuf, 1989, p. 213)  
Heteronomy, which Onuf uses to describe the situation of states within the international system, 
is a situation in which commitment-rules regulate, unequally, the material opportunities of 
agents within the system, all while continuing to allow the ruled to sustain an illusion of 
autonomy (Onuf, 1989, p. 219). 
 
 As is common with ideal-types, none of the types of rule identified above neatly fit the 
sort of political structures minority nationalist parties operate in. The inclusions of these 
concepts, however, allows us to recognise that, although minority nationalist parties are agents 
in their own right, they are more often than not subjected to a condition of rule that severely 
restricts what they can legitimately pursue. These conditions of rule in which minority 
nationalist parties find themselves vary depending on the level of analysis and can be 
reasonably expected to combine various aspects of the categories describe above. To provide 
a brief insight, minority nationalist parties can be reasonably seen as agents ‘relating available 
means to particular ends’, yet this is not accompanied by a particularly strong illusion of 
autonomy. Similarly, although the position of minority nationalist parties (especially in 
government) can best be characterised by hierarchy, they are certainly able to imagine 
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alternatives that could undermine the ruling position of the rulers, and they actively seek to 
bind rulers to further, extensive commitment-rules that could potentially lead to a change in 
the position of the rulers (understood as the institutions of central government in our particular 
case).  
 The behaviour of minority nationalist parties, as agents, is influenced by the rules and 
institutions under which they operate. These rules and institutions create a condition of rule, in 
which some agents hold greater control and greater legitimacy to enforce and shape the content 
of rules. However, as constructivism’s idea of mutual constitution shows, agents are not passive 
victims of structure – opening up a potential for change within constructivism and within our 
theoretical framework.  
Change in constructivism 
The possibility of change lies at the heart of Wendt’s constructivist theory of 
international relations and his critique of neorealism. Much of his critique of neorealism, 
whether in his 1992 article Anarchy is what the States make of it or in his later book A Social 
Theory of International Politics is aimed at showing that neorealism’s static understanding of 
anarchy as a self-help system is flawed, and that different self-understandings and interactions 
between agents can lead to change in the international system from a self-help system to one 
characterised by cooperation, for instance (Wendt, 1992). Agents which, as we saw above can 
act and think rationally independent of structure, are able through action to undermine and 
bring about change in the structures they operate in. Using the example of international culture, 
Wendt argues that culture is not static but dependent on agent practices, which can sustain or 
undermine cultures and bring about change (Wendt, 1999, p. 188). 
The possibility of change is also reflected in most of the constructivist research 
methodologies and strategies highlighted by Klotz and Lynch. According to them, one of the 
key debates at the heart of constructivism is not whether structures are immutable or not, but 
whether they are stable or unstable (Klotz and Lynch, 2007, p. 25). Focusing notably on the 
discursive approaches highlighted in the section above, the dominant understandings at the 
heart of structures can be challenged discursively by agents, who are able to provide a basis for 
alternative conceptions which can lead to structural change. The changes brought about by 
competing discursive narratives are highlighted notably by Maja Zehfuss and her study of the 
identity of the Federal Republic of Germany after the Cold War in relation to military 
intervention abroad, which acts as a backdrop to her critique of Wendt’s conception of identity 
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(Zehfuss, 2006). In her example, she highlights how actors, by proposing alternative narratives 
of German history and the normative elements that are drawn from it, helped to create different 
understandings of Germany’s military role in the world and allowed for the development of a 
limited German role in foreign military interventions, something which according to Zehfuss 
was initially unthinkable (Zehfuss, 2006).  
Onuf’s constructivism provides a clear overview of the way in which the process of 
mutual constitution affects structure (understood as rules, institutions and unintended 
consequences) and agency. We have already described quite extensively in the section above 
the impacts of rules and institutions on agency. Rules constitute agents in specific social 
contexts, provide those agents with choices, and establish which means and ends are legitimate 
while establishing which resources agents can rely upon to achieve their goals. Onuf, however, 
also provides a strong overview of the way in which agency can affect structure in this process 
of mutual constitution. With institutions defined as ‘stable patterns of rules and practices’, it is 
logical that agents, through practices, can shape the context within which they operate and 
perhaps change institutional features themselves. As we have seen above, Onuf grants the 
possibility of agents rationally deciding to break rules, leading to the enforcement of the broken 
rules by other agents. However, as an alternative, Onuf also recognises the possibility of agents, 
instead of enforcing rules, using resources to alter rules, a process which he describes as ‘slow’ 
and ‘costly’ (Onuf et al., 2013, p. 17).  
The notion of change being ‘slow’ and ‘costly’ is best understood through the lens of 
the ‘path dependence’ concept, a concept central to the theory of historical institutionalism but 
which has also emerged in constructivist writings to explain the difficulties of securing change. 
The notion of path dependence seeks to explain why certain institutions, certain rules, certain 
meanings are durable and stable across time. This durability is caused by what historical 
institutionalists term ‘positive feedback mechanisms’ and ‘increasing returns’ (Bulmer, 2009, 
pp. 309–310). These two mechanisms institutionalise practices into paths, where only some 
policy choices are conceivable and change both ‘slow’ and ‘costly’ (Klotz and Lynch, 2007, p. 
82). 
Pierson, in his book Politics in Time, provides a very clear overview of the historical 
institutionalist approach to path dependency. Placing the emphasis on sequence and time, 
Pierson highlights four key characteristics of increasing returns: unpredictability, inflexibility, 
nonergodicity and potential path inefficiency (Pierson, 2000, p. 253). Both unpredictability 
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(which describes the large impact of early events in a historical sequence) and nonergodicity 
(accidental, early events in a sequence do not cancel out) point to the crucial role played by 
historical sequencing in the development of institutions. However, inflexibility and potential 
path inefficiency are more relevant factors when describing the difficulty of securing 
institutional change. Nonflexibility describes the idea according to which the longer a historical 
process continues, the harder it is to change it, while potential path inefficiency describes how 
in the long run, institutional choices can turn out to be less effective than potential alternatives 
(Pierson, 2000, p. 253). 
 According to Pierson, there are many other reasons for the emergence of path 
dependence in politics. For instance, he argues that institutions, because they are often 
grounded in law and formally established, are difficult to change. Institutions generate learning, 
expectations. They develop political and social identities and encourage agents to invest in 
skills and networking. Once this initial effort has been achieved by agents, the attractiveness 
of alternative arrangements, with all the adaptive efforts this entails, decreases significantly. In 
other words, the more agents become used to and invested in an institution, the less they will 
be willing to consider change (Pierson, 2000, p. 259). Other relevant factors which are used to 
explain dependency include time horizons, which describe the idea that democratic political 
leaders, due to their short mandates, will be unwilling or unable to implement significant 
changes whose consequences might not be clear until long after their departure from office. 
Political leaders will have a tendency to carry out short-term changes, from which they can 
reap the political benefits while still in office (Pierson, 2000, p. 262). Related to this, Pierson 
also highlights what he describes as ‘the status quo bias of political institutions’, with many 
institutions implementing significant barriers (supermajorities, unanimity) to change (Pierson, 
2000, p. 262). 
 All three of these reasons for the emergence of path dependence have direct relevance 
to the subject matter of this project. The issue of initial costs and adaptation to institutions can 
be seen as one of the reasons why the French government has been reluctant to develop 
systematic, widespread regional language teaching, with all the training and recruiting costs 
this entails (Kranzer, 2015). Both time horizons and the status quo bias of institutions directly 
impact on the stance of both the Spanish and French governments with regards to minority 
nationalist demands for constitutional reform, an issue that minority nationalist parties are well 
aware of in their own discourse (see Femu a Corsica, 2016 for an example of this). Many, if 
not all, of the institutions and rules minority nationalist parties have to contend with in their 
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political activity are subject to path dependence as described by historical institutionalists, 
making change difficult to implement. 
 Although Onuf, and the idea of path dependency, might lead us to think that 
institutional or rule change is inherently slow and costly, it does not necessarily need to be. 
Historical institutionalism provides us with a concept, ‘critical junctures’ to explain moments 
in history where long standing, established institutions and rules are challenged, undermined 
and replaced (Pierson, 2004; Bulmer, 2009, p. 309). Described by Risse and Wiener, critical 
junctures are periods ‘during which long-time stable structures change’, causing ‘significant 
shifts in identity and behaviour’ (Risse and Wiener, 1999, p. 780). With both path dependency 
and critical junctures integrated into this framework, I am now able to account for both the 
slow pace of change in most matters involving minority nationalist parties, as well as the 
potential for single events (electoral results, significant changes in policy) to precipitate 
significant change. 
 A few examples from the cases in this study will highlight this. Many of the events that 
have taken place during the period of this study are, or have the potential to be, critical 
junctures. The cease-fire declared by the FLNC can be understood as a critical juncture, at 
which the long standing, established institution of political violence in Corsica was ended, 
leading to significant changes in behaviour and identity, namely a renewed focus on democratic 
politics and a softening of the traditional radical/moderate dichotomy that characterised 
Corsican nationalist politics until then (Olivesi, 1998; Hepburn and Elias, 2011; Corsica 
Infurmazione, 2015c; U Ribombu Internaziunale, 2015). Similarly, electoral results can be 
understood as critical junctures or at the very least, potential critical junctures. The Scottish 
independence referendum in 2014 challenged the very notion of a United Kingdom, while a 
vote in favour of independence would, according to some observers, have triggered further 
pushes for independence in other territories in Europe (Elias, 2008b, p. 10). In Catalonia, the 
victory of pro-independence parties in the September 2015 Catalan parliamentary elections 
triggered a significant political challenge to the notion of indivisibility of the Spanish nation, 
to the extent that a major national party (Podemos) proposed an independence referendum for 
Catalonia in their manifesto for the June 2016 general elections in Spain (Rubio, 2016). 
Significant political events act as potential critical junctures for minority nationalist parties by 
putting issues onto the national or international agenda and putting sometimes long-standing 
institutions and rules into question. 
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Norm diffusion: norm entrepreneurs, norm life cycle and change. 
 In addition to providing an alternative concept in the form of norms as we saw above, 
the norm diffusion literature contributes significantly to our understanding of normative 
change. While Onuf and Pierson’s contributions allow us to establish that norms or rules are 
indeed prone to change through agent actions and contestation (and that this process is often 
slow and costly), norm diffusion as a concept gives us the required tools to explore in further 
detail how exactly norms can change. 
 A few different definitions of norm diffusion have been proposed in academic literature. 
Among them, Allison-Reumann describes norm diffusion as the ‘transfer of, among others, 
regulatory, cooperative, institutional, and political norms from one actor to another (Allison-
Reumann, 2017). Checkel defines norm diffusion in simpler terms, describing it simply as ‘the 
process of inducing actors into the norms and rules of a given community’ (Checkel, 1999). 
More broadly perhaps, studying norm diffusion allows us to understand in what way a given 
norm can emerge, be adopted by various agents to perhaps become, eventually, a dominant and 
widely accepted norm. As in the case of rules and norms however, most academic literature 
describes norm diffusion not through a single definition, but by setting the different ways in 
which such a process can take place. In their overview of norm diffusion in the context of the 
European Union, Risse and Börzel provide five different ways in which a given norm can 
spread from one agent to another and gain broader acceptance. While not exhaustive, these five 
pathways for norm diffusion form an excellent basis for analysis and, as we will see, are 
relevant in many ways to the processes that occur around minority nationalist party activity. 
These avenues for spread are: coercion, manipulation of utility calculations, socialization, 
persuasion and emulation (Börzel and Risse, 2009). As we will see across the following 
chapters, all five different forms of norm diffusion can take place, often simultaneously, 
between minority nationalist parties and other relevant agents around them. A few short 
examples will be provided here. 
 Coercion and the manipulation of utility calculations are two ways in which norm 
diffusion (or norm enforcement) can take place between minority nationalist parties and central 
governments. Examples of coercion and utility calculation can be found in the cases studied in 
this thesis: in the case of Catalonia, the forceful dissolution of the Catalan government through 
the imposition of article 155 of the Spanish Constitution (Torregrosa, 2017) can be seen 
simultaneously as the enforcement of a constitutional rule by the Spanish central government 
in the face of rule-violating behaviour from the Catalan minority-nationalist-led government, 
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but also as the (re)imposition of norms (for instance Spanish territorial integrity) that had been 
growing weaker and weaker under the normative challenge put forward by minority nationalist 
parties. Utility calculation, can also be seen as part of the explanation as to why all minority 
nationalist parties studied in this thesis are now committed to democratic politics as the most 
effective way of achieving their goals – not only does democratic success provide a significant 
legitimacy boost, but alternatives to democratic politics often come with a significant 
legitimacy penalty within the political contexts in which these parties operate.  
 Emulation and socialization frequently operate together – in Börzel and Risse’s 
understanding, socialization and emulation function in a similar way, but socialization is a more 
overt process while emulation occurs indirectly (Börzel and Risse, 2009). In many respects, 
the decision by Corsican nationalists to end the use of political violence can also be understood 
as socialization – during this process, radical Corsican nationalists adapted their identity, 
adopted new norms of behaviour in order to secure greater normative approval and legitimacy, 
most notably in the eyes of their electorate and, indirectly, from the standpoint of the French 
central government. Similarly, the impact of emulation on the rhetoric of Catalan minority 
nationalist parties is evident, and recognised by senior elected officials. In an interview with 
Catalan Member of the European Parliament Ramón Tremosa i Balcells (Appendix A, 
interview 8), the impact of the Scottish National Party’s own pursuit of independence in 
Scotland was widely acknowledged, and the Scottish National Party’s securing of an 
independence referendum in 2014 was frequently highlighted as an example for Catalan parties 
to follow.  
 Finally, persuasion best characterises the process of norm diffusion from minority 
nationalist parties to the electorate at the national and sub-national level. At this stage, the day-
to-day rhetoric of minority nationalist parties plays an important part in securing further support 
from the electorate – a prerequisite for electoral success and for minority nationalist parties to 
access positions of political power that can be used to further challenge norms and rules held 
at the national level. 
 
 While norms can, and indeed, do, diffuse from one actor to another, how do they 
emerge, and how do they get into a position where diffusion becomes possible? In their work, 
Finnemore and Sikkink describe three major stages of the ‘norm life cycle’, which describes 
the various stages a norm goes through from its emergence to its potential full acceptance by 
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all concerned agents. The three stages are ‘norm emergence’, ‘norm cascade’ and ‘norm 
internalization’ (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). All three stages are useful to understand how 
the basic ideas put forward by minority nationalist parties emerge and spread. 
 In the words of Sikkink and Finnemore, ‘norms do not appear out of thin air; they are 
actively built by agents having strong notions about appropriate or desirable behaviour in their 
community’ (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). These agents, introduced in norm diffusion 
literature as the key agents in the process of ‘norm emergence’, are called ‘norm entrepreneurs’ 
(Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; Macdonald, 2015). Defined by Björkdahl as actors with ‘a 
strong commitment to a particular norm […] willing to advocate this norm and to bring about 
normative change’(Bjorkdahl, 2012), norm entrepreneurs propose new norms, deemed to be 
more desirable or better suited than alternative norms, and attempt to persuade other key agents 
that these norms are preferable.  As we have seen above, this process can take different forms 
depending on which relevant agents are involved: norm diffusion between a norm entrepreneur 
and the state often takes the form of lobbying through non-governmental organisations 
(Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; Macdonald, 2015). Failing this, and most frequently in the case 
of political parties, this process of persuasion often takes place in the context of democratic 
politics, where political parties (and, in some cases, civil society organisations), attempt to 
persuade an electorate that their norms as well as the proposals that stem from these norms 
present a better alternative than those put forward or defended by the central government or 
other competing political parties.  
 In order to successfully impose a norm within a given political environment or context, 
norm entrepreneurs are required to target what Finnemore and Sikkink call, in an international 
relations context, ‘critical states’, that is, critical agents without whom the success and 
widespread adoption of a given norm is compromised (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). In the 
case of minority nationalist parties, there are several, simultaneous potential critical agents that 
parties target in different ways. As we will see in chapter 4 on self-determination, the inferior 
hierarchical position of sub-national territories and authorities in relation to the central 
government places the central government of each respective country as one of the most 
important critical actors for the types of norms minority nationalist parties seek to promote. In 
addition to this, the sub-national electorate (as we will see in chapter 5) and other European-
level actors or neighbouring states, also represent critical agents that are necessary, but not 
sufficient, requirements for the success of the kind of norms that minority nationalist parties 
seek to promote to achieve their goals. 
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 Once a critical mass of critical agents is reached, the second stage, ‘norm cascading’, 
takes place. This is the point at which norm adoption begins to take place without overt pressure 
or action from norm entrepreneurs (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). At this stage, socialization 
and utilitarian calculations lead actors, including secondary or non-critical actors, to adopt a 
given norm. While there are few examples of this occurring in the context of minority 
nationalism, the example of the recognition of minority languages across Europe can, arguably, 
be understood as a norm in the process of cascading – through the establishment of the 
European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages (ECRML) by the Council of Europe, 
most European countries have adopted the norm that a degree of public recognition and 
promotion of native minority languages is desirable, putting significant pressure on countries 
(such as France) who continue to be reluctant to implement the charter’s provisions in national 
law (Locatelli, 2002; Rédaction France Info, 2015). 
 The final stage, ‘norm internalisation’, takes place when a given norm becomes ‘taken 
for granted’ (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998) and no longer the subject of significant challenges 
or debates. This is the case, as we will see in the third chapter on language, for the protection 
and promotion of native minority languages in the United Kingdom – with a broad consensus 
allowing for the recognition, teaching, and public use of languages such as Welsh and Gaelic, 
minority nationalist parties in both cases have tended to not address this issue in any significant 
manner. This contrasts significantly with the crucial place given to language in both Catalonia 
and Corsica, where no such consensus exists. 
  
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have sought to develop a comprehensive constructivist framework to 
understand and analyse why, and how, minority nationalist parties ‘act and speak’ the way they 
do in Catalonia, Corsica and Scotland. By drawing upon fundamental concepts such as mutual 
constitution, rules, agency and structure, we are able to analyse, to what extent, the political 
rules under which minority nationalist parties (as well as every other political actor within the 
same political environment) operate. By building a set of conceptual tools drawn from 
constructivist social theory as expressed in both constructivist international relations and norm 
diffusion, and from historical institutionalism, we have determined that such normative change, 
while possible from a bottom-up perspective, can be difficult and extremely time-consuming 
to achieve. Finally, drawing on norm diffusion, the framework allows us to analyse, in detail, 
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the process behind this time-consuming and difficult process. To challenge and change long-
established norms, minority nationalist parties need to propose convincing alternatives, 
persuade relevant actors (whether directly or indirectly) and establish their alternative 
understandings sufficiently, sometimes to the extent that they take on a ‘taken-for-granted’ 
dimension, although this is unlikely.  
Previous studies in the literature on minority nationalist parties have highlighted the 
fruitfulness of complementing and testing empirical research against conceptual frameworks 
drawn from other, broader, related bodies of literature. Building on that understanding, the 
framework presented here draws upon a previously neglected body of literature, that of 
constructivism and norm diffusion, to present an alternative interpretive framework to 
understand minority nationalist parties as norm entrepreneurs, first and foremost. The 
complexity of the framework, with its multiple layers of concepts draw from different (if 
closely related) academic schools of thought, allows us to account for what is, in practice, a 
highly complex and multi-layered process. Far from reducing minority nationalist party 
rhetoric and strategy to a handful of causal mechanisms, the thesis, with the help of this 
framework, will provide a broad, multi-faceted explanation of the different ways in which 
minority nationalist parties seek to achieve their goals – and the various and sometimes almost 
insurmountable obstacles they encounter along the way.  
 To analyse this however, it is important to adopt methods that allow us to study, in 
detail, the rhetoric of minority nationalist parties – highlighting which issues, which objectives, 
and which principles really drive these parties (and the different ways in which they address 
different challenges and audiences). In the next chapter, I describe these methods, as well as 
some of the fundamental background information required to understand the cases studied here. 
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2. Methodological Considerations 
What principles, if any, characterise minority nationalist parties? How are they impacted 
and how do they affect their normative, legal, constitutional and political environment? 
Through what avenues do they seek to secure change? To answer these questions and the others 
this thesis addresses, drawing upon empirical knowledge that can be analysed using the 
conceptual tools developed in the previous chapter is essential. Onuf argues that rules establish 
what means and ends are legitimate (Little et al., 2013, p. 5). The public communication of 
political parties, a broad term I use to describe everything political parties communicate to the 
public in the format of speeches, media interviews, leaflets, books and many other media, is a 
strong way to analyse not only the aims of these parties, but the ways in which they believe – 
and seek to convince the electorate – that their means and ends are legitimate. Considering the 
role of rules in establishing this legitimacy, as well as the centrality of persuasion in 
establishing an alternative norm and creating a normative challenge, such an analysis is the 
best way to understand the influence of rules on party rhetoric and strategy, and vice-versa.  
While the theoretical framework developed in this thesis draws upon previously 
neglected concepts in the literature on minority nationalist parties, the methodology used in 
this thesis reflects, in large part, methodologies used in the literature. While some studies on 
minority nationalist parties adopt a quantitative methodology (Alonso, Cabeza and Gómez, 
2015; Massetti and Schakel, 2015), many other studies focus on a qualitative study of either a 
small number of cases (Mar‐Molinero, 1994; Elias, 2008b; Hepburn, 2009b; Hepburn and 
Elias, 2011) or single cases (Olivesi, 1998; Guibernau, 2000; Leith and Steven, 2010). 
Similarly, although the reliance on online media is not frequently encountered in the existing 
literature, the analysis of party rhetoric through manifestos, speeches or other discursive 
elements is also a well-established practice within the existing literature on minority nationalist 
parties. While the thesis does not seek to contribute a new approach to the methodology 
underpinning the study of minority nationalist parties, the focus on the analysis of discursive 
elements, albeit collected online, enables the study to rest on a solid methodological basis, 
underpinned by similar practices in pre-existing literature. 
 The first section of this chapter focuses primarily on the concept of triangulation, a core 
research method in qualitative work. Triangulation, in the context of this study, was essential 
to study to what extent any given rhetorical element or policy was central, or peripheral, to a 
party’s core policy platform and values. By finding similar rhetoric and policy statements 
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across a wide range of different sources allows us to convincingly argue in favour of a given 
idea or policy being a fundamental part of the political party’s positioning and aims. After a 
brief description of the reasoning behind the use of multiple methods in this thesis, I then 
describe, in detail, the data collection process – describing which sources were used and the 
‘sampling rationale’ behind the selection of these different sources. This is followed by a 
description and analysis of the interview process, the second part of the data collection process 
undertaken for this research.  
 Finally, I discuss further methodological points regarding case selection, describing 
ways in which the selection of Corsica, Scotland and Catalonia as major case studies was not 
only valid from an empirical perspective (as described in the introduction), but also 
methodologically convenient and fruitful.  
 
The data collection process: social media, interviews, analysis 
In a review of qualitative research, Barusch, Gringeri and George highlight that, in the 
majority of work surveyed, methods such as ‘sampling rationale’ and ‘triangulation’ were used 
(Barusch, Gringeri and George, 2011, p. 12). A closer analysis of the sampling rationale used 
for this project will follow further down in the chapter, with a clear description of the rationale 
behind both the data collection and the case selection processes. The concept of triangulation 
however, although common in qualitative research, requires a little more exploration. 
Triangulation is defined is a variety of ways in the literature, from strict definitions to 
broader, more general approaches. Some academics, such as Oppermann, describe 
triangulation as a process specifically drawing from at least three different methods, and 
specifically drawing from both qualitative and quantitative methods  (Oppermann, 2000).  
  Other academics, such as Arksey and Knight or also Barusch, Gringeri and George, 
define triangulation in a slightly more flexible way, describing it as ‘collecting data from 
multiple sources’ (Barusch, Gringeri and George, 2011, p. 12) or using ‘different techniques to 
explore a single set of research questions’ (Arksey and Knight, 1999, p. 21). Building on this 
wider understanding of triangulation, any research drawing upon multiple techniques, whether 
quantitative, qualitative or mixed, and multiple sources can be interpreted as using triangulation 
as its core methodological idea. 
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Beyond the basic definition, triangulation is also differentiated in many different ways 
in the literature. Denzin defined different types of triangulation: methodological, data, 
investigator and theoretical – all of which can be used individually, or simultaneously if 
necessary (Arksey and Knight, 1999, p. 22). In this particular study, two types of triangulation 
were used: methodological, or the use of various methods to collect data, and data, with a 
variety of data types drawn from different sources (Arksey and Knight, 1999, p. 23).  As we 
will see below, both interviews and textual and audiovisual analysis were used, with a variety 
of data types (texts, interviews, audio recordings, video recordings) drawn from a wide range 
of different sources. In this respect, this study attempted to engage in multiple 
triangulation(Arksey and Knight, 1999, p. 23).  
Although different types of triangulation are used in this study, it is also important to 
highlight exactly what the purpose of triangulation is. Arksey and Knight highlight two key 
purposes for triangulation: completeness and confirmation, purposes which re-emerge 
frequently in the literature2. In this particular study, triangulation is primarily used to provide 
completeness to the data set used in the analysis. As we will see below, it became necessary to 
offset some of the weaknesses of online data collection by using interviews, which provided 
the necessary data to ‘fill in the gaps’ that had emerged in the online data collection. Offsetting 
the weaknesses of a single method by bringing in another is another key characteristic of 
methodological triangulation to feature in this study (Arksey and Knight, 1999, p. 21).  
There are, however, a number of criticisms of triangulation that deserve to be addressed 
before we proceed to a more detailed description of the methodology used in this project. 
Blaikie for instance argued that it is unsatisfactory to combine methods with different 
epistemological and ontological underpinnings – a particular problem for researchers 
combining more positivist quantitative methods with reflectivist qualitative methods (Arksey 
and Knight, 1999).  This however, is not a particular issue in this research, with interviews 
frequently understood to be a core element of qualitative research, and textual analysis forming 
the basis of many interpretivist studies (Zehfuss, 2002).  
 This similarly addresses the critique of Fielding and Fielding, who argue that 
triangulation does not fundamentally bring a researcher closer to objectivity or the truth 
(Arksey and Knight, 1999, p. 23; Oppermann, 2000, p. 144).  While this thesis does seek to 
                                                          
2 Confirmation, notably is frequently referred to as “getting closer to the truth” or “eliminating bias” in other 
academic works.  
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provide an understanding of the reasons that drive minority nationalist parties to adopt similar 
rhetoric and similar strategies across various territories, this project does not claim to produce 
generalizable, objective knowledge – and indeed, alternative interpretations of the rhetoric and 
actions of minority nationalist parties are possible and available (Keating, 2008b). Other 
criticisms address the difficulty and practical problems related to triangulation (Arksey and 
Knight, 1999, p. 23).  Collecting from a variety of data sources, and using different methods 
for this project lead to a number of practical problems, including the availability of data, 
language barriers and interviewee availability. Other aspects of triangulation, such as 
researcher triangulation (using multiple researchers to offset individual biases) were impossible 
to implement within the framework of a doctoral thesis. These practical limitations, however, 
did not prevent me from carrying out the analysis, and as was described the use of multiple 
methods and multiple data sources and types contributed to offset some of these practical 
problems.  
The two major stages of this research project were as follows: a social media data 
collection, and interviews. This combination of methodological and data triangulation, 
combining different methods and a variety of data sources, provided the basis for the analysis 
in this thesis. It is to these two processes that I now turn my attention. 
 
Social media collection 
 The data collection on social media was carried out from June 2015 to June 2016 
inclusive, allowing me to cover a number of significant events within each of the territories 
analysed: the United Kingdom general election in May 2015, the Catalan parliamentary 
elections in September 2015 and the French territorial elections in December 2015 are three 
examples of major events for minority nationalist parties covered by the timeframe used for 
the collection process (BBC News, 2015c; Vilaweb, 2015; Willsher, 2015).  In addition to this 
initial period of data collection, further, shorter periods of data collection became necessary 
when major relevant events occurred. Accordingly, further data was collected in May and June 
2017 to cover the United Kingdom General election as well as the French Parliamentary 
elections, and between October and December 2017 to cover the attempted Catalan 
independence referendum, subsequent crisis and the December 2017 Catalan parliamentary 
elections. 
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Most of the data used to analyse the rhetoric and action of minority nationalist parties 
in Corsica, Catalonia and Scotland was collected from official social media accounts (both 
corporate and personal accounts of leading figures within the parties) and from the online 
editions of major local, regional and national newspapers in the relevant territories. Collecting 
from these two sources allowed me to obtain a wide variety of data, from official speeches, 
media interviews, television appearances to short, targeted, issue specific postings on social 
media. Analysing party activity online also allowed me to gather data aimed at different 
audiences: from short messages targeted at party supporters or other political actors to broader, 
national newspaper appearances targeted at the wider audience of national or regional 
newspapers, radio or television channels. 
Social media data collection was also particularly fruitful for several other reasons. 
First, and perhaps the most practical point, is the low-cost of social media data collection: 
through social media, and assuming the objects of study have a significant presence online, a 
very significant body of data can be acquired with relative ease over prolonged periods of time. 
This differs most notably from interviews, which often only provide only a snapshot of 
empirical evidence, and from more traditional forms of long-term ‘on the ground’ study that 
often require a significant, resource-intensive commitment from the researcher which would 
have been, in the case of this study, impossible to achieve across all three cases equally. 
Social media, with its emphasis on networking and the relative ease through which 
users can relay relevant information from other contributors, was also particularly helpful in 
establishing all of the relevant party-political actors, civil society actors and individual 
politicians within a given minority nationalist movement. While the initial sample of accounts, 
parties, and individuals used in this study was drawn from prior research and academic 
literature, many other sources of information emerged over time as they were relayed, engaged 
with and mentioned by social media accounts in the initial sample. This process, which can be 
described as a form of ‘snowballing’, proved particularly fruitful in the context of a social 
media analysis through which a clear picture of all relevant agents within a given movement 
became very clear early in the study. In addition to providing a more complete picture, this 
process also allowed for a larger selection of relevant data, and to a greater degree in confidence 
in the conclusions drawn from the data. 
In Corsica, my main data sources were social media accounts representing both Femu 
a Corsica and Corsica Libera as well as their leaders (Jean-Guy Talamoni and Gilles Simeoni) 
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and other leading figures such as Jean Christophe Angelini for Femu a Corsica and 
Petr’Antone Tomasi or Massimu Poli for Corsica Libera (Collectivité Territoriale de Corse, 
2016). Party publications were also drawn upon, such as Corsican radical newspaper U 
Ribombu Internaziunale as well as publications representing the moderate branch of Corsican 
nationalism, such as Arriti. In addition to the online content these publications produced, I also 
drew upon any other multimedia content published by the official social media accounts 
associated with these publications, with U Ribombu Internaziunale’s account on video-sharing 
website Dailymotion providing a significant amount of video data encompassing speeches and 
public meetings held by minority nationalist parties and civil society groups. Another 
significant source of data especially with regards to nationalist party activity and rhetoric was 
the nationalist news website Corsica Infurmazione, which primarily reports on all public 
statements, political meetings and media appearances made by Corsican nationalist actors in 
what is termed the ‘mouvement national’ (national movement), encompassing all political and 
social actors associated with Corsican nationalism. 
 In addition to these sources, more ‘traditional’ media sources were also drawn upon, 
including public-owned television channel France 3 and their Corsican regional version 
‘France 3 Corse Via Stella’. Combined with Corsican newspaper Corse Matin and Corsican-
language radio Alta Frequenza, data drawn from these sources allowed me to access and 
analyse how non-party political news sources were addressing the political action and rhetoric 
of nationalist parties in Corsica, and how this was being reported to the wider Corsican 
population. Occasionally, when significant events occurred such as the electoral victory of 
Corsican nationalists in the French territorial elections in December 2015, data was also drawn 
from major national newspapers such as Le Monde, Le Figaro and Libération, allowing me to 
analyse how major events in the political life of Corsica and Corsican nationalist parties were 
presented to a wider, French and international audience. 
 
 A similar selection of sources was used to analyse party rhetoric and actions in 
Catalonia. As with Corsica, official social media accounts of all main minority nationalist 
parties (initially the CiU coalition, then Convergencia Democràtica de Catalunya (CDC), ERC 
and Candidatura d’Unitat Popular (CUP)) were used to gather a wide selection of data ranging 
from short posts to longer press releases, speech transcripts and recorded television, radio or 
public appearances. Catalan parties were by far the most active on social media out of the 
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parties analysed in all three territories, providing a very large quantity of data to analyse their 
rhetoric and action. To provide an example, a wide selection of all social media postings 
including short messages, recordings of television or radio interventions, press releases and 
official commentary posted online by party officials and leaders yielded over six hundred 
individual pieces of data in September 2015, the month of the Catalan parliamentary elections. 
During election campaigns, Catalan parties also produced several television election 
broadcasts, providing further insight into the way they sought to promote their political 
platform to the wider Catalan electorate. 
 A wide range of local and regional media was also used. Catalan minority nationalist 
politicians were frequently invited to various political shows on regional television and radio 
channels (such as TV3 or RAC1), providing an almost day-to-day picture of the way the 
political platform and rhetoric of these parties developed and changed over the period analysed 
and in response to political events. Similarly, minority nationalist parties were also very widely 
covered in regional newspapers and regional news websites, including El Punt Avui, El 
Periodico, La Vanguardia, Vilaweb, Raco Catala. Similarly, Catalan political issues were also 
frequently covered by national Spanish newspapers such as El Mundo and El Pais. The 
widespread availability of both online and print media reporting on Catalan politics allowed 
me to build a very clear picture of all major political events in Catalonia during the time frame 
of this study, balancing views from more sympathetic media outlets and media more hostile to 
the demands and actions of Catalan nationalist parties. 
 
 Finally, in Scotland, the range of sources used was comparatively smaller than the 
sources used for the Catalan and Corsican examples. This is first and foremost because, 
whereas Corsican and Catalan nationalism are both represented by a variety of parties and other 
bodies, Scottish nationalism is, in many ways, embodied by the SNP, despite other parties’ 
support for Scottish independence (the Scottish Greens are a good example of this) (The 
Scottish Greens, 2016). As a result, with regard to gathering data on party policy, rhetoric and 
action, the official social media accounts of both the SNP and its leading members were drawn 
upon, including that of First Minister Nicola Sturgeon, Alex Salmond, a former First Minister 
and influential Member of Parliament  and Angus Robertson, current leader of the SNP group 
in the House of Commons. The activity of both corporate and individual social media accounts 
allowed me to gather a very large quantity of data on the SNP’s rhetoric and policy on a very 
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wide range of issues, highlighting not only the ideological platform of the SNP but equally the 
way in which it seeks to present itself to the Scottish (and British) electorate. 
In addition to this, and similarly to the other two cases, a range of Scottish and British 
media were also used to provide further insight into the way the SNP portrayed itself (and was 
portrayed) to the public. Scottish newspapers such as The Scotsman and the Daily Record 
reported extensively on the SNP throughout the period studied, while televised debates and 
other interviews broadcast for instance on STV provided another opportunity to gather data.  
 
 Drawing from all of these sources, a database of relevant data elements was created, 
including social media posts, videos, traditional media articles and interviews and party press 
releases. The database spanning from June 2015 to June 2016 continuously (with additional 
data collection periods in December 2016, June 2017 and October 2017), included several 
thousands of entries, with particularly high counts for months during which major political 
events occurred in one or more of the three cases analysed. This database, collected using 
qualitative analysis software NVivo, formed the core of the empirical data upon which the 
empirical analysis in following chapters was built. The software, a widespread tool used in 
qualitative studies, provided the best platform to collect, classify and read all of the data 
elements collected for this thesis, providing a flexible way to create a useful folder structure to 
classify various data elements and providing a very useful add-on, NCapture, that enabled the 
direct copy of webpages into the database. 
 
Although the collection of this data provided a significant quantity of material to 
analyse the rhetoric and action of minority nationalist parties, interviews were deemed to a 
useful addition to the overall data collection process. There are a number of reasons why this 
was established: firstly, interviews with key political actors within the parties analysed were 
deemed important to fill any potential gaps in the data collected online – in some cases, certain 
key topics only emerged around specific times, and a further clarification of the stance adopted 
by these parties was required. Secondly, due to the concise nature of most newspaper articles, 
social media postings and media appearances made by political actors in general, interviews 
were considered to be an important opportunity to address key topics in more depth, as a way 
to highlight perhaps some of the subtleties that could have potentially been lost in public 
communication. The interviews conducted for this study, as a whole, provided political actors 
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with significantly more time to expand their thoughts, as opposed for instance to the highly 
restrictive environment of most, if not all, media interviews and public speeches. 
 
The interview process 
 To provide an alternative source of information and discourse from online and media 
appearances, I also conducted several targeted interviews with minority nationalist political 
representatives, the list of which can be found in Appendix A. These interviews, in addition to 
providing a way to verify and validate the discursive trends found online and in traditional 
media, provided me with an opportunity to address topics that were not frequently addressed 
in the general public discourse of minority nationalist movements.  
  
 In designing the interview process for this study, I decided to target political actors who 
were either at the top, or close to the top, of their respective party’s hierarchy. Although this 
proved to be difficult in practice as I will explore below, there were several reasons supporting 
that decision at the time of the interview process design. Party leaders, or party representatives 
holding significant governmental or party positions, were deemed to be the best source to 
gather rhetoric that can be accepted as representative of their political party’s position as a 
whole. In addition to this however, as the purpose of the interview process was to provide an 
alternative source of information and discourse from that gathered from online and media 
appearances, high-level party representatives and party leaders were seen to be the most likely 
candidates to provide additional information and rhetoric that may not already be widely 
available through the party’s public discourse. While the number of interviews conducted in 
this thesis is not sufficient to make a broader claim regarding this, this assumption was broadly 
borne out in the outcome of this thesis’ interview process. Interviews conducted with Corsican 
nationalist leaders Jean-Guy Talamoni and Gilles Simeoni were both highly productive and 
allowed me to address broader issues around the self-determination claims of Corsican 
nationalism and their overall, long-term goals, more deeply than what had been available 
through public discourse. 
 The targeting of high-ranking politicians became, however, problematic in the course 
of the interview process for this study. I faced several major limitations that hindered my ability 
to interview all the political actors I had intended to interview, and in turn this prevented the 
interview process from occupying an equivalent place to the online discourse collection in this 
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thesis. While, as described above, the period of this study was a significant and eventful period 
for minority nationalist parties and politicians throughout all three cases, this in turn created 
difficulties when attempting to secure interviews from leading politicians and elected officials. 
Most notably, the majority of the interviews I attempted to secure with SNP elected officials 
either within the Scottish Government or within the United Kingdom Parliament were rejected, 
with lack of time cited as the most frequent reason behind refusals. Similarly, no interviews 
were conducted with leading Catalan politicians in Catalonia, something that can be primarily 
attributed to a lack of firm responses to my requests and, at a later stage in the study, a lack of 
resources which prevented travel to Catalonia to conduct interviews in-situ.  
 The difficulties encountered in carrying out the interview process led to several changes 
to my approach throughout the study. One of the more practical impacts of these difficulties 
was my decision to consider the interviews to gather supplementary information, as opposed 
to a full-blown and equivalent alternative to the online data collection. As a supplementary 
source, the interviews still enabled me to challenge and confirm, or question, the discourses 
analysed online.  
 Once the difficulties in securing my initial interviews became clear, the second decision 
which was taken was to broaden the spectrum of politicians approached for interviews. This 
led to several fruitful interviews with MEPs (both Alyn Smith MEP and Ramon Tremosa 
MEP), and with other political actors who were still, or were recently, involved in important 
political roles within the nationalist movements analysed here. In addition to this, a few 
additional interview opportunities with political actors unrelated or indirectly related to the 
three cases analysed in this thesis also arose. The interview of Paul Molac, a French Member 
of Parliament for La République en Marche and a prominent regionalist and linguistic activist, 
allowed me to gather further information on the broader political context faced by sub-national 
activists in France, and on the role played by other countries and European institutions in 
legitimising the demands of French sub-national activists from their perspective. Similarly, the 
interview of prominent Occitan political leader, David Grosclaude, provided further depth to 
my understanding of the political context in France. Finally, the interview of Plaid Cymru MEP 
Jill Evans provided interesting additional information on the political environment faced by 
minority nationalist parties in the UK. The interview with Jill Evans also provided interesting 
information on the perception minority nationalist parties have of their relationship with other, 
similar parties across Europe. This point will be explored in more depth in chapter 5. 
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 The changes in the purpose and scope of the interview process above did alleviate some 
of the main concerns that emerged early on in the process. Despite the difficulties highlighted 
above, the requirements of multiple triangulation, as described above, were broadly met. While 
the number of interviews conducted was small, at least two interviews per major case study 
were conducted, providing a limited, but concrete alternative source of data collection to satisfy 
methodological triangulation. The notion of data triangulation, on the other hand, was broadly 
also satisfied, regardless of the small interview pool used for this study: the online data 
collection process provided a significant sample of minority nationalist discourse across 
multiple platforms, multiple media and across several periods of time. For this reason, the 
comparatively small number of interviews used in this thesis was not considered to be a 
crippling factor. All of the discursive trends identified in this thesis are exemplified and 
supported both in the few interviews conducted, and in the several thousands of samples of 
discourse collected for each of the case studies. 
  There is no doubt however, that more interviews, notably leading representatives of the 
minority nationalist parties analysed here could have provided more fruitful information and 
could have strengthened the overall body of empirical evidence upon which this thesis relies. 
The scope of the interview process, as well as the difficulties faced in securing most of the 
expected interviews, are a significant limitation that is fully acknowledged here. 
With regard to interview design, semi-structured interviews were preferred. Designed 
to ‘hear what informants have to say on the topics and areas identified by the researcher’ while 
giving room to ‘improvise questions to clarify or extend answers’ (Arksey and Knight, 1999), 
these semi-structured interviews were deemed to be the best way to address key topics while 
granting the interviewee sufficient flexibility to address other, related topics that I had not 
anticipated or not understood as being central or important to the rhetoric and thought minority 
nationalist party leaders and officials. To carry this out, each interview was approached with a 
pre-prepared list of questions and topics to discuss. However, the interviews remained 
sufficiently flexible to allow me to further explore any points or key topics the interviewees 
put forward in response to my initial questions. In many of the interviews conducted for this 
project, interviewees put forward certain points or certain topics that I did not initially intend 
to cover, providing new and interesting material to analyse.  
 Prior to any interviews, and in accordance with the ethics approval granted by the 
School of Government and International Affairs for these interviews, interviewees were 
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provided with an interview sheet, which summarised my project, indicated the topics I intended 
to cover and provided an overview of the interview process, including information regarding 
recording and data storage and protection. The interview sheet also provided interviewees with 
an opportunity to grant or withhold consent regarding the recording of the interview, and to 
indicate their preference with regards to anonymity and direct use of the interview data in the 
thesis. Each interviewee, shortly before the interview or shortly after, returned the signed form 
indicating both their willingness or not for the interview to be recorded as well as their 
willingness to be directly quoted or not on any of the material gathered during the interviews. 
When the form was returned shortly after, the questions regarding recording and anonymity 
were reiterated at the beginning of the interview, to make sure interviewee preferences were 
considered before the interview was carried out. 
 The interview design was also faced with some additional practical limitations that were 
taken into account. Time constraints, particularly with high-ranking leaders or politicians, 
forced me to design interviews in a modular way – key question formed the basis of the 
interview, but were supplemented by secondary questions expanding on each topic. Depending 
on the time allocated for my interviews and on the responses of the interviewees, this modular 
design allowed me to either skip through certain questions to make sure all key topics were 
addressed, or expand certain topics if they appeared to be particularly fruitful with any given 
interviewee. The ability to lengthen and shorten interviews depending on the responses and 
time constraints faced by interviewees, while in some cases damaging to the quality of the data 
collected, enabled me to secure more interviews that would have been possible had longer 
interviews been requested. Despite these time constraints however, most of the interviews 
carried out in this project lasted around an hour, providing me with enough time to address a 
wide range of topics in sufficient depth to be useful for the analysis in this thesis.  
Once social media data and interviews were carried out, the data analysis could be 
carried out. It is to this process that I now turn my attention. 
 
Data analysis 
The data analysis for this thesis focused on three particular aspects, or three stages. 
Firstly, the data was analysed to highlight key patterns or trends in the rhetoric of minority 
nationalist parties, especially recurring topics and recurring policy stances. This enabled me to 
create categories in which to organise the various press releases, media articles, recordings and 
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social media postings – categories such as ‘democracy’, ‘international/European affairs’ and 
‘constitutional change’ were, for instance, particularly frequent and relevant categories in the 
analysis. 
 The second stage was, for each respective category, to try and uncover exactly how 
minority nationalist parties understood their action to be both in compliance with, and 
constrained by rules. This stage required a more detailed analysis of the various points and 
arguments developed by minority nationalist parties across the time period of the analysis. As 
we have described in the previous chapter, rules determine which course of action or which 
activities are legitimate, while delegitimising alternative courses of action. Analysing exactly 
how minority nationalist parties presented their actions and their ideas as legitimate and the 
ways in which they argued against alternative courses of action was deemed to be a direct and 
accurate way to determine which rules, consciously or subconsciously, framed minority 
nationalist rhetoric and action. 
 Finally, the third stage of the analysis was to determine exactly what the rules that 
legitimised and constrained minority nationalist party rhetoric and action were. Building on the 
categorisation developed in the first stage and on the analysis carried out in the second stage, I 
was either able, when explicitly expressed by minority nationalist party actors, to determine 
what exactly those rules were understood to be, or, when no explicit mention was made, I was 
able to provide an interpretation of what these rules appear to be through the public 
communication of the parties concerned. The outcome of all three stages forms the backbone 
of the analysis presented in chapters four, five and six of this thesis. 
 
To carry out this categorisation and analysis, the qualitative analysis software package 
Nvivo was used. The software, alongside web browser extension NCapture, first allowed to 
collect and preserve all webpages and audiovisual files found throughout the data collection 
process, enabling me to save offline copies of all relevant pieces of data therefore avoiding any 
possibility of data loss over the time of the project. This was particularly relevant in both the 
Catalan and Corsican cases: over the data collection period, Catalan pro-independence party 
CDC changed identity twice, splitting from the CiU coalition in June 2015 and launching the 
Democracia i Llibertat platform for the December 2015 Spanish general election  (Democracia 
i Llibertat, 2015). The party split, as well as the temporary DiL branding for the purpose of the 
December general elections meant that a number of social media accounts and websites 
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associated with the CiU and DiL were no longer fully available by the time the data analysis 
was carried out. In Corsica, key information website Corsica Infurmazione faced significant 
difficulties late in the data collection period, and threatened to close due to continued cyber-
attacks and lack of funds. The loss of such a website, had offline copies not been made possible, 
would have been a crippling development for the data analysis and the project as a whole. 
 Once offline copies of all relevant data items were obtained, Nvivo’s built-in file 
structure allowed me to categorise all of the data. Nvivo’s coding capability helped me to 
highlight specific sentences or specific paragraphs within the collected data that were relevant 
to specific topics or helpful to highlight the existence of specific rules. The list of codes used, 
including examples of relevant data, are included in the following table: 
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Code Purpose Example 
Democracy Covered any grievance expressed by minority nationalist parties regarding 
democracy, or any attempt to legitimise policy decisions or party stances 
based on democratic legitimacy. 
‘Democracy is unbeatable. We will win. We have the 
democratic mandate and it all rests upon us now’. (Esquerra 
Republicana, 2015b) 
 
Identity Covered any discussion of identity, including any grievances related to 
unrecognised identities, any attempt to differentiate territorial identity from 
state-wide identity, any attempts to define territorial identity. 
‘I think there exists a Corsican people, which can be defined 
as a living, open human community that builds and sustains 
itself also through the integration of people who wish to make 
our language, our culture, our project, their own’. (Appendix 
A, Interview 2, my translation). 
Language A sub-set of identity, this code covered any discussion of language, 
including language grievances and any attempt to legitimise language 
policy. 
‘It is not normal that in a normal country, you cannot use 
your own language without any concerns’ (Convergents - 
CDC, 2015e) 
 
Economy Covers any economic grievance, any economic proposal, any economic 
discussion or criticism of the central government or of the minority 
nationalist party-led regional governments. 
‘“In contrast to the Scottish Government’s approach, the UK 
Government has done little to nothing to promote the Living 
Wage. Rather than working with trade unions and businesses 
to promote fair work and decent pay – the Tory Business 
Secretary spends his time attacking workers’ rights and trade 
unions’(Scottish National Party, 2015g) 
 
Constitution Covered any institutional and constitutional grievances, proposals and 
discussions. Includes critique of the central government’s constitutional or 
institutional stance, alternative policy proposals. 
‘The state has systematically obstructed all of the initiatives 
put forward by the Generalitat to secure new revenue and 
guarantee the welfare state’(Convergents - CDC, 2015f) 
 
Independence A subset of the Constitutional code, this covered any direct discussion or 
legitimisation of independence as a policy goal by minority nationalist 
parties. 
‘The most important thing for us at @Esquerra_ERC (ERC) 
is to achieve independence to improve the wellbeing of our 
citizens.’ (Esquerra Republicana, 2015d) 
 
Europe Covers any discussion of European Union institutions, any statement of 
support, any critique. 
‘Nobody is interested in keeping Catalonia outside of Europe 
or the Euro’ (Esquerra Republicana, 2015i) 
 
Transnational Covers any mention of other minority nationalist parties in other territories. ‘C’est l’union des forces nationalistes qui a permis les 
avancées en Ecosse et en Catalogne !’ (Corsica Infurmazione, 
2015a, my translation) 
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Convergence Any discursive element that covers the relationship between minority 
nationalist parties within a single case. Primarily applicable to Catalonia 
and Corsica. 
‘Sondage: Ensemble, les nationalistes pourraient donc 
remporter la prime du 2e tour, gagner et gouverner. C’est 
désormais possible’(Talamoni, 2015) 
 
News Any miscellaneous piece of data that discusses news events that do not fall 
into any of the above categories. Includes things such as party events, 
advertising, leadership changes, party name changes. 
‘Public meeting #PNC #PartitudiaNazioneCorsa in Aregnu 
tonight at 7PM, with further work by the Cultura commission 
tomorrow in Tallà’ (Angelini, 2015) 
 
 
Table 1: List of codes used in the Nvivo analysis  
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Before proceeding with a brief analysis of each of these codes, a few important caveats 
need to be mentioned regarding the coding process and the analysis conducted here. Firstly, 
the codes above were only used to categorise elements of discourse that could be directly 
attributed to a minority nationalist party as a corporate agent or to individual representatives of 
minority nationalist parties. While, for instance, news reports on party policy, campaigning or 
events were also collected in the data collection process to gain a more detailed understanding 
of the daily political life of the territories analysed here, second-hand reports of party rhetoric 
were not used, unless a direct quote that can attributed back to a minority nationalist party 
representative was provided. Secondly, the codes here do not claim to be an exhaustive list of 
all the topics addressed by minority nationalist parties during that period. Rather than provide 
the basis for quantitative claims regarding topic frequency, these codes were used to categorise 
discursive elements to facilitate a qualitative analysis of party rhetoric over the period analysed.  
The codes themselves were selected based on several different rationales. Codes such 
as ‘economy’, ‘constitution’ and ‘independence’ were selected as they broadly reflect the 
realms in which minority nationalist parties are widely understood to operate in in existing 
literature. Additional codes, such as ‘identity’ were included for two main reasons: identity 
grievances are often highlighted as a major issue for minority nationalist parties, and to test for 
the importance of identity-grievances and ‘peopleness’ for parties committed to self-
determination. ‘Language’, a sub-set of identity grievances, was also included to make a 
practical distinction between linguistic grievances and broader identity-based grievances, both 
contributing to the analysis in the following chapter. The code ‘Europe’ and ‘transnational’ 
were both included to assess the extent to which minority nationalist parties discuss both 
European institutions, and other European minority nationalist parties, in their daily rhetoric. 
This allows us to analyse not just their stance on Europe, but how Europe and other parties can 
be used as a legitimising factor for their own demands. The code ‘convergence’ was determined 
to be relevant during the data collection process, as notions of ‘minority nationalist unity’ 
within both Corsica and Catalonia became significant and dictated electoral and subsequently 
the political strategy of minority nationalist parties. The data collected under this code was 
particularly useful to analyse the importance of coalition-building amongst minority nationalist 
parties and how this contributed to their pursuit of democratic legitimacy as detailed in chapter 
4. Finally, code ‘News’ was included to categorise elements of party rhetoric that were useful 
to understand the political life of minority nationalist parties, but not fundamentally useful per 
se to analyse their positions and their ideology. This includes mentions of meetings, campaign 
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events, party name changes or anything else that is relevant to understand the background and 
political life of a given minority nationalist party. 
As highlighted above, and as the examples in the table above illustrate, the main unit 
of analysis was sentences or paragraphs of minority nationalist party rhetoric and discourse. 
Many of the data collected on social media, notably from Twitter, often included no more than 
a single sentence of interest, while longer party publications such as manifestos, speeches or 
press releases often included far more, and far lengthier, elements of rhetoric. Categorising 
these into the codes described above allowed me to then make empirically supported 
assumptions on the types of norms minority nationalist parties were promoting, how they were 
looking to promote them, how they reacted to the environment they operated in, and how 
important alternative avenues of norm diffusion were to them. 
 
The ability to fine tune the analysis down the sentence-level (as opposed to classifying 
entire data items as a whole) enabled me to analyse each piece of data in great detail, and was 
particularly helpful to analyse larger items such as speeches or party publications that covered 
multiple topics. The process of coding, by allowing me to categorise specific sentences or 
paragraphs within each item of data, provided me with a single document in which all rhetoric 
pertaining to a specific topic (such as ‘democracy’ or ‘international affairs’) was 
chronologically ordered. These documents, of which one for each territory was produced, were 
the basis upon which my analysis was built. 
 
Case selection – Catalonia, Corsica and Scotland 
 Ahead of selecting cases for my project, a broader, preliminary research was undertaken 
to familiarise myself with a broad range of potential cases for the purpose of this project. Aside 
from the elements highlighted in the introduction justifying  
 
Party size 
 Choosing territories with strong, relevant minority nationalist parties also had 
implications for the practicality of the project. In all three territories concerned, the parties 
analysed were both highly visible in local, regional and sometimes national media, as well as 
very active online with a strong network of official social media accounts, websites and other 
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media sources gravitating around these parties (sympathetic news agencies and websites). In 
all three cases, the visibility of these parties in media as well as their activity online enabled 
me to gather a significant amount of data for the analysis. To provide a comparison to illustrate 
the importance of this point, a look at the number of individual data items collected for the 
month of September 2015 is helpful. While September 2015 yielded over six hundred 
individual pieces of data to analyse for Catalan minority nationalist parties, a similar data 
collection process for Alsatian nationalist party Unser Land and Cornish nationalist party 
Mebyon Kernow provided less than ten individual items of data. Many of the smaller parties 
included initially in the data collection process sometimes yielded no data at all for certain 
months, with the Partit Occitan and Unitat Catalana (in Occitania and French Catalonia 
respectively) being two particularly striking examples of this. 
Using party size as a measure, however, also leads to some difficulties. Although 
democratic self-determination is, as we will see in following chapters, a crucial rule informing 
the actions, expectations and rhetoric of minority nationalist parties in Catalonia, Scotland and 
Corsica, it is possible to argue that democracy only plays an important role for parties insofar 
as they have the required size and influence to be able to compete with other major parties in 
electoral contests. Although it is clear smaller minority nationalist groups such as the ones 
claiming to represent Occitania (territory covering much of southern France) focus primarily 
on cultural activities  (Partit Occitan, 2016), other small minority nationalist parties have 
focused on democratic politics to a similar extent as those in the three territories analysed – a 
good example of this would be the key role played by Breton regionalist Christian Troadec, 
who attempted (and failed) to gather sufficient support to stand as a ‘regionalist’ candidate in 
the 2017 French Presidential elections (Troadec, 2016). 
 
 Key Electoral Contests 
 Another important factor in deciding to focus the thesis on Corsica, Catalonia and 
Scotland was the occurrence of major electoral contests in all three territories. Significant 
elections, in addition to providing an up-to-date estimation of the support parties enjoy within 
given territories, also provide an opportunity to discover and analyse the stance of political 
parties on a very wide range of issues. Throughout the data collection process, the rhetoric and 
public discourse of minority nationalist parties was found to differ significantly between 
periods of electoral involvement and periods outside of any immediate electoral campaigning. 
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Minority nationalist parties (and, arguably, most political parties) appeared to be mainly 
reactive outside of electoral periods, allow me to collect valuable information on the various 
ways in which the ideology and driving principles of minority nationalist parties were applied 
to a wide range of different political events and issues. In all three cases however, election 
campaigns running up to major elections (from the perspective of the parties) were particularly 
helpful periods to gather a very wide range data with minority nationalist parties presenting 
comprehensive policy platforms and commenting on each other’s electoral fortunes through 
social media and traditional media. While the data collected outside of electoral periods was 
helpful to understand the evolution of party rhetoric in reaction to various political events, 
electoral campaigns presented a unique opportunity to collect numerous and comprehensive 
statements of ideology and policy from minority nationalist parties. 
In all three cases, the occurrence of major electoral contests throughout the data 
collection process proved useful. Data collection began a month after the May 2015 United 
Kingdom general election, at which the Scottish National Party secured 56 out of 59 
parliamentary seats in Scotland, representing a 50-seat increase from the previous general 
election (Turner and Boyle, 2015).  Data collected a month after this event allowed me to 
analyse the ways in which Scottish National Party rhetoric was shaped by this newfound status 
as Scotland’s dominant parliamentary party, a status which further reinforced the SNP’s 
tendency to legitimise their demands by claiming to represent the interests of the Scottish 
people as a whole (Gayle, 2016).  Similarly, the May 2016 Scottish parliamentary elections 
provided a further opportunity to explore the policy platform developed by the SNP. 
The September 2015 Catalan parliamentary elections and the December 2015 Spanish 
parliamentary elections provided two major opportunities to analyse minority nationalist party 
in Catalonia in differing contexts. While the main minority nationalist parties in Catalonia, the 
CDC and ERC merged to form the Junts Pel Sí coalition ahead of the September 2015 elections, 
minority nationalist parties participated in the December 2015 elections separately – providing 
a great opportunity to see both the common ground shared by most Catalan minority nationalist 
political actors and the differences that continue to exist between these actors. In addition to 
providing a vast quantity of data to analyse, having two separate electoral campaigns through 
which to analyse minority nationalist party rhetoric in Catalonia allowed me to see the way in 
which this rhetoric changed and adapted to the overall enthusiasm prior and in the immediate 
aftermath of the September 2015 elections, and to the frustration that emerged in the months 
following that victory. While a simple analysis of the September 2015 election might have 
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conveyed a false sense of unity, continuing the data collection almost 10 months beyond that 
first electoral contest allowed me to factor in the continued, and sometimes growing, divisions 
developing with the Catalan minority nationalist movement. (Young, 2016). Similarly, data 
collected around the October 2017 referendum, attempted declaration of independence and 
subsequent Catalan parliamentary election in December 2017, provided valuable data to 
analyse how, if at all, Catalan minority nationalism had evolved since the start of their process 
towards independence in 2015. 
 Finally, the French territorial election in December 2015 was deemed a crucial, historic 
electoral contest by Corsican nationalist parties. As in the other cases, the months running up 
to the election date were particularly fruitful for data collection, with Corsican nationalist 
parties developing comprehensive policy agendas and using all possible avenues (social media, 
internet, local and national media) to promote and spread their message. The victory of 
minority nationalist parties in these elections further strengthened the data analysis process, by 
enabling us to analyse how Corsican nationalist parties argued for the legitimacy of their 
demands while in a position of power, backed up by an electoral, popular mandate. This in turn 
provided a great opportunity to analyse the importance of democracy and self-determination as 
a principle in shaping the rhetoric and action of minority nationalist parties.  
 
Conclusion 
 As we have seen in this chapter, the concept of triangulation, widespread in qualitative 
research, also forms the basis of the analysis and data collection in this thesis. Drawing upon 
both methodological and data triangulation, I drew upon triangulation to improve the 
completeness of the data collection, using interviews to obtain data that was not always easily 
obtainable through online sources.  
 The bulk of the data collected for this project was gathered from a wide variety of online 
sources, from official social media accounts to online local, regional or national newspapers to 
other news sources (both affiliated, sympathetic to and unaffiliated to minority nationalist 
parties in their respective territories). This data collection process yielded a very wide variety 
of data items, from brief social media posts, to press releases, to online videos and speeches, 
to media interviews and appearances, giving me a selection of written and audio-visual data to 
analyse. However, to compensate for the absence of certain topics in minority nationalist 
parties’ day-to-day rhetoric, a few interviews were deemed necessary to fill some gaps that had 
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emerged in the online data collection process. In addition to these, these interviews also 
provided key minority nationalist political actors with considerably more time to expand on 
policy and ideological points, providing a more detailed coverage of some of the issues often 
briefly addressed on social media and in traditional media.  
 A brief explanation of the methodological considerations behind the case selection for 
this study was then included. As described in the introduction, minority nationalism in all three 
territories plays a significant role in local politics, represented by sizeable parties that have, in 
recent years, been in a position to compete for electoral success at the level of the territory they 
seek to represent. For methodological purposes, both party size and the involvement of these 
parties in major electoral contests throughout the data collection period proved to be 
particularly helpful in gathering a broad database of relevant empirical data as evidence for this 
study. By virtue of their size, all minority nationalist parties involved here were particularly 
accessible online through social media, with all parties maintaining several very active online 
presences. In addition to their online presence, party size can also be understood as an important 
factor in determining the extent to which a given party is able to access traditional, mainstream 
media sources, whether regional or national. With all minority nationalist movements in all 
three territories playing a significant political role at the scale of the territory they seek to 
represent, minority nationalist parties are also frequently quoted, discussed, and reported on in 
mainstream media sources. 
 Finally, the importance of regular electoral contests to the data collection process was 
highlighted. While the fundamental policy aims of minority nationalist parties were found to 
be less frequently discussed and explicitly stated outside of major electoral campaigns, the 
occurrence of several key elections in all three territories over the period studied provided a 
significant opportunity to assess the core policy platform of each party. While in no way limited 
to minority nationalist parties, the tendency by parties to present a more comprehensive view 
of their own principles, values and policies at election time was quite pronounced in the cases 
analysed here. 
 Drawing upon the theoretical framework described in the first chapter and the methods 
described here, the following chapter will begin to address the questions stated at the beginning 
of this study.  Analysing self-determination as a principle and the ways in which it relates or 
underpins most minority nationalist party claims, the following chapter will establish self-
determination not only as the fundamental raison d’être of these parties, but as the main driver 
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behind demands for, attempted and successful changes brought about by minority nationalists 
to the constitutional, political, economic and legal environment in which they operate.  
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3. Self-determination and minority nationalist identity and 
interests 
 
Self-determination, as a concept, plays a central part in the rhetoric and policy platforms 
of minority nationalist parties in Europe. Described by SNP MEP Alyn Smith as the ‘raison 
d’être’ or main purpose of parties like his (Appendix A, interview 7), the notion of self-
determination most visibly drives a common desire for recognition and significant institutional 
change shared by all minority nationalist parties in this study. Self-determination, in the case 
of minority nationalist parties, most visibly takes the form of demands for increases in 
autonomy to, most frequently, full independence for the territory they claim to represent. 
 In the following two chapters, we will explore two different ways in which minority 
nationalist parties address and interact with self-determination. Understood as a norm, which, 
according to the United Nations should apply to ‘peoples’ (United Nations, 1945), self-
determination can be seen to permeate almost every aspect of minority nationalist parties’ 
rhetoric, action, and aims. In this chapter, we will begin by addressing the concept of ‘people’ 
and ‘peopleness’, and how minority nationalist parties draw upon and reinforce the notion that 
the people within the territory they seek to represent are a distinct people, with all of the rights 
and opportunities this entails. This, in turn, provides a strong illustration for the mutual 
constitution of norms or rules and agency: because minority nationalist parties promote a sub-
national identity, the norm of self-determination is constituted as a legitimate norm: ‘because 
Catalans/Corsicans/Scots are a people, they are entitled to self-determination’. In turn, the 
notion that the population of their respective territories are entitled, legitimately, to pursue self-
determination by virtue of their ‘peopleness’ informs many of the grievances, and most of the 
solutions, these parties promote in their day-to-day rhetoric. This chapter identifies three major 
types of grievances related to self-determination and ‘peopleness’: economic grievances, 
institutional grievances and identity-based grievances. While these kinds of grievances are not 
unique to minority nationalist parties, the understandings and norms that underpin them are 
clearly rooted in the notion of self-determination.    
 In this chapter, I begin by describing two ways in which definitions of self-
determination have been extended, by drawing on the notion of ‘peopleness’ and on a 
dichotomy between ‘external’ and ‘internal’ self-determination. I then go on to detail the 
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various grievances held by parties in Catalonia, Corsica and Scotland, highlighting similarities 
in both the rhetoric used to express these grievances and in their content. Finally, I highlight 
how minority nationalist parties sustain and reinforce the notion of a distinct ‘peopleness’ for 
the populations of the territories they seek to represent, and how this rhetoric then underpins 
much of the rhetoric and grievances expressed by minority nationalist parties. I conclude by 
discussing the extent to which common grievances have produced common solutions for 
minority nationalist parties across the three territories, while providing some elements to 
understand how self-determination as a norm explains and underpins both the grievances and 
the solutions embraced by these parties. 
  
Self-determination – definitions, history. 
‘What is stated in big print – as the reiterated United Nations injunction: All 
peoples have the right to self-determination – is drastically modified by what 
follows in small print’(Emerson, 1971) 
 To best understand how the concept of self-determination is understood by minority 
nationalist parties and how international and domestic norms that stem from this concept might 
inform their rhetoric and their actions, a brief overview of the various ways in which self-
determination has been defined in both international law and academia is in order. Described 
as ‘frustratingly ambiguous’ by Summers (2013), the understanding of self-determination in 
international law has also undergone significant changes throughout recent historical periods. 
An overview of these changes, and of the different ways in which self-determination has been 
conceptualised in international law, will provide a clearer picture of the variety of definitions 
and conceptions of self-determination that might continue to influence or inform political 
agents (in our case, minority nationalist parties and central governments). 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, self-determination plays a significant role in studies of minority 
nationalist parties. However, while the importance of self-determination is often cited, the 
concept itself is rarely explored in significant depth.  In minority nationalist party literature, 
self-determination, while rarely defined, is understood to be one of the fundamental concepts 
underpinning minority nationalist party policy choices, ‘an enduring touchstone of 
identification for party elites, members and voters, as well as the basis upon which a more 
pragmatic policy package is developed’ (Elias, 2008b, p. 29). Self-determination, understood 
as the basic ideology upon which minority nationalist parties are predicated, acts as an 
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important, although only one of many, constraints limiting the spectrum of policy choices a 
minority nationalist party can conduct. Similarly, literature seeking to explain the different 
political strategies available to minority nationalist parties also place a great deal of emphasis 
on self-determination as a driving concept for minority nationalist parties. Drawing on theories 
of multi-dimensional party competition (Rovny and Edwards, 2012; Rovny, 2013), Elias 
Szöcsik and Zuber (2015) develop a an analytical framework in which minority nationalist 
parties are primarily operating along the ‘territorial dimension’ (as opposed to the ‘economic 
dimension’) of party politics, a dimension where policies rooted in self-determination and 
centre-periphery grievances play a central role. This is echoed in large part by other academics, 
such as Massetti and Schakel who argue that the territorial dimension, or self-determination-
based policies, entirely subsume the economic dimension and the left-right orientation of 
minority nationalist parties. While more cautious about the role given to the economic 
dimension in minority nationalist party policy, Alonso, Cabeza and Gomez similarly argue that 
the territorial dimension of politics is primary for minority nationalist parties (Alonso, Cabeza 
and Gómez, 2015; Massetti and Schakel, 2015). The centrality of the territorial dimension, 
either in co-existence with or in domination of the economic dimension, to minority nationalist 
party policy-making and identity is well established in the literature. Self-determination, an 
important concept of territorial politics and one frequently understood to be one, if not the main 
ideological ‘touchstone’ of minority nationalist parties, therefore seems like a fruitful concept 
to explore further, to determine what different types of self-determination can exist, and, to 
what extent these underpin minority nationalist party thinking and policy-making. Introducing 
the varied and subtle understandings of self-determination found in international relations 
literature can provide us with a more detailed understanding of the different ways self-
determination as a principle can express itself in minority nationalist party rhetoric and the 
different ways in which it underpins seemingly unrelated policy demands. A more fine-grained 
understanding of self-determination will not enable us to detail the various ways in which self-
determination can generate policies at all ends of the ‘territorial dimension’ spectrum, but can 
also act as a useful test of the extent traditional left-right issues are subsumed by territorial, 
self-determination-driven demands.   
 
 Few academics attempt to provide a concise, single-sentence definition of self-
determination. Sterio  for instance defines self-determination as ‘the legal right for “People” to 
attain a certain degree of autonomy from its sovereign’ (Sterio, 2013, p. 9). However, most 
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academic discussions surrounding the very nature of self-determination involve several layers 
and several accompanying concepts that describe the different ways in which self-
determination has been imagined. Buchanan, for instance, discusses self-determination as a 
concept taking on many different ‘forms’ and existing to various ‘degrees’ (Buchanan, 1992). 
In attempting to describe internal self-determination, Muharremi in his study of self-
determination in Kosovo provides a baseline definition for self-determination: the pursuit of 
‘political, economic social and cultural development’ for a ‘people’ (Muharremi, 2008). 
However, many studies drawing upon self-determination focus less on the meaning of self-
determination itself as the various degrees to which self-determination can be accepted and 
implemented (Oklopcic, 2009 for examples of this; see Mtendeweka, 2012), and, more 
importantly, on the legitimacy of self-determination as an international legal concept (Philpott, 
1998; see Buchanan, 2003). Building on the definition described above, Sterio similarly 
introduces a number of different concepts to nuance self-determination: under self-
determination, ‘a group with a common identity and link to a defined territory is allowed to 
decide its political future in a democratic fashion’ (Sterio, 2013, p. 16). Of the various complex 
and contested concepts introduced in this definition, once of the most recurring and most 
controversial notions in the context of minority nationalist parties is the notion of ‘group with 
a common identity’, or ‘peopleness’. 
 To disentangle such complexities, most academics discussing the idea of self-
determination adopt a broader approach to define the concept. Moore for instance describes 
three fundamental questions at the heart of self-determination: who are the ‘People’, what is 
the relevant territorial unit in which self-determination should be exercised by them and does 
self-determination have a ‘demonstration effect’, a term which Moore uses to ask whether self-
determination in one instance is an isolated event, or whether it influences similar instances 
across space and time (Moore, 1998a). Other academics discuss whether self-determination, 
rather than being singular concept, can in fact represent a wide spectrum of potential policies 
and situations. Discussions over a potential dichotomy between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ self-
determination help us to comprehend and include varied forms of ‘self-determination’ in our 
analysis. Discussing what many describe as the most ‘extreme’ form of self-determination 
(Sterio, 2013), understood as being secession or independence, academics have explored the 
various ways in which secession as a form of self-determination is justifiable, producing three 
major approaches (nationalist, choice and just-cause theories). All of these various 
contributions to the concept of self-determination provide us with additional tools to 
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understand, and eventually apply the idea of ‘self-determination’ as a contested norm or rule 
driving the rhetoric and actions of minority nationalist parties (and, by extension, the actions 
of those who interact with them in the political arena).  
 Perhaps unsurprisingly, self-determination plays a significant role in studies of minority 
nationalist parties. In minority nationalist party literature, self-determination, while rarely 
defined, is understood to be one of the fundamental concepts underpinning minority nationalist 
party policy choices, ‘an enduring touchstone of identification for party elites, members and 
voters, as well as the basis upon which a more pragmatic policy package is developed’ (Elias, 
2008b, p. 29). Self-determination, understood as the basic ideology upon which minority 
nationalist parties are predicated, acts as an important, although only one of many, constraints 
limiting the spectrum of policy choices a minority nationalist party can conduct. 
  
 
‘Peopleness’ and territory 
 The two definitions provided above by Sterio bring into focus two of the key elements 
in self-determination: a ‘people’, and a ‘territory’. Although Summers argues that the ‘people’ 
is undefined and likely to remain that way (Summers, 2013, p. 229), other academics have 
attempted to provide definitional elements to understand what, or in this case ‘who’, is entitled 
to self-determination. In her discussion on self-determination, Sterio describes a ‘two-pronged 
test’ to determine whether a group of individuals qualifies as a ‘people’: the presence of a 
‘shared common ethnic, religious, historical, linguistic and cultural heritage’ and the existence 
of a conscious self-perception as a ‘people’ and viable political entity (Sterio, 2013). This 
approach, which attributes ‘peopleness’ (Sterio, 2013, p. 18) to a wide range of groups, echoes 
one of the initial understandings of ‘self-determination’ within the context of international law, 
which established politically mobilised ‘ethnic’ groups as the fundamental subject of self-
determination (Moore, 1998a).  
While shared linguistic, religious, cultural or ethnic characteristics play an important 
part in developing a ‘common identity’ (to draw from the definition of self-determination used 
above), the notion of ‘peopleness’ is also closely tied to the notion of ‘territory’ – for a ‘people’ 
to exercise ‘self-determination’ not only involves the political recognition of an identity or 
‘people’ but also a claim on a given territory. Moore describes two forms of ‘people’ that 
interact in different ways with the notion of ‘territory’, the first being an ethnic approach which 
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draws upon the shared characteristics described above, and the second being a ‘civic’ 
conception which uses the territory as the base line for ‘peopleness’: under the ‘civic’ 
understanding of ‘peopleness’, everyone within a given territory belongs to the ‘people’ 
associated to that territory (Moore, 1998a). 
Academics discussing self-determination have highlighted a number of difficulties 
related to the territorial, or civic approach to self-determination. While borders do play an 
important part in defining identities (Summers, 2013), creating a physical boundary that 
contributes to the definition of a group identity notably by differentiating people within the 
‘border’ and people outside of it, borders need not inherently create a sufficiently homogenous 
group identity, making self-determination and the relationship between people and territory 
problematic at best. Academics highlight for instance the problem of minorities within 
minorities in a given territory, arguing that self-determination for a given territory might, in 
practice, create more minorities within the territory in question (Norman, 1998; McGarry, 
Keating and Moore, 2006; Summers, 2013). Another particularly relevant issue to the cases 
studied in this thesis is the issue of ‘shared identities’ within a given territory – while ‘the 
existence of a people in a given territory [often] precedes the creation of a larger mother state’ 
(Sterio, 2013, p. 16), the very existence of minority ‘peoples’ within a given state need not be 
recognised by the larger state or states within which a territory can find itself, and broader state 
identities can either co-exist within individuals in a given territory or be exclusively held by 
these individuals (Summers, 2013).  
These concerns are particularly relevant in all cases studied here, where residents within 
Catalonia, Scotland and Corsica need not, despite being within the territory claimed as the 
‘heartland’ of such identities, identify as Corsicans, Catalans or Scots. In all three cases, ‘sub-
national’ identities co-exist, and are simultaneously held, with broader, state identities. In the 
2011 census in Scotland, while 62% of the population of Scotland described themselves as 
‘Scottish only’, 18% of the population described themselves as both British and Scottish, with 
8% describing themselves as ‘British only’ (Scotland’s Census, 2011). In Catalonia, Spanish 
identity remains even stronger, with 19% of the population describing themselves as ‘only 
Catalan’, while 75% of the population described some form of dual Catalan-Spanish identity, 
and only 8% of the population describing themselves as ‘only Spanish’ in a 2015 poll for 
Spanish newspaper El País (El País, 2015). While such studies are rare in Corsica, a 1999 
survey indicated that 45% of the population describes themselves as ‘French above all else’, 
with 36% of the population describing themselves as ‘Corsican above all else’  (Polloni, 2012) 
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It is reasonable to assume that the proportion of people identifying as Corsican might have 
increased in the near 20 years since this poll was conducted, but it is also safe to assume that 
both the French and Corsican identities continue to co-exist, frequently simultaneously, on the 
island today.  
 
External vs internal self-determination 
While questions of over the definition of ‘people’ and the relationship between ‘people’ 
and territory are central to understanding self-determination as a principle, academics have 
developed additional ways through which to understand the many subtleties and to disentangle 
the complexity of the concept. In addition to discussing ‘who’ or ‘what’ exactly can claim a 
right to self-determination, most academics working on the concept have come to understand 
it as a spectrum of possibilities, as opposed to single, binary concept (self-determined/not self-
determined). We will begin here by addressing the distinction made between external and 
internal self-determination, before moving on to the various theories discussing the conditions 
and requirements of legitimate self-determination. 
 Discussing the identification of a ‘people’, Sterio argues: 
is not simultaneous with the conclusion that any people deserves the right to 
self-govern in an independent manner, as a single, separate state, through the 
exercise of external self-determination. Rather, the identification of a group as 
a people signals that the group deserves rights, which can be fulfilled equally 
well within the central mother state, through so-called internal self-
determination (Sterio, 2013, p. 18). 
A concise definition of internal self-determination was also established by the Canadian 
Supreme Court in the landmark Re Secession of Quebec case in 1997. In that judgement, 
internal self-determination is described as ‘a people’s pursuit of its political, economic, social 
and cultural development within the framework of an existing state’ (CanLII, 1998). The same 
judgement then quotes the United Nations Declaration on Friendly Relations of 1970 to define 
external self-determination as ‘the establishment of a sovereign and independent state’ 
(CanLII, 1998). Based on this understanding, internal self-determination concerns primarily 
domestic, constitutional arrangements regarding autonomous, sub-national government within 
a given territory, while external self-determination solely concerns the secession of a given 
territory from a state.  
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 Summers provides a slightly different understanding of the dichotomy, focusing on 
perspectives and context as opposed to a clear autonomy/secession dichotomy. Summers 
argues that the ‘internal-external division relates to emphasis and perspective’: focusing on 
relationships and connections, self-determination could be exercised internally in relation to 
certain actors, and externally in relation to others. Summers for instance argues that minority 
nationalists might, in practice, see their relationship with central government as an exercise of 
‘external self-determination’ – understood as the interaction between two distinct and 
politically recognised ‘peoples’, as opposed to an interaction between a government and 
subordinate actors (Summers, 2013). Based on this understanding, any activity considered or 
perceived to be outside of the hierarchical, constitutional, or domestic realm of the state can be 
understood as an act of ‘external self-determination’.  
 In addition to this, Summers questions the usefulness of the dichotomy as described by 
the Re Secession of Quebec judgement. Summers argues that the distinction, rather than being 
a simple analytical tool, also significantly limits any claim to a right to external self-
determination. For Summers, the creation of an internal-external dichotomy within self-
determination primarily allows us to identify alternatives to secession frequently associated 
with self-determination. In this context, differentiating between internal and external self-
determination can enable states to reject secessionist claims in cases where ‘internal’ self-
determination exists (Summers, 2013). As we will see later in the chapter, while the dichotomy 
between internal and external self-determination can be useful to analyse the aims of minority 
nationalist parties and their motivations regarding self-determination, the distinction itself is 
not one that can be found frequently in the vocabulary of minority nationalist parties. 
 Both understandings of external and internal self-determination allow us to better 
understand the ways in which minority nationalist parties interact with their central government 
and how they interact, either directly or indirectly, with each other.  
 
Establishing ‘peopleness’ 
As we have seen above, ‘peopleness’ is one of the pre-requisites of self-determination: 
with no ‘peopleness’, self-determination is, according to most current and international legal 
understandings of the term, irrelevant and inapplicable.  
In the case of minority nationalist parties, this means that, for the norm 
‘Catalans/Corsicans/Scots should be granted self-determination’ to be defended as legitimate, 
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an additional norm, which can simply be stated as ‘Catalans/Corsicans/Scots should be 
recognised as a distinct “people”, with all the rights and opportunities this entails’, needs to 
exist and needs to be promoted by minority nationalist parties. However, this study does not 
claim that minority nationalist political parties are the sole ‘norm entrepreneurs’ creating and 
promoting a sense of distinct ‘peopleness’. While the source of such an idea (and of the norm 
that stems from it) is hard to pinpoint and is beyond the scope of this chapter, it is clear that a 
very wide range of different agents are responsible and contribute to the creation, revival or 
sustaining of the cultural, historical, social and territorial elements that are drawn upon to create 
the notion of a distinct, sub-national identity in these territories. These agents range from 
political parties, civil society organisations and other political groups to musicians, film 
makers, artists and athletes – all of whom can, in various ways, contribute to the construction 
of a new sub-national identity or the promotion and protection of an existing one. 
If ‘peopleness’ is a pre-requisite for legitimate access to self-determination, it is 
important to determine how, and in what contexts, minority nationalist parties can draw upon 
this notion of distinct ‘peopleness’ to argue that the people within the territory they seek to 
represent are legitimate recipients and practitioners of self-determination, with all the 
normative implications this contains. 
 The notion of ‘peopleness’ is relatively uncontroversial in Scotland today. Due to the 
historical circumstances surrounding its union with England in the early 18th century, Scotland 
has been able to sustain a shared cultural, linguistic, religious and historical heritage with more 
or less success and stability. The notion of ‘self-perception as a people and a viable political 
entity’ is harder to pin down, however a number of points could arguably support both a clear 
self-perception as a ‘people’ and a self-perception as a viable political entity. Regarding self-
perception as a ‘people’, national identity data from the 2011 census used above shows that 
80% of people in Scotland identify as ‘Scottish’. Although 18% people do identify as both 
Scottish and British, there is a strong, distinct identity perceived by people in Scotland (this 
identity can, for instance, be easily seen in the case of sports) (Scotland’s Census, 2011). With 
regard to political viability, support for both devolution (74.3% of voters backed the 
introduction of Scottish Parliament in 1997) (Dewdney, 1997) and a minority nationalist party 
such as the SNP shows that a significant portion of the population in Scotland believes that the 
‘Scottish people’ can legitimately and viably exercise at the very least a degree of self-
government through devolved institutions (with opinions varying on the suitable extent of this).  
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 ‘Peopleness’ remains a central element in the day-to-day rhetoric of the SNP. With the 
exception of the months following the 2015 General Election, during which the SNP adopted 
a more UK-wide rhetorical approach based on fundamental opposition to David Cameron’s 
governmental policy, SNP rhetoric throughout my period of study and in the subsequent 
months and years up to the time of writing has focused on ‘Scotland’ and, more importantly, 
on the ‘Scottish people’. References to both ‘standing up for Scotland’ and ‘the people of 
Scotland’ are very frequent for instance in the various manifestos published by the SNP 
throughout 2015 and 2016 (Scottish National Party, 2015q, 2016b), and general discourse 
around the European Union membership referendum emphasises the ‘Scottish people’ as 
having a distinct opinion, and distinct political significance with regards to the results of the 
referendum  and its implementation.  
 While SNP policy is (sometimes strongly) opposed by both the UK Labour and 
Conservative parties, its continuous mobilisation of Scottish ‘peopleness’ in political rhetoric 
and discourse remains uncontroversial. Few, if any, politicians in the United Kingdom question 
or challenge the existence of a Scottish people, and few challenge the SNP for its focus on that 
category of people. On the contrary, the notion of a distinct Scottish people as a politically 
relevant and viable entity has become common across most political parties operating in 
Scotland, with the Conservative Party, Labour Party and Liberal Democrats maintaining a 
Scottish identity distinct from their counterparts in England – by maintaining Scotland-specific 
names (Scottish Conservatives, Scottish Labour Party and Scottish Liberal Democrats 
respectively), distinct leaderships, separate web pages, and, in the case of the Scottish 
Conservatives, a different visual identity from its UK-wide counterpart. 
 
 The notion of a ‘Catalan people’, and the political mobilisation of this category of 
people as politically relevant and viable is also recurrent notion and phenomenon across all 
minority nationalist parties in Catalonia. This is particularly visible in the day to day rhetoric 
of both major minority nationalist parties, ERC and the former CDC (now PDeCAT) and in 
the rhetoric of the electoral coalition Junts Pel Sí, the coalition composed of both the ERC and 
CDC created specifically to stand on a pro-independence platform for the September 2015 
Catalan parliamentary elections. Rhetoric surrounding Catalan independence makes frequent 
use of ‘Catalans’ as a distinct category of people (see Junts Pel Sí, 2015a, 2015b for examples 
of this). Pro-independence parties frequently described their efforts as an attempt to ‘create a 
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new country for all Catalans’ (Convergents - CDC, 2015c; Junqueras, 2015a; Junts Pel Sí, 
2015c), while others described the success of pro-independence parties in the September 2015 
elections as evidence of the ‘strength of the Catalan people’ as opposed to the ‘powers of the 
Spanish state’ (Junts Pel Sí, 2015i). 
The question of the boundaries and conditions for belonging to ‘the Catalan people’, 
and the question of who exactly could be considered as a ‘Catalan’, also shows the importance 
of ‘peopleness’ as a legitimising element in the rhetoric of Catalan minority nationalists. In a 
variety of social media posts, the ERC argued that belonging to the ‘Catalan people’ was not a 
question of birth or language. Anyone could be Catalan so long as he or she wishes to 
‘contribute to its prosperity’ or ‘build a common future’ in Catalonia’ (Esquerra Republicana 
de Catalunya, 2015b, 2015a). Similar rhetoric emphasised ‘a shared project’ as a crucial 
criterion for ‘Catalan-ness’ (Junts Pel Sí, 2015d). As in the case of Scotland and Corsica, 
Catalan minority nationalists legitimise their policy platform and describe themselves as being 
in the service, or in the interests of, a specific category of people within a specific territorially-
defined nation. 
 The question of distinct peopleness in Corsica is perhaps the most controversial across 
all three cases. While similar historical, cultural, linguistic elements required to create a sense 
of ‘peopleness’ exist in Corsica, the notion of a distinct people within France clashes with a 
fundamental constitutional rule, reinforced by legal constitutional decisions brought about 
specifically by Corsican demands for a fully recognised status as a distinct people within the 
French Republic (see Noiriel, 1988 and Germain and Lassalle, 2006 for studies of France’s 
approach to communities and immigration). Whereas in Scotland the notion of ‘peopleness’ is 
relatively unproblematic, the notion of Corsican ‘peopleness’ clashes directly with very long-
standing and established constitutional rules establishing, and protecting, what is often 
perceived as an exclusive French ‘people’ (Assemblée Nationale, 2017).  
 The norm according to which the French ‘people’ should not be sub-divided into 
communitarian categories can be found codified in Article 1 of the 1958 French Constitution, 
which states: ‘The French Republic is one and indivisible, laïque, democratic and social. She 
ensures equality before the law for all citizens, with no distinction made of origin, race or 
religion’ (Assemblée Nationale, 2017). This article, one of the fundamental definitional articles 
establishing the very nature of the French Republic, has a number of major implications for the 
recognition of minorities within the French population. These implications were further 
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strengthened by decisions taken by the French Constitutional Council in response to efforts 
made to recognise Corsicans as a distinct people – when a 1991 law establishing a special 
administrative status for Corsica described the ‘Corsican people as a component of the French 
people’, the French Constitutional Council reiterated that this would be in violation of Article 
1 of the French Constitution, insofar as it introduces a subdivision within the undividable 
French Republic (Chicot, 2000). 
 In contrast to the lack of public recognition emanating from the French central 
government, the notion of a distinct ‘peopleness’ for Corsicans, is, similarly to Catalonia and 
Scotland, a fundamental part of minority nationalist party rhetoric. Throughout the period 
analysed, prior to that period and beyond, the notion of a ‘Corsican’ people is repeatedly and 
continuously invoked by Corsican minority nationalists to describe the people on behalf of 
whom Corsican nationalists believe they act. To provide an example, the electoral victory 
secured by Corsican nationalists at the regional level in Corsica in December 2015 led to a 
number of high profile debates and exchanges between French politicians, journalists and 
Corsican nationalist leaders on the existence (or not) of a ‘Corsican people’. Gilles Simeoni, 
for instance, described the existence of a ‘Corsican people’ as an ‘objective reality’, describing 
rejections of such an idea by the French central government as ‘denying the obvious’ (see 
Simeoni interviewed on BFM TV, 2015; Cochard, 2016 for identical statements across various 
media platforms around the same period; Huffington Post, 2016). 
As in Catalonia, the question of the boundary of ‘Corsican peopleness’ is particularly 
relevant. Considering the split identities found in Corsica (as seen above), Corsican nationalists 
provide, with few variations due to context, the same answer as that provided by Catalan 
nationalists. Answering allegations of racism within Corsican nationalism, Gilles Simeoni 
described how, ‘for centuries, men and women have arrived on this island, regardless of their 
origin, their skin colour, their religion, and they integrated, became fully part of our people’ 
(Simeoni cited in L’Indépendant, 2015; Le Point, 2015). Echoing this, Jean-Guy Talamoni 
described the notion of a ‘Corsican people’ as including ‘native Corsicans’ and ‘adoptive 
Corsicans’, a conception which he describes as very ‘open’ (Appendix A, interview 3). Despite 
this however, Talamoni estimates that approximately half of the island’s population cannot be 
considered to be a part of the ‘Corsican people’. Most notably, he excludes those who are in 
Corsica as a result of temporary French civil service postings, whether administrative workers 
or members of the armed forces and the emergency services. While this number represents 
approximately 10% of the Corsican population (L’Internaute, 2018), Talamoni also, albeit 
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implicitly, includes many of the temporary seasonal workers who contribute to the islands 
tourism industry, or what he terms the ‘residential economy’, a number estimated to be around 
15000 to 20000 (Corse-Matin, 2017). While no figure suggests that half of the population in 
Corsica can be safely considered temporary, economic residents, the suggestion that both 
temporary French civil servants and other temporary economic residents in Corsica are not 
fundamentally integrated into a Corsican ‘people’ shows a similar emphasis placed on 
permanent residence and overall social, economic, and personal commitment as one of the 
markers of belonging to the ‘people’ as the one found in Catalan minority nationalist parties. 
  
 Despite local contextual variations, one of the ways in which ‘peopleness’ is drawn 
upon by minority nationalist parties in all three cases is in the rhetorical distance placed 
between ‘the people’ from the territory they claim to represent and the ‘state’ within which 
they currently find themselves. In addition to distance, minority nationalist parties often refer 
to their government at the sub-national level as a partner, rather than as a subordinate institution 
to the central government. SNP rhetoric frequently opposed the interests of the Scottish people 
and Scotland with the policies carried out at the UK-government level by the Conservative 
Party (Scottish National Party, 2015e), and frequently describes its work with the UK-
government as ‘intergovernmental’ work, or ‘negotiations’, a relatively uncontroversial 
terminology in the United Kingdom, with similar terminology being used for instance in the 
Smith Commission report (Smith Commission, 2014). Similarly in Corsica, minority 
nationalists in Corsica frequently try to establish their government as a distinct partner of the 
French government, as opposed to a subordinate institution. A good illustration of this is the 
short, provocative statement issued by Corsican nationalist and President of the Corsican 
Assembly Jean-Guy Talamoni, describing France as a ‘friend’ of Corsica during a visit to the 
French government in 2016 (de Boni, 2016). In the run-up to the 2015 regional elections in 
France, other elements of rhetoric presented Corsica as being ‘close to France’, but a ‘nation’ 
in itself (Corsica Radio, 2015), while much of the project and purpose of supporting the 
nationalists in the elections was presented as enabling ‘Corsicans’ to ‘impose reforms on Paris’, 
with ‘Paris’ seen to mean the French government as an external actor as opposed to a domestic, 
hierarchical superior (Alta Frequenza, 2015e; Corsica Radio, 2015). In Catalonia, the Spanish 
state is frequently presented as an external opponent to the ‘Catalan people’, with frequent calls 
for ‘negotiations’ being made by Catalan nationalists to negotiate either a referendum on 
independence or independence itself (Junts Pel Sí, 2015g, 2015i). Oriol Junqueras, leader of 
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the ERC party in Catalonia, for instance described his primary opponent as ‘a state that works 
tirelessly against Catalonia’ (Junqueras, 2015b), while Raul Romeva, leader of the Junts Pel Sí 
electoral coalition, described Spain’s Constitutional Court as a politicized tribunal working 
against the interests and decisions of the Catalan people (Romeva i Rueda, 2015c). In all three 
cases, the central government of France, Spain and the United Kingdom are considered, with 
varying degrees of hostility and opposition, as external actors – unlike many other regions or 
territories with little to no nationalist politics, minority nationalist parties in government in 
Catalonia, Corsica and Scotland place their governments outside of the national-subnational 
hierarchy which usually characterises the relationship between national governments and 
regional or local administrations. 
 By creating, or sustaining, a distinct ‘peopleness’ for the people they claim to represent, 
minority nationalist parties legitimise self-determination as a solution to many of the 
grievances they put forward. By continuously constituting their respective ‘peoples’ as a real, 
relevant and legitimate category in discourse, minority nationalist parties contribute to the 
creation and promotion of the idea that the people they seek to represent in their respective 
territories are distinct from the larger ‘people’ represented by the central government of the 
state they find themselves in today. In all cases, this creates, and legitimises, an almost 
inevitably associated norm that can be stated in this manner: ‘the existence of a distinct 
Corsican/Catalan/Scottish people should be recognised as a reality’. As with all norms, the 
notion of life cycle can be used to understand the varying extent to which such a norm is 
accepted in the United Kingdom, France and Spain, leading to a different emphasis within 
minority nationalist discourse. In the case of Scotland, the notion of ‘Scottish people’ is 
frequently used and accepted by nationalists and non-nationalists alike, and can be seen as an 
‘internalised’ norm that is almost beyond contestation and certainly not the source of 
continuous political debate. At the other side of the spectrum of a norm’s life cycle, Corsican 
nationalists frequently need to address the existence of a Corsican ‘people’, engaging in 
persuasion in an attempt to convince a sufficient number of ‘critical agents’ to achieve 
recognition at the level of the French state. In all three cases, the discourse of minority 
nationalist parties and the norm of ‘peopleness’ they seek to promote and establish reinforce 
each other in a process of mutual constitution, with agent discourse changing relative to the 
overall acceptance among critical agents of the norm they have adopted. 
In addition to this, the adoption of distinct ‘peopleness’ forms the building block of 
several major grievances put forward by minority nationalist parties. By drawing on self-
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determination as a right granted to all people, minority nationalist parties have developed 
economic, institutional and identity-based grievances which, for the most part, can be resolved 
through the implementation of better, or more, self-determination. It is to these grievances that 
I turn my attention now. 
 
‘Internal self-determination’ and minority nationalist grievances 
 In all three cases studied in this thesis, minority nationalist parties pursue significant 
institutional and constitutional changes in their respective states. Ranging from a potentially 
drastic expansion in autonomy in the case of moderate nationalists in Corsica to outright 
independence for radical nationalists in Corsica as well as nationalists in Catalonia and 
Scotland, all minority nationalist parties studied in this case seek either ‘external’ self-
determination or a radical change in the provision of ‘internal’ self-determination within the 
state to which they currently belong. These similar goals, despite (sometimes significantly) 
different political contexts in the states within which these parties operate, can be perceived as 
being rooted in a common dissatisfaction with the characteristics or the extent of ‘internal’ self-
determination tolerated or provided by the central government.  
 An analysis of the various grievances put forward by minority nationalist parties in 
three major areas (economy, institutions, identity) further strengthens the notion that self-
determination, and ‘peopleness’, are the building blocks of most, if not all, other policy 
considerations put forward by these parties. While similar grievances and, in some cases, 
similar discourses, can be found across all three cases, a close study of the rhetoric of these 
parties as well as the normative political context they operate in allows us to determine a degree 
of hierarchy between grievances, which nonetheless places institutional, or self-determination-
driven grievances and demands at their core. 
 However, because different political contexts and normative frameworks mean that the 
norms being challenged by minority nationalist parties, and the normative gap that exists 
between the norms supported by central government and those put forward by minority 
nationalists are different in each case, the salience of each of the three types of grievances 
varies in minority nationalist discourse. In this case, we can see mutual constitution at work 
again: while all minority nationalist parties share a common commitment to self-determination, 
the normative and rules-based frameworks within which they operate (the structure) influences 
these parties’ interests as expressed through their rhetoric. 
Edward Walker – School of Government and International Affairs, Durham University 
103 | P a g e  
 
 The following section will draw on examples of rhetoric from throughout 2015, 2016 
and 2017 to highlight the different ways in which minority nationalists have presented their 
grievances to the public. This equates to attempting to persuade a key critical agent for norm 
adoption, the electorate. As we will see, while institutional grievances appear salient in the 
rhetoric of all minority nationalist parties, the extent to which economic grievances and identity 
grievances are present, and the way in which they are presented, varies across cases.  
 
Scotland 
Identity-based grievances 
The overall acceptance of Scottish ‘peopleness’, as well as a consensus on linguistic 
issues, contribute to the relative non-salience of identity-based grievances in the discourse and 
policies of the SNP.  
 The historical context surrounding Scotland’s place in the United Kingdom provides 
some explanations as to why identity-based grievances remain secondary today.  Whereas, 
historically, both Catalonia and Corsica were coercively absorbed into broader, unitary nation-
states, Scotland entered into a larger union with England and Wales, retaining its judicial, 
educational and religious systems as well as a distinct civil society. In the words of Soule, Leith 
and Steven, ‘in terms of public cultural activity, a continuity of Scottish institutions and 
traditions persisted enabling the Scottish middle class to continue to enact Scottish ways of 
being.’ (Soule, Leith and Steven, 2012, p. 2). The continued existence of a distinct society, and 
therefore a distinct identity, contrasts starkly with the homogenising tendencies of both the 
Spanish and French states, as best exemplified by their attitude to minority languages (see 
previous chapter). Other examples of this continued distinctiveness could also be found in other 
domains such as the arts, or sports, where the existence of separate, ‘sub-national’ teams 
representing all four of the United Kingdom’s ‘nations’, continues to be a global exception and 
an important vector for the affirmation of national identity (comparatively, the existence of 
such ‘sub-national’ sports teams in Corsica and Catalonia continues to be unrecognised and 
politically sensitive). 
 The question of language, which appears so central to the identity-based grievances of 
many minority nationalist movements including those in Catalonia and Corsica, also plays a 
minor and relatively uncontroversial role within the SNP’s rhetoric. The position and rhetorical 
importance granted to Scottish Gaelic within SNP rhetoric provides a strong example of the 
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secondary nature of language as a basis for identity-based grievances in Scotland. While 
spoken by only a very small proportion of the overall population of Scotland (1.1%) (REF), 
Scottish Gaelic benefits from a significant symbolic recognition, notably through the Gaelic 
Board (the institution monitoring Gaelic and implementing language policy)  and its 
commitment to establishing Gaelic as a language equal in status to English (Paterson and 
O’Hanlon, 2014).  
Despite this symbolic importance however, the presence of Gaelic language policies or 
issues in SNP rhetoric remains relatively limited. As an example, the Gaelic language is 
virtually absent from SNP leaflets, manifestos or social media. SNP Scottish Parliament 
election manifestos are not available in Gaelic, and the party website itself does not include a 
full Gaelic translation: only a single bilingual page could be found, discussing the SNP’s stance 
on Gaelic (Scottish National Party, 2017). Similarly, virtually none of the party’s 
communication on social media included Gaelic. Throughout the data collection period for this 
study, the SNP Twitter account issued messages almost exclusively in English, while all major 
party speeches, interventions, press releases and media appearances are conducted in English 
too. Gaelic-language interventions from SNP elected officials were frequently limited to 
elected officials from Gaelic heartlands, such as the Western Isles, and often on topics directly 
related to Gaelic education  or Gaelic language development (see BBC News, 2016a for an 
example of this - Allasdair Allan MSP addresses BBC Alba in Gaelic). However, even in 
Gaelic heartlands, SNP communication appears to be primarily conducted in the English 
language (see Electionleaflets.org, 2010 for a 2010 SNP leaflet from the Western Isles). 
 Substantially, Gaelic language policy does not appear to be a major point for the SNP, 
appearing generally less frequently and in more broad terms than what can be seen in other 
cases. The 1999 SNP manifesto mentions Gaelic only 3 times, highlighting the SNP’s 
commitment to promoting the Gaelic and Scots languages’ recognition as part of Scotland’s 
heritage and Gaelic-medium education. A further mention is made of supporting Gaelic 
language arts, alongside ‘art and culture expressed in other languages in common use in 
Scotland’ (Scottish National Party, 1999). The 2003 manifesto addressed Gaelic language 
issues more prominently, with a commitment to establishing a ‘Languages Act’ providing a 
‘secure status for the Gaelic and Scots language’ (Scottish National Party, 2003). The 
commitment included the establishment of a Gaelic Language Board as a statutory body, as 
well as commitments to promote the learning of Gaelic ‘as a second language’ in schools and 
in adulthood (Scottish National Party, 2003). Similar commitments to sustaining Gaelic and 
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improving Gaelic education are reiterated in the 2007, 2011 and 2016 manifestos, with 
recurrent commitments to improving Gaelic’s profile and sustaining it as a community 
language where it is currently used as such (Scottish National Party, 2007, 2011, 2016b). 
 There are several possible reasons to explain the relative absence of Gaelic from the 
SNP’s rhetoric and from its policy platform. The first explanation focuses on the minority status 
of Gaelic even within Scotland. As described above, Gaelic language speakers represent a small 
minority of the overall Scottish population. For this reason, there appears to be little reason for 
the SNP to grant a significant place to Gaelic language issues in a manifesto aimed at an 
electorate which, by and large, has no direct stake in the day-to-day practice and use of Gaelic. 
 However, aside from the minority status of Gaelic, the lack of SNP focus on Gaelic 
language issues within its rhetoric can be a sign of normative alignment between the existing 
legal and political framework regulating language policies in Scotland and the normative stance 
of the SNP on the issue. As described above, the SNP’s last major institutional demand relating 
to Gaelic language policy dates back to 2003, and the demand for a statutory government 
agency controlling Gaelic language policy. The demand itself was broadly satisfied in 2005 
under a Labour and Liberal Democrat coalition with the Gaelic Language Act, establishing a 
statutory body called Bòrd na Gàidhlig, or the Gaelic Board, with wide ranging powers in terms 
of promoting the use of Gaelic in public bodies in Scotland (Rogers and McLeod, 2007). 
Although SNP amendments granting ‘equal validity’ to Gaelic were rejected in favour of ‘equal 
respect’, the Act itself was supported unanimously in the Scottish Parliament (BBC News, 
2005). 
 While the SNP cannot be uniquely credited as the agent behind the official recognition 
of Gaelic in the 2005 Act, the Act built upon the decentralisation of linguistic issues in Britain 
to provide a significant set of tools for the promotion of Gaelic at the Scottish governmental 
level. While SNP commitments to Gaelic remained marginal in subsequent manifestos, the 
SNP once in government following the 2011 elections were able to enhance Gaelic language 
policy provisions by using the tools brought into existence by the Act and the Bòrd.  
 One the most important powers granted to the Bòrd is the ability for it to request ‘Gaelic 
Language Plans’, or policy documents detailing measures to promote and protect Gaelic, from 
individual government and other public institutions (Walsh and McLeod, 2008). In addition to 
the baseline National Gaelic Language Plans describe above, a wide range of Scottish 
governmental institutions have also been asked to, and have produced, Gaelic Language Plans 
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of their own. The Gaelic Language Plans adopted by the Scottish Government since 2007 act 
as an important illustration of the ways in which the SNP-led Scottish government believes 
Gaelic should be promoted across Scotland. In both plans, covering 2010 to 2015 and 2016 to 
2021 respectively, the SNP-led government can be seen to undertake a very wide range of 
measures promoting the visibility of Gaelic across Scotland and the use of Gaelic in public life 
in core speaker areas, altering significantly both the image of the Scottish Government from 
the perspective of ordinary citizens and the practice of the Scottish Government in relation to 
Gaelic language provision. The 2010 language plan for instance committed the Scottish 
Government to the introduction of Gaelic language equivalents within most of the 
Government’s visual identity elements, including official logos, letterheads, institutional 
names and government property signage (The Scottish Government, 2010). Several other 
provisions in the 2010 plan focus on making Gaelic a usable language for citizens to interact 
with the Government, improving Gaelic language training for Government customer service 
staff, providing Gaelic language forms, and providing Gaelic language translations of 
Government documents when requested (The Scottish Government, 2010). Building in large 
part on the 2010 plan, the plan adopted in 2016 further reinforces the visibility of Gaelic on 
Government properties, reinforcing Government communication in Gaelic, improving Gaelic 
usage in online resources and improving staff training to facilitate the provision of Government 
services in Gaelic (The Scottish Government, 2016). In addition to Gaelic language policies 
concerning core Government practices, the plan also highlights a range of commitments by the 
Scottish Government on the broader promotion of Gaelic in society, including a commitment 
to bilingual signage ‘on a new or replacement basis’, a commitment to further funding for 
Gaelic education and a commitment to the further use of Gaelic in national advertising and 
communication campaigns (The Scottish Government, 2016). 
 Analysed using the lens of norm diffusion and the norm life cycle, the norm that can be 
stated as ‘Gaelic should be recognised as a valuable part of Scottish identity and given equal 
visibility to English in Scotland’ is at the very least close to reaching the final stage of its life 
cycle, that of internalisation. Far from being the basis for identity-driven grievances, language 
(and specifically the place of Scottish Gaelic) appears to be an object of normative consensus 
across most, if not all, political actors in Scotland and the United Kingdom. The unanimous 
adoption of the 2005 Act provided a strong illustration of the consensus surrounding the need 
to promote and safeguard Gaelic, and the SNP has embraced and used all of the institutional 
tools provided by the Act to enthusiastically promote Gaelic not only within its core territories, 
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but across Scotland. Using its position in government, the SNP has been able to legitimately 
and significantly alter the public image of Scottish Government institutions, granting Gaelic an 
almost equal place to English in many of the public-facing elements of the Scottish 
Government.  
 Comparatively to the other two cases analysed below, the SNP’s focus on Gaelic in 
public party rhetoric is limited. Broadly satisfied with the institutional framework surrounding 
Gaelic language policy at the Scottish Government level, the SNP has focused on using its 
position as the governing party of Scotland to implement changes within the remit of the Bòrd 
and its National Gaelic Language Plan, granting many of the changes made by the SNP a 
significant degree of legal, institutional and political legitimacy. With demands for self-
determination in the realm of language broadly met, identity-based grievances based on 
language remain minimal in SNP rhetoric. 
 
 Due to the nature of Scotland’s relationship with and position within the United 
Kingdom, the consensus around the recognition of Scottish ‘peopleness’ as a legitimate identity 
and due to the relatively marginal position of language as a vector of identity in Scotland 
(despite it being a significant and sensitive part of identity in our other cases), the of Scottish 
national identity being under threat or attack, common within Corsica and Catalonia, is absent 
from SNP discourse. This however does not imply that national identity plays no part in the 
SNP’s rhetoric; the national category of ‘Scots’ is frequently used by the SNP in their rhetoric 
to differentiate Scotland, and the Scottish electorate and government, from its UK counterparts. 
The notion that the SNP is a party representing all ‘Scots’ and ‘standing for Scotland’s best 
interests’ or for ‘what is best for Scotland’ is a central element in the party’s rhetoric, and is 
frequently referred to in manifestos, speeches and other appearances. Manifestos, and the 
debates around Scotland’s position following the EU referendum, are clear examples of this 
(Scottish National Party, 2016b; Cheyne, 2017). 
 However, despite the SNP’s use of national identity to mobilise voters and frame 
economic and institutional matters alike, national identity in itself is rarely the source of 
specific, identity-based grievances as seen in Catalonia and particularly in Corsica. While 
Corsican national identity is primarily endorsed by minority nationalist parties and a frequent 
point of tension between Corsican nationalists and their opponents both in Corsica and within 
the French state, Scottish national identity remains relatively uncontroversial, and broadly 
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adopted by all political parties in Scotland (Soule, Leith and Steven, 2012). Considering this, 
the historical context and the political framework establishing Scotland as a distinct entity, 
there appears to be little ground, and indeed little need, for the SNP to focus on identity-driven 
grievances as a pre-requisite for self-determination and recognition. 
 
Institutional grievances 
 Over the period spent analysing the SNP’s policies from May 2015 to June 2016, two 
major institutional or constitutional grievances played a central part in the SNP’s rhetoric. In 
May 2015, the Scottish National Party was facing its first electoral test since the ‘No’ vote in 
the 2014 Scottish independence referendum. While the result was deemed a significant blow 
to the SNP’s pursuit of independence, it was also characterised by a political campaign which 
granted political momentum to the SNP, raising it to the strong levels of support that it enjoyed 
in the months running up to the election and to its historic 2015 General Election results 
(Dennison, 2015). Throughout that period and in the months following the 2015 General 
Election, the primary focus of the SNP’s  rhetoric and action on institutional or constitutional 
issues was the devolution of further powers to the Scottish parliament and government 
following promises made to that effect by British Prime Minister David Cameron, deputy 
Prime Minister Nick Clegg and leader of the Labour Party Ed Miliband shortly before the 2014 
independence referendum (Clegg, 2014; Page, 2015; McHarg, 2016).  
 With the aftermath of the 2014 ‘No’ vote in the Scottish independence referendum 
rendering external self-determination (independence) an impossible aim for the SNP in the 
short term, the party focused primarily on campaigning for a more advanced form of internal 
self-determination than what was granted at the time to Scotland as ‘nation’ in the United 
Kingdom. Campaigning ahead of the 2015 General Election, SNP leader Nicola Sturgeon 
focused the party’s message on making ‘Westminster sit up and take notice’ (Scottish National 
Party, 2015h), focusing on a strong anti-establishment message targeting the United Kingdom 
government for what the SNP perceived was an inadequate response and follow-up to the 
plans for further devolution that were highlighted in the run-up to the independence referendum 
in 2014.  
 Much of the SNP’s rhetoric focused on the proposals made by the Smith Commission 
in a report published on the 27th November 2014, which sought to set out the ways in which 
further powers could be devolved to the Scottish authorities. The Smith Commission, created 
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as a response to the aforementioned promises made by major British parties in the run-up to 
the independence referendum (Himsworth, 2016, p. 362) published a report after two months 
of consultations between major British parties, the SNP and both the UK and Scottish 
governments (Smith Commission, 2014; Eden, 2016). The report recommended three major 
developments in the institutional arrangements in Scotland. The first, and perhaps the most 
institutionally significant (strictly speaking), was a recommendation to establish both the 
Scottish Parliament and Scottish Government as permanent features of the United Kingdom’s 
institutional design, with stronger, more transparent and more systematic inter-governmental 
work between the Scottish and the United Kingdom government (Smith Commission, 2014, p. 
5; Page, 2015). While the removal or reversal of devolution was unlikely to be considered a 
realistic prospect in the short or medium term regardless of this recommendation, establishing 
both the Scottish Parliament and Scottish Government as permanent features of the United 
Kingdom’s institutional design responded to a demand by the SNP-led Scottish Government 
to provide greater legal and statutory certainty to the devolved institutions, rendering any top-
down abolition of devolution legally impossible (Himsworth, 2016, p. 362). In addition to this, 
the Smith Commission report recommended a statutory footing for what had become known 
as the ‘Sewel Convention’, according to which the UK government would refrain from 
legislating on devolved matters in Scotland without the approval of the Scottish institutions 
(Smith Commission, 2014, p. 13). Although, as noted by Page in his analysis of the Smith 
Commission report, these recommendations did not fundamentally challenge the notion of UK 
government sovereignty over Scotland, establishing the Scottish institutions as permanent and 
the Sewel Convention in law provided clear constitutional boundaries, limiting the spectrum 
of possible policies for the United Kingdom government both in terms of devolved policy areas 
in Scotland but also with regard to the very nature of Scotland’s devolved institutions (Page, 
2015). 
 The other two ‘pillars’ for further devolution identified in the Smith report focused 
primarily on economic and social matters, addressing some of the economic grievances carried 
by the SNP to which I will return below. In the second pillar, the Smith Commission 
recommended a significant expansion of the Scottish Government’s powers in the field of 
welfare, with powers including setting the frequency and rate of many benefits including 
carers’ allowance, disability benefits, winter fuel payments, housing benefit (and the housing 
element of the Universal Credit when implemented) and the symbolic ‘under-occupancy 
charge’ or ‘bedroom tax’, and the ability to create new benefits in areas of devolved 
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competence (Page, 2015, pp. 235–6; Mullen, 2016, p. 382). This pillar, which the Smith 
Commission report labelled as ‘delivering prosperity, a healthy economy, jobs and social  
justice’ (Smith Commission, 2014), represented a significant change in a number of important 
aspects related to both institutional and economic grievances raised by the SNP. Politically, by 
shifting control over a large number of different welfare payments to the Scottish authorities, 
the Smith report recommendations moved an important, day-to-day, administrative contact 
point between the public and government administrations away from UK institutions towards 
devolved institutions (Mullen, 2016, p. 383). The devolution of sections of welfare also 
provided leeway for the SNP-led Scottish government to address some of the more significant 
economic grievances surrounding differences in opinion with the UK government over 
budgetary and welfare policy. The devolution of welfare recommended in the report, alongside 
all other recommendations, would provide the Scottish government with control over 60% of 
public expenditure in Scotland, with Mullen identifying more specifically that 15.3% of 
welfare expenditure previously exclusively controlled by the UK government would then be 
devolved to the Scottish authorities (Page, 2015; Mullen, 2016).  
 Considering the potentially significant increases in expenditure brought about by the 
Smith Commission’s proposals for welfare devolution, the third ‘pillar’, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, addressed the issue of tax devolution. The recommendations of the Smith 
Commission report included wide ranging ideas such as allowing the Scottish government to 
set non-dividend and non-savings income tax rates, as well as allowing the government to retain 
up to the first ten percentage points of VAT taxation raised in Scotland (Page, 2015, p. 236). 
Overall, Page identifies that, while Scotland would be responsible for up to 60% of welfare 
expenditure as described above, the Scottish government would also, under the Smith 
Commission recommendations, retain 40% of tax raised in Scotland (Page, 2015, p. 236). The 
gap between expenditure and tax income would continue to be filled by block grants from the 
UK government calculated under the ‘Barnett Formula’, a convention according to which UK 
government funding for devolved administration is based on population figures and the extent 
of devolved powers – and adjusted as population figures change (Select Committee on the 
Barnett Formula, 2009). Alongside the devolution of tax powers, the Smith Commission 
recommended an increase in independent budgetary scrutiny and increased borrowing powers 
for the Scottish government to match the increased financial responsibility (Page, 2015), as 
well as a ‘no detriment principle’, according to which further devolution of expenditure ought 
to be matched by an increase in UK government funding for the devolved institutions, while 
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devolution of tax income ought to be matched by a reduction of the same funding (Smith 
Commission, 2014, pp. 25–26). 
 The SNP’s rhetoric in 2015 and in early 2016 on institutional issues focused primarily 
on the implementation of the Smith Commission recommendations, and on the negotiations 
surrounding the implementation of these recommendations in the form of the Scotland Act 
2016. While SNP criticism of the Smith Commission report remained relatively muted 
throughout the period, the general view from the party was that the Smith Commission 
recommendations, although welcome, did not go far enough in providing full fiscal 
responsibility to the Scottish government and further devolved powers. Criticism of the report 
began soon after its publication in late 2014, with Scottish First Minister Nicola Sturgeon 
criticising for instance what was perceived as the limited control given over welfare to the 
Scottish government, and encouraging voters to use the 2015 General Election to vote SNP and 
demand further powers (Brooks, 2014). This commitment was subsequently reflected in the 
SNP’s 2015 General Election manifesto, demanding that ‘the proposals of the Smith 
Commission are delivered quickly and in full’, adding that these proposals do not ‘go far 
enough to honour the promises made during the referendum’ (Scottish National Party, 2015q). 
 However, as the first drafts of what would become the Scotland Act 2016 emerged and 
as negotiations over their content began, the SNP’s rhetoric shifted slightly, adopting the Smith 
Commission as a benchmark that was not being reached in the proposed legislation. Drawing 
from the SNP’s strong position following the 2015 General Election, the party was particularly 
active in criticising early drafts of the Scotland Act. Commenting on an SNP amendment to 
one of the early drafts, SNP Westminster leader Angus Robertson described the Smith 
Commission recommendations as ‘the bare minimum which should be delivered to Scotland’, 
arguing that the Bill  failed ‘to meet even the limited powers set out in the Smith Commission’ 
and fell ‘far short of the aspirations of people in Scotland as expressed so firmly at the General 
Election’ (Scottish National Party, 2015k). Later, the focus on securing powers beyond the 
Smith Commission recommendations faded further, with criticism of UK government policy 
focusing on simply failing to implement the report in full (Scottish National Party, 2015f). By 
2016 and the finalisation of the Scotland Act 2016, the SNP rhetoric focused on the importance 
of securing the powers that were available in the Act, this despite considering that the powers 
were still insufficient (ITV, 2016; Swinney, 2016). One of the last points of contention in the 
SNP rhetoric concerned what the SNP perceived as a lack of fiscal framework associated with 
the new powers included in the Scotland Act, with concerns that the ‘no detriment principle’ 
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described above was not being respected and that the powers devolved in the Scotland Act, 
alongside continued budget cuts from the UK central government, would have a negative 
impact on the Scottish government’s own budget (ITV, 2016; Swinney, 2016). 
 
 By 2016 however, the focus of the SNP’s institutional grievances had shifted away 
from matters of ‘internal self-determination’ towards a renewed push for independence 
(Brooks, 2016b). As early as September 2015, and despite refusing to consider the 2015 
General Election result as a mandate for an independence referendum at the time (The 
Scotsman, 2015), SNP-elected representatives began arguing that a vote to leave the European 
Union in the then-upcoming European Union membership referendum in June 2016 was a 
sufficiently significant event to warrant re-opening the debate on Scottish independence 
(Barbiere, 2015; Brooks, 2016b). Discussions on introducing a second independence 
referendum began playing a central part in SNP rhetoric in the run-up to the 2016 Scottish 
elections and the subsequent European Union membership referendum, both in June 2016. 
Campaigning for the 2016 Scottish elections was perceived by observers as being dominated 
by the independence question. Accordingly, a series of televised leaders’ debate prior to the 
2016 Scottish election were broadly seen as being dominated by debates over the legitimacy 
of a second independence referendum, although much of the discussion focused on economic 
arguments for and against independence itself (BBC News, 2016b; Brooks, 2016a). The 
commitment to independence was re-iterated in the SNP’s manifesto for the 2016 elections, in 
which the SNP committed to organising a referendum ‘if there is clear and sustained evidence 
that independence has become the preferred option of a majority of the Scottish people – or if 
there is a significant and material change in the circumstances that prevailed in 2014, such as 
Scotland being taken out of the EU against our will’ (Scottish National Party, 2016b).  
 In the run-up to the EU membership referendum held weeks after the Scottish elections 
in June 2016, SNP rhetoric focused on defending EU membership, emphasising the economic 
and political benefits of membership for Scotland. A series of posts detailing the SNP’s position 
on EU membership highlighted membership benefits with regard to young people, families, 
employment, trade, immigration and international investment (Furby, 2016a, 2016b; Livey, 
2016). While the SNP’s defence of EU membership itself focused primarily on economic 
matters, the SNP’s response to the referendum result focused primarily on institutional 
considerations. In a televised statement on the morning following the EU membership 
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referendum, Sturgeon described a second independence vote as ‘highly likely’ (Cramb and 
Henderson, 2016). Justifying the mandate for a second independence referendum in an 
interview conducted for the purpose of this research, SNP Member of the European Parliament 
Alyn Smith emphasised institutional failings, as well as the result of the EU referendum itself 
in which a majority of Scottish voters voted to remain in the EU (The Electoral Commission, 
2016), as primary reasons legitimising the SNP’s demand for a second independence 
referendum. Alyn Smith emphasised, for instance, what he perceived as a continued inequality 
between the Scottish government and the UK government, highlighting the UK government’s 
unwillingness to negotiate or implement amendments from the Scottish government in the run-
up to the EU referendum such as voting age, including EU citizens in the franchise for the 
referendum or including a ‘double majority’ requirement (majority across the UK and all four 
constituent nations). More so than the EU referendum result, Smith emphasised primarily what 
he perceived as an unwillingness or inability from the UK government to work with and 
consider the Scottish parliament, lamenting the lack of a ‘spirit of compromise’ and describing 
the UK-Scotland intergovernmental relationship as ‘not a partnership’. 
Throughout the first half of 2017, the SNP continued to emphasise their pursuit of 
independence, with Nicola Sturgeon announcing a second Scottish referendum in March 2017, 
and further committing to the vote in the run-up to the 2017 General Election (Cheyne, 2017; 
Stone, 2017). However, disappointing results in that election, in which the SNP lost 21 of its 
56 seats, undermined the SNP’s plans to introduce a second independence referendum, leading 
to its postponement until 2018 at the earliest  (Carrell, 2017; Johnson, 2017). While it remains 
unclear whether an independence referendum in response to the EU referendum will take place, 
the SNP’s institutional grievances, from 2016 to the current time of writing, have focused 
primarily on the impact of leaving the European Union for Scotland. 
 Institutional grievances have, throughout the period analysed in this thesis, continued 
to be central to the SNP’s policy platform and rhetoric. However, and unlike Corsica and 
Catalonia, several external events and an ongoing negotiation process with the central UK 
government have led to changes in emphasis in the SNP’s rhetoric, ranging from the demand 
for deeper political autonomy and further devolution at the time of the negotiations for the 
Scotland Act 2016 to a renewed demand for outright independence in the context of the UK’s 
upcoming departure from the European Union. These changes over time can be explained in 
different ways. Following the 2014 referendum on independence, many agents, including the 
SNP, had come to the conclusion that independence was no longer a legitimate goal in the short 
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term, having been rejected by the Scottish electorate. However, the critical juncture caused by 
the European Union referendum in 2016 altered this position, creating another self-
determination-based normative gap between the SNP and the central UK government. 
Considering the central place given to the EU referendum result in Scotland in SNP rhetoric, 
the normative chain legitimising the pursuit of self-determination can be understood in these 
terms: 
(1) The Scottish people are a distinct people, that should be entitled to democratic self-
determination. 
 
(2) Therefore the democratic decision of the Scottish people to remain a member of the 
European Union should be respected. 
 
(3) For this democratic decision to be respected, the Scottish people should be consulted 
on independence from the United Kingdom, on the assumption that the choice is either 
(a) remain in the United Kingdom and outside of the European Union or (b) achieve 
independence and remain a member of the European Union. 
 
Considering the relative overall acceptance of the Scottish people’s ‘peopleness’ described 
above, at first glance these norms should appear unproblematic. However, a significant 
normative difference developed in the specific context of the UK referendum on European 
Union membership. While, for the purpose of Scottish elections or in the context of Scottish 
independence, Scottish ‘peopleness’ is well established and recognised by all relevant agents, 
Scottish ‘peopleness’ appears subsumed within a broader ‘British peopleness’ in British 
government rhetoric about the legitimacy of the EU referendum result. Frequently presented 
as a decision by ‘the British people’ (see May, 2017), the absence of a distinction between the 
‘British people’ and its components within the rhetorical context of the EU referendum meant 
that the right to self-determination, which appeared virtually uncontested in the run up and the 
aftermath of the 2014 independence referendum, was denied by the UK central government in 
the context of the European Union referendum. As a response, the SNP hardened its position 
on self-determination, arguing that only external self-determination would enable the Scottish 
‘people’ to make major decisions such as European Union membership on the basis of the 
wishes they expressed. 
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Economic Grievances 
Economic grievances, while present in the rhetoric of most political parties, are 
presented and mobilised by minority nationalist parties in a different way. In the case of 
Scotland, the central position given to economic policies in the Scottish National Party’s 
political platform cannot be overstated. In the run-up to the 2015 United Kingdom General 
Election, the first of two major electoral contests observed through my daily collection of social 
media posts, media appearances, speeches and other forms of party literature, economic 
grievances, and the SNP’s policies to address some of these economic issues, were at the centre 
of party rhetoric and perception.  
 Major statements and documents ahead of the election emphasised SNP opposition to 
Conservative Party economic policy. The introductory section of the party’s election manifesto 
illustrates this: 
The SNP will use our influence at Westminster to help deliver positive change for the 
benefit of ordinary people, not just in Scotland, but across the UK. 
We propose a real alternative to the pain of austerity, an end to unfair policies like the 
Bedroom Tax, a higher minimum wage and protection for our NHS and vital public 
services. 
Instead of even deeper Westminster spending cuts, we want to see more investment in 
our economy, to create more and better paid jobs. 
And we want the precious resources of our country to be invested in building a better 
future for our children, not on a new generation of nuclear weapons. 
The SNP will never put the Tories into power. (Scottish National Party, 2015q) 
In this extract from the SNP 2015 manifesto, which represents more than half of the 
introductory message, opposition to public expenditure cuts and support for greater public 
spending in public services form the core of the SNP’s campaign platform. This economic 
focus was further reiterated during Nicola Sturgeon’s ‘campaign conference’ speech in March 
2015, during which she dedicated a considerable amount of time to attacks against ‘slash and 
burn austerity’ and support for ‘a fair wage for all’, ‘pensions that protect our older people’ and 
‘a decent welfare system that helps people into work’ (Scottish National Party, 2015h).  
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 A similar emphasis on economic issues continued in the months following the 2015 
general election. A post-election rapprochement between the SNP and the Scottish Trade 
Unions Congress (STUC) provided an opportunity for the SNP to continue emphasising its 
opposition to Conservative Party economic policy and its economic policy proposals (Scottish 
National Party, 2015j). A series of website posts made throughout the summer of 2015 
highlighted a range of economic grievances, from housing shortages (Scottish National Party, 
2015c) to the impact of benefit sanctions (Scottish National Party, 2015i, 2015m) to tax credit 
cuts and their impact on the Scottish population (Scottish National Party, 2015b). Similar posts 
during the same period highlight how opposition to Conservative Party economic policy was 
not only at the heart of the SNP’s policy platform, but also very much an integral part of the 
way in which the party sought to portray itself to the public and integral to the place the SNP 
was seeking to secure in the national political arena – opposition to Conservative Party policy 
was essential in the SNP’s attempt to portray itself as the only ‘real opposition’ in the United 
Kingdom Parliament, criticising the Labour Party for its inability to oppose Conservative Party 
policy effectively (Scottish National Party, 2015l, 2015o). Similar statements on the SNP’s 
official website and in various media outlets continued to emphasise economic policy 
throughout the autumn of 2015, with for instance then-cabinet secretary for social justice Alex 
Neil MSP stating that the ‘SNP’s first priority is to stop tax credit cuts’ (Learmonth, 2015; 
Scottish National Party, 2015n, 2015p). 
Economic grievances were not only at the heart of the party’s campaign rhetoric, but 
also at the centre of the perception of the SNP’s campaign platform by observers and critics 
alike. Summaries of the platform made available to the public through several national media 
emphasised the party’s economic platform: the BBC for instance provided a list of ‘key 
pledges’ of the SNP, with five out of the six ‘key pledges’ identified as key economic policies 
including increases in the minimum wage, protection of pensions and increases in public 
spending (BBC News, 2015b). Other major press outlets such as The Telegraph or The 
Guardian provided in-depth summaries of SNP policies ahead of the campaign, with multiple 
sections dedicated to the SNP’s economic policies on issues such as general public spending 
or welfare and health expenditures (Brooks, 2015; Johnson, 2015). 
The centrality of economic issues similarly extended to critics of the SNP’s campaign 
platform, most notably the Conservative Party. One of the major criticisms focused on the 
SNP’s potential desire to enter a coalition agreement with the Labour Party in order to secure 
power in the event of another ‘hung parliament’, a parliament in which no party has secured an 
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overall majority. Then Prime Minister David Cameron frequently described a potential 
coalition agreement between the SNP and the Labour Party as a ‘coalition of chaos’, 
emphasising what he perceived as the economic damage that such a coalition would cause – 
‘job losses’, ‘massive tax rises’ and an ‘economy “back on the brink of bankruptcy”’ (BBC 
News, 2015a; Morris, 2015; Wintour, 2015). While, as I described above, institutional issues 
also played an important part in the SNP’s rhetoric around the 2015 General Election campaign, 
it is clear from evidence collected from both SNP publications and media appearances and 
general media coverage that their economic grievances, as well as the policy platform 
developed address these issues, dominated both the rhetoric and the perception of the SNP 
during that campaign. 
Throughout my observation of the SNP’s rhetoric daily and at the time of major 
electoral contests, it is clear that economic grievances play a significant role and shape the 
policy platform adopted by the party, the image it seeks to establish of its own political role 
and the perception of its main policies in both the media and from the perspective of opposition 
parties in the United Kingdom. 
 
Catalonia 
In the Catalan case, the relative importance of economic, identity-based and 
institutional grievances differs from the Scottish case. Identity-based grievances, while 
important to Catalan nationalism, are inseparable from broader institutional grievances. It is to 
these two that I turn my attention now. 
 
Identity-based and institutional grievances 
 There are several reasons to consider both identity-based and institutional grievances 
as closely connected in the Catalan case. One of the most important considerations, however, 
relates to the notion of ‘peopleness’, and the extent to which this is contested by the Spanish 
central government. As we have seen in the case of language in Scotland, a norm around which 
there is significant consensus across most critical actors will usually become secondary in the 
discourse of minority nationalist parties. The notion of ‘peopleness’ itself for the Catalans, with 
all its requirements in terms of cultural, historical and linguistic recognition, is relatively 
uncontroversial.  
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Language is an essential component of Catalan nationalism, and an essential component 
of Catalan national identity (Major, 2013). Of all the cases analysed here, Catalonia is the 
closest to being a bilingual society. Although some academics characterise Catalan society as 
being divided along ethnolinguistic lines (Miley, 2013), and, according to 2008 figures, only 
35% of the population were native Catalan speakers, 94% of residents over the age of 14 
indicated that they could understand Catalan, with 78.3% saying they could speak the language, 
81.7% saying they could read it and 61.8% saying they could write it (Xavier Vila, 2013). 
Proficiency levels increase in the younger age groups, with 2010 data showing that 85% of 15-
24 year old residents report that they can understand, speak, write and read Catalan perfectly 
(Strubell, 2013). The Catalan language, broadly understood as an ‘expression’ of ‘Catalan 
nature’ and one of the building blocks of the Catalan nation, enjoys broad support among the 
population and is among the 20 most used languages globally (Major, 2013; Xavier Vila, 2013). 
Most road signs, commercial signs, place names and street names are often exclusively in 
Catalan and all newspapers publishing in Catalonia publish either exclusively in Catalan or 
publish simultaneous, separate Castilian and Catalan editions. Public television in Catalonia is 
also primarily in Catalan. (Xavier Vila, 2013) 
 
Unlike most of the parties analysed in this thesis, the presence of Catalan nationalists 
in power for most of the past thirty years at the regional level gives us a clear insight into the 
importance accorded to language in Catalan minority nationalist party rhetoric and policy. In 
an interview with Catalan MEP Ramon Tremosa i Balcells, he described Catalan nationalist 
parties as being particularly focused on language prior to 2010, with a focus on education and 
the media (Appendix A, interview 8). This focus is reflected in some of the key policies passed 
by the minority nationalist regional government in the years and decades following the re-
establishment of the Catalan regional government in 1979. The Llei de Normalització 
Lingüística in 1983, followed by the Llei de Política Lingüística in 1998, contributed 
significantly to increasing Catalan speaker numbers and Catalan education provision, while 
building on the recognition afforded by the 1979 Statute of Autonomy to firmly establish 
Catalan as the primary language of business, administration, education, culture and the media 
in Catalonia (Mayans Balcells, 2013; Miley, 2013). 
 The commitment to Catalan as a “normal” language to be used daily for political 
activity was evident in the fieldwork conducted for this thesis. With regard to social media and 
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internet identification and communication, all minority nationalist parties in Catalonia 
overwhelmingly use Catalan for social media messages, press releases and online multimedia. 
A glance at the website of both the PDeCAT and ERC reveals that neither party provide a 
Castilian translation of their website and content, a fact that contrasts significantly with the use 
of minority languages online and on websites in Britain and France. While the commitment to 
bilingualism, even in the event of an independent Catalonia, remains a feature of minority 
nationalist rhetoric and thought (El Periódico, 2015), there is no doubt from looking at the 
online presence of Catalan minority nationalist parties that from their perspective, Catalan is 
the primary, national language of Catalonia, and the language to be used in public and political 
life. 
 Some academics have argued that, although language is a crucial element of Catalan 
nationalism, the surge of pro-independence feeling as well as the secure status of Catalan as 
the primary language of Catalan society have made language issues secondary in the rhetoric 
of minority nationalist parties and in pro-independence campaigns (Xavier Vila, 2013). Indeed, 
throughout the fieldwork period for this study which included the significant September 2015 
Catalan parliamentary elections, language was clearly a secondary issue relative to the 
economy, healthcare and constitutional issues (Junts Pel Sí, 2015m). In an interview, Ramon 
Tremosa i Balcells, while recognising the role of language as an essential part of Catalan 
identity, did not particularly mention language as a key political issue at stake today as opposed 
to democracy, potential independence and the economy (Appendix A, interview 8). The strong 
status of the Catalan language, and its frequent use, seem to have depoliticised, or ‘normalised” 
the presence and use of Catalan language within Catalan society, a status that is rarely 
questioned from within Catalonia.  
 Supported in large part by a flexible institutional framework granting significant 
autonomy to the Catalan government on language policy, minority nationalist parties in 
government in Catalonia have been able to implement wide ranging policies that have 
contributed to the establishment of ‘Catalan is the primary language of Catalonia’ as the 
primary norm regulating the position and status of the language within Catalonia and Catalan 
society. The norm, supported by the laws described above and introduced by Catalan minority 
nationalists in government, continues to be well established within Catalonia, as illustrated by 
the use of Catalan as a primary language of communication by most Catalan political parties. 
However, while minority nationalist parties no longer treat language as a primary issue in their 
day-to-day rhetoric, occasional attacks on the norm stated above have led to re-emergence of 
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language as a significant topic in Catalan politics. Tensions have re-emerged in the recent 
context of a surge of pro-independence feeling since 2010. Several decisions made by the 
central Spanish state can be understood as either limiting attempts at further strengthening the 
norm, and, in some cases, as attempts to reverse it. In 2010, a reformed Statute of Autonomy 
was deemed constitutionally invalid by the Spanish Constitutional Court, with specific mention 
made of a clause making Catalan the sole language of instruction (Mayans Balcells, 2013), the 
argument being that while Castilian was considered compulsory for all citizens in the 
Constitution, the same could not be declared of any other language (Xavier Vila, 2013). In this 
context of tensions, Spanish Education Minister José Ignacio Wert introduced an Organic Law 
for the Improvement of the Quality of Education in 2012, providing balanced Castilian/Catalan 
teaching across all subjects, prohibiting the exclusion of Castilian as a language of instruction 
and giving parents the choice to pick the language of education of their children (Xavier Vila, 
2013). In further comments, justifying the law, Wert argued that one of the causes of separatist 
feeling in Catalonia was decades-long indoctrination in the Catalan education system, arguing 
for the need to “Hispanise” Catalan pupils (Ganyet, 2013; Mayans Balcells, 2013). 
 There is however, little sign of the norm being reversed successfully. Despite attempts 
at restricting the increasingly dominant position of Catalan within Catalonia, the language 
continues to be the primary language of public life within the territory. Unlike Scotland 
however, minority nationalist parties have continued to try and strengthen the position of 
Catalan within Catalonia, and moves by the Spanish state to either limit these attempts or even 
reverse some of measures granting Catalan a dominant position in education have triggered 
significant reactions from minority nationalists. However, drawing upon the fact that Catalan 
use is widespread in society and, for the most part, not significantly contested by any critical 
political agent, Catalan nationalists have frequently focused on more contentious issues for 
which persuasion, and further norm diffusion and legitimisation, were necessary. 
 
As we have seen above, the Catalan language enjoys a significant degree of protection 
within Catalan society, and remains firmly established in day-to-day use. The relative strength 
of the Catalan language, and the way in which it contributes to the creation of a sense of distinct 
identity for Catalans, means that in general, recognition is not at stake for Catalan minority 
nationalist parties, and pure, identity-based grievances tend not to occupy an important place 
in those parties’ rhetoric and policy platforms. 
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 However, unlike Scotland, difficulties emerge in Catalonia with regard to the normative 
connection between ‘peopleness’ and self-determination and all its institutional consequences. 
As in the case of Corsica, the normative contestation between minority nationalists and the 
Spanish central government focuses on the Constitution, and often takes place outside of the 
strictly political realm. As an example of this, two major decisions taken by the Spanish 
Constitutional Court highlight the difficulties minority nationalist parties have faced in 
reconciling cultural, historical ‘peopleness’ with the rights this potentially confers on a people 
through self-determination. 
 One of the most fundamental illustrations of the normative clash between Catalan 
minority nationalist parties and the Spanish central state is the 2010 rejection of the 2006 
reform of the Catalan Statute of Autonomy by the Spanish Constitutional Court. Despite broad 
political agreement between the then-Catalan government and the Spanish central government, 
the new statute was brought to the Spanish Constitutional Court, who, following four years of 
deliberation, rejected it as unconstitutional (de Laguérie, 2014). While the Court highlighted 
several problems, the detail of the clauses that were considered unconstitutional and the 
reasoning behind this decision is less relevant, and had less of an impact on Catalan minority 
nationalism, than the overall perception this decision caused. Referring to the overall decision 
as opposed to any specific clause, Catalan minority nationalist parties argued that internal self-
determination on the terms supported by the Catalan population through elections was no 
longer possible within the legal framework of the Spanish state (de Laguérie, 2014). 
Accordingly, while the detail of the decision taken by the Spanish Constitutional Court in 2010 
is rarely brought up in public rhetoric, minority nationalist party representatives made it 
abundantly clear throughout the 2015 electoral campaign that the Court’s decision was one of 
the key motivations for their decision to pursue independence rather than further autonomy 
(Esquerra Republicana, 2015e; Romeva i Rueda, 2015c). Observers widely credit the decision 
as the main factor that transformed the Catalan pro-independence movement from a minority 
to a quasi-majority today (Munoz Jofre, 2014). 
 Aside from the symbolic impact of the 2010 Constitutional Court decision, a further 
decision, published this time in 2014 in response to the Catalan Parliament’s 2013 adoption of 
a ‘Declaration of Sovereignty’ challenged, more directly, the notion of ‘peopleness’ put 
forward by minority nationalist parties in Catalonia. The Declaration, among other points, 
declares the Catalan people as a ‘political and sovereign entity’, ‘backed by democratic 
legitimacy’ and established a guaranteed legal commitment to facilitating the practice of ‘self-
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determination’ in a negotiated process with the Spanish government (Parlament de Catalunya, 
2013). In doing so, the Declaration establishes the position of the Catalan people not only as a 
distinct ‘people’ from the Spanish people, but also as an equal by virtue of its status as a 
political, sovereign, and democratically legitimate entity. In opposition to this, the decision 
published by the Spanish Constitutional Court argued that the clauses on sovereignty contained 
in the Declaration violated two articles of the Spanish Constitution: 
Article 1.2: National sovereignty stems from the Spanish people, from whom the 
powers of the State emanate. 
Article 2: The Constitution is based on the indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation, 
common and indivisible homeland of all Spaniards; it recognises the right to self-
government of the nationalities and regions of which it is composed and the solidarity 
among them all (Cortes Generales, 2011) 
 Based on the brief description made of the Declaration above, it is relatively clear that 
it is incompatible with these two articles. If sovereignty within Spain stems from the Spanish 
people, another category cannot simultaneously be sovereign. This fact is reinforced by the 
‘indissoluble’ and ‘indivisible’ nature of the Spanish nation as established in Article 2. While 
the second article does recognise the right for ‘nationalities’ to exercise self-government, the 
fact that these nationalities are deemed to ‘compose’ the ‘Spanish nation’ as opposed to being 
distinct from it precludes any possibility of considering a sub-section of the Spanish people as 
a distinct ‘people’ with access to full self-determination. The notion that national sovereignty 
stems from the Spanish people, also means that although the ‘nationalities’ and ‘regions’ that 
compose Spain have a right to self-government as established in Article 2, any decision 
regarding self-government is subject not just to the people of a given region or territory, but to 
the Spanish people (as the only legitimate sovereign entity) as a whole, an expression of which 
the Constitution establishes itself to be (Comella, 2014). 
 The normative struggle surrounding ‘peopleness’ and ‘self-determination’ illustrated 
by these two major Spanish Constitutional Court decisions highlights the core institutional 
grievance at the heart of Catalan minority nationalist discourse. Throughout the period 
analysed, Catalan minority nationalist parties offered one, major reason for their pursuit of 
external self-determination: the unwillingness of the Spanish central government to recognise 
the democratic decisions made by the Catalan people (by electing, several times in relatively 
quick succession, minority nationalist majorities in the Catalan parliament). In a series of public 
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messages on social media, Raul Romeva, a major minority nationalist political actor and leader 
of the Junts Pel Sí electoral coalition heading into the October 2015 Catalan parliamentary 
elections, highlighted a number of reasons as to why his coalition were now pursuing 
independence actively:  
 We are where we are because we have no alternative. We spent five years 
demanding a legal and agreed negotiating process, and nothing. On the #27S [27th 
September, the date of the election], we will finally make them listen.’ (Romeva i 
Rueda, 2015e) 
We are where we are because even though a majority of the Parliament (80%) is in 
favour of the “Right To Decide”, we nevertheless cannot exercise that right (Romeva i 
Rueda, 2015b) 
We are where we are because a President went to the ballot box, to ask people, and was 
taken to court in response (Romeva i Rueda, 2015d) 
We are where we are because a country voted for a new Statute, and a political Tribunal 
decided to reject it (Romeva i Rueda, 2015c) 
This series of messages encompasses, in brief, the fundamental institutional grievance put 
forward by minority nationalist parties in Catalonia to legitimise the pursuit of external self-
determination. Described as unwilling and ‘tirelessly working against Catalonia’ (Esquerra 
Republicana, 2015e; Junqueras, 2015b), Catalan minority nationalist parties focused much of 
their rhetorical anger on the unwillingness of the Spanish state to recognise and act upon 
Catalan demands for Constitutional reform, an important pre-requisite for further autonomy or 
for any legal independence referendum (Comella, 2014). 
 The critique of the Spanish state’s position can be understood from the perspective of 
norm diffusion. As long as the Spanish state, most notably through the Constitutional Court 
but subsequently directly via the suspension of Catalonia’s political autonomy in the aftermath 
of the attempted independence referendum in 2017 (Torregrosa, 2017), continues to rely on 
coercion as a method of imposing and safeguarding its norms regarding Spanish sovereignty 
and ‘peopleness’, it becomes very complicated for Catalan minority nationalists to successfully 
diffuse their norms and reach a stage of norm cascading. Insofar as Catalonia remains a part of 
Spain, the Spanish central government remains one of the most important ‘critical agents’ for 
norm diffusion in Catalonia – without the approval, or at the least the tacit indifference, of the 
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Spanish government, minority nationalist parties will struggle to implement their preferred 
norms in a legitimate and functional way. The continued request for negotiations can be 
understood as an attempt to move away from coercion towards a process of socialization, where 
both parties, through exchange and mutual learning, can either be persuaded to adopt each 
other’s norms or adopt a compromise norm that satisfies all of the necessary critical agents. At 
the time of writing however, there is very little evidence of such a demand being met. 
 
Economic grievances 
 In addition to these fundamental institutional grievances, Catalan minority nationalist 
parties also draw on the economy as an important area of political discourse. While central in 
the case of the SNP, economic discourse here plays a secondary role in relation to the 
institutional grievances addressed above. In most cases, economic grievances are consequences 
of the institutional grievances, and are used as evidence to support the perceived necessity of 
independence. More often than not, Catalan minority nationalist discourse on the economy 
does not take the form of grievances, but of opportunities: public discourse has a tendency in 
this case to focus on the ‘opportunities’ of independence, as opposed to the economic 
‘problems’ caused by continued incorporation into the wider Spanish state.  
 Both grievances and opportunities form the basis of the electoral manifesto put forward 
by the Junts Pel Sí coalition in 2015. One of the most significant economic grievances put 
forward concerns the fiscal arrangements and the fiscal contribution of Catalonia to the overall 
Spanish economy and government. In the manifesto, Junts Pel Sí argue that Catalonia 
contributes 19.8% of the overall Spanish budget, while receiving 14% back in public 
expenditure from the central government (Junts Pel Sí, 2015k). According to the manifesto, 
recovering the money lost in this fiscal deficit would allow for further investment in social 
security, education and healthcare, and would simultaneously allow Catalonia to adopt a 
simpler, more advantageous tax structure for individuals and businesses (Junts Pel Sí, 2015k).  
 Another important question that is often raised by minority nationalists in Catalonia is 
what they believe to be a ‘historic deficit in infrastructure investment’ that Catalonia suffers 
from as a result of Spanish government policy and centralisation. Minority nationalist political 
actors frequently criticised the lack of central government investment in a wide range of 
infrastructures, such as trains, airports, ports and roads (El Punt Avui, 2016; March, 2016). 
Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (Appendix A, interview 8), Catalan Member of the European 
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Parliament for the PdeCAT party, also highlighted the lack of central government investment 
in basic infrastructures, accusing Spain’s ‘centralisation’ as one of the major reasons why major 
infrastructure projects were frequently focused around Madrid, as opposed to Barcelona. He 
also contrasted the lack of central government investment with the overall economic dynamism 
of the Catalan economy, a contrast which, if widely acknowledged, significantly contributes to 
reinforcing the perception that the Spanish central government is hindering, rather than helping, 
Catalonia as a whole. Much of the economic discourse of minority nationalist parties hinges 
exactly on these two facets: criticising the Spanish government for its ineffective economic 
management, and promoting the idea that an independent Catalonia would inherently achieve 
better results. This, in turn, highlights the extent to which the economic grievances of Catalan 
minority nationalist parties play a primarily supportive role to fundamental institutional 
demands. 
 
Corsica 
The political and historical context of our final case, Corsica, also contrasts with that 
found in Scotland and Catalonia. Accordingly, although all three major types of grievances 
are found in the discourse of minority nationalists in Corsica, the emphasis placed on 
identity-based grievances differs markedly from what we described in Scotland and 
Catalonia.  
 
Identity-based grievances 
 As discussed above in the context of ‘peopleness’, Corsica remains the only territory, 
out of the three discussed here, to not have its population recognised as distinct from the overall 
population of the State. In this context, where securing ‘peopleness’ remains the primary 
struggle faced by minority nationalist parties, identity-based grievances are the most salient 
issues in Corsican nationalist political rhetoric. 
 While in Catalonia and Scotland the vocabulary of injustice is often used to describe 
the way in which central government addresses minority nationalist demands, Corsica is the 
only example here where the notion of injustice is reinforced by the notion of ‘survival’. The 
idea that the Corsican people, their culture, their language, are in mortal danger and risk 
disappearing, frequently appears in Corsican nationalist rhetoric. Gilles Simeoni, when 
addressing the debate around the ‘peopleness’ of Corsicans following his success at the 2015 
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regional elections, argued that ‘when a Constitution does not allow the recognition of a people, 
we need to change the Constitution, not make that people disappear’ (20 minutes, 2017). 
Similarly, in an interview for this thesis, Jean-Guy Talamoni described the Corsican people as 
an ‘endangered people’, arguing that because of France’s refusal to recognise and properly 
support the Corsican language and their refusal to recognise Corsicans as a distinct ‘people’, 
Corsicans had been, for a very long time, condemned to disappear and assimilate into the wider 
French population. 
 For minority nationalist parties in Corsica, language remains one of the most 
central and essential political issues within their rhetoric and action. Language plays an 
important, symbolic role in the ideology of Corsican nationalism, as best described here by 
Pierre Poggioli, veteran radical nationalist and academic: 
Corsicans have a language, both a natural communicative tool and the symbol of a 
collective identity. Our language is not simply an external or internal vector for 
communication. Language constitutes our identity, on the same terms as culture, and it 
is both the foundation and the expression of a people’s identity, and the main thing 
preventing the assimilation and disappearance of our people.  (Poggioli, 2016, p. 35) 
Further on, Poggioli describes Corsican nationalism’s struggle for linguistic recognition as a 
struggle for ‘who they are’, arguing that the language is the main reason through which 
‘Corsicans constitute a people in the first place’ (Poggioli, 2016, p. 36). This idea of language 
as primordial vector of identity is echoed across Corsican nationalism: in an interview 
conducted for this study, Jean-Guy Talamoni described language as “not a single issue, but 
permeating all issues. Language is what we are” (Appendix A, Interview 3). Such an 
understanding of language is not reserved to the radical branch of Corsican nationalism (see 
the thesis introduction for an explanation of different branches of Corsican nationalism). Gilles 
Simeoni, current executive leader of the Corsican sub-national authority and moderate 
nationalist leader, describes language as one of the pillars that establishes Corsicans as distinct 
people, alongside geography and a shared identity (Appendix A, interview 2). 
 
 The strength of Corsican nationalism’s commitment to the Corsican language, as well 
as the centrality of language within the agenda of Corsican nationalist parties, stems from 
Corsica’s unique situation within France with respect to its ‘regional’ language. While many, 
if not all regional languages in France have been reduced to a marginal position, characterised 
Edward Walker – School of Government and International Affairs, Durham University 
127 | P a g e  
 
by absence from society and falling speaker numbers, Corsica has been characterised as being 
in a situation of ‘diglossia’, a term used to characterise situations in which two language subsist 
in different spheres within society, with different usages (Cole and Harguindéguy, 2013). 
Estimates for the number of Corsican speakers vary greatly, depending on whether the Corsican 
diaspora (estimated at over 500.000 people in mainland France) is included in the statistics or 
not. Figures vary from 90.000 to 150.000 Corsican speakers, at varying levels of competency 
(Verdoodt, 1991; Cole and Harguindéguy, 2013). Recent estimates state 90.000 (45% of the 
island’s population) regular Corsican speakers, although Corsican civil society organisation 
Parlemu Corsu (‘Let’s Speak Corsican’) moderate these figures by arguing that 50.000 daily 
Corsican speakers would be a more realistic target, indicating that daily speakers represent a 
smaller number than this figure. 
 While Corsican, as a minority language, remains remarkably strong in comparison to 
its regional counterparts in other territories within France, the institutional and normative 
framework surrounding minority language status and use has contributed very little to the 
safeguarding and promotion of Corsican in Corsica. Unlike in the cases of Scotland and 
Catalonia, and as we saw above, language policy in France remains explicitly set at the national 
level, with several norms such as ‘French is the language of the Republic’ establishing French 
as the dominant, and only legitimate, language in the public sphere. Unlike Scotland and 
Catalonia, Corsican minority nationalist parties have had very little impact in establishing the 
institutional and normative framework regulating minority language status and use within 
Corsica. Of the three cases, Corsica is undoubtedly the case where minority language use 
remains the most contentious. 
 Although measures at the French state level on the teaching of minority languages have 
contributed in some way to the protection of Corsican, much of the current status enjoyed by 
Corsican in Corsica stems from a broad cultural ‘revival’ movement in which minority 
nationalist parties played a part alongside cultural groups, artists, and musicians. The 
movement, called ‘U Riacquistu’ (The Reappropriation) by Corsican nationalists, marked a 
period of intense cultural revival with a plethora of Corsican language literature works, music 
groups and other artists re-establishing a strong and vibrant cultural basis upon which a renewal 
of Corsican identity in the following decades was based (Poggioli, 2016). The movement, 
which according to Jean-Guy Talamoni re-established the Corsican language as a desirable and 
valuable entity as opposed to a sign of backwardness (Appendix A, interview 3), contributed 
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significantly to the revival of the Corsican language’s fortunes in a process which mirrored the 
re-emergence of Corsican nationalism as a viable political force.  
 In addition to the cultural movement described above however, minority nationalist 
parties have, since entering government at the Corsican level in 2015, engaged in a number of 
policies and activities in an attempt to further reinforce the status of the Corsican language in 
Corsica. These measures, which include education funding and a simultaneous pursuit of 
official recognition paired with an increasing use of Corsican as a de facto official language, 
constitute the main ways in which Corsican minority nationalists have attempted to undermine 
strict linguistic norms at the French state level by pushing into existence alternative norms 
corresponding closer to their own normative stances. 
 The first, and perhaps the most important attempt at improving Corsican’s position in 
Corsica, is Corsican nationalist support for increased Corsican-language education on the 
island. Although the political and legal space for Corsican-language education is limited in the 
French context as we have seen above, Corsican nationalists supported a language plan called 
Lingua 2020, aiming to generalise bilingualism on the island and generalise a minimum of 
three weekly Corsican language hours in all schools on the island (Collectivité Territoriale de 
Corse, 2017). This plan, although less extensive than what has been implemented in other 
territories such as Scotland and Catalonia (as we saw above), seeks to increase Corsican 
language proficiency with the aim of establishing a bilingual society in which Corsican 
operates as an equal language to the current, majority French language. 
 Another policy promoted by Corsican nationalists is the idea of language co-officiality. 
(France 3 Corse Via Stella, 2013). This policy, if implemented, would recognise the Corsican 
language as an official language alongside French within the Corsican public sphere. In 
practice, this would allow all elected representatives to use Corsican within the Corsican 
Assembly, while allowing individuals in Corsica to interact with administrative bodies in either 
Corsican or French, following their preference. In addition to making Corsican considerably 
more relevant to daily, public life, such a move would significantly increase the public visibility 
of Corsican. However, bearing in mind Article 2 of the French Constitution (‘The Language of 
the Republic is French’), government approval for such a move appears unlikely. Former 
French Prime Minister Manuel Valls rejected calls for the official status of Corsican in 2013 
(AFP, 2013), and future developments in favour of this measure seem unlikely at the time of 
writing. This, in practice, means that a norm according to which ‘Corsican should be an official 
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language in Corsica’ is unlikely to override the norm codified in Article 2 of the French 
Constitution, and attempts at enforcing the use of French as the exclusive language of public 
life in Corsica enjoy, at the very least, a significant degree of legal legitimacy. 
 As an alternative to the granting of an official status to Corsican, Corsican nationalists 
have attempted to circumvent central government opposition to the policy by implementing a 
de facto official status for the Corsican language. The most high-profile examples of this are 
the speeches conducted in Corsican in the Corsican Assembly by Jean-Guy Talamoni and 
Gilles Simeoni upon their election as President of the Corsican Assembly and President of the 
Corsican Executive respectively (Quinault Maupoil, 2015). The idea of a de facto official status 
for Corsican was also explicitly stated by Gilles Simeoni in an interview conducted during my 
fieldwork: 
Today, you are aware that we are putting forward a demand for a co-official status 
between Corsican and French. Today, it is not possible in the current legal framework. 
We have a proactive policy which attempts to establish co-officiality in practice, even 
though it is not legally established yet. (Appendix A, interview 2). 
While speeches in the Corsican Assembly were high profile moves, this de facto co-official 
status is visible in a variety of more or less significant domains. Official social media posts are 
frequently written in Corsican, Government communication includes letterheads and signatures 
detailing titles and government positions in Corsican, and even the use of Corsican in the visual 
identity of Corsican government institutions. While lacking in legal legitimacy, Corsican 
nationalists have been able to establish a situation in which the norm ‘Corsican should be an 
official language of Corsica’ is perceived as broadly legitimate by a significant portion of the 
Corsican electorate and political class, a legitimacy further backed by democratic legitimacy 
obtained through the electoral successes of 2015. This norm, and the legitimacy it has gathered 
over time, allows for a considerable amount of leeway in the pursuit of de facto co-officiality 
between Corsican and French, shaping the linguistic reality of both society and public life in 
Corsica. However, while a sufficient number of critical agents have adopted the alternative 
norm at the territorial level for the norm to start cascading, any attempts to provide a legal 
footing to the current de facto status of Corsican within Corsica would undoubtedly require the 
support, tacit or explicit, of the French government, an important critical agent for any norm to 
diffuse successfully at the state level. Considering the relative size of Corsica and the lack of 
any clear support for the alternative norm outside of Corsica, there appears to be little incentive 
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for this norm to diffuse at the state level, and while the pursuit of de facto co-officiality could 
trigger a critical juncture in the event of a coercive imposition of the established state-level 
norm (French as the language of the Republic), the outcome of such a critical juncture is 
uncertain and the appetite for such a coercive imposition appears limited. 
 In addition to the issue of language and ‘peopleness’, there are several ways in which 
identity-based grievances inform and motivate other types of grievances, including economic 
and institutional ones. It is to these that I now turn. 
 
Economic and institutional grievances 
 While identity-based grievances form the basis of Corsican nationalism’s policy 
platform, there are also several economic grievances worth describing here. Most of the 
economic grievances that appear in Corsican nationalist discourse concern, in one way or 
another, the question of real-estate and property on the island. Corsican nationalists have, for 
decades, been extremely critical of what they perceive as the French government’s economic 
strategy for the island, emphasising tourism above all other forms of economic activity. The 
emphasis on tourism has, according to Corsican nationalists, widespread damaging effects on 
the economic situation of the island’s population: according to Femu a Corsica (the major, pro-
autonomy Corsican nationalist party), the emphasis on summer tourism creates a situation 
where employment on the island is unstable, temporary and unemployment in winter becomes 
a significant problem year on year (Femu a Corsica, 2015; Femu A Corsica, 2015). In addition 
to this, Corsican nationalists consider that the emphasis on tourism is also responsible for major 
difficulties Corsicans face to buy property in Corsica. With Corsica being a highly desirable 
holiday destination, property prices have been driven up by the purchase of properties as 
holiday homes (Femu A Corsica, 2015), which represent over 30% of the island’s total property 
according to Corsican nationalists (Femu A Corsica, 2015). 
 In addition to this critique of Corsica’s current economy, Corsican nationalists also 
critique the lack of resources given to Corsican authorities to address economic concerns 
through local-level policy-making. One of the major demands put forward by minority 
nationalists in the aftermath of the 2015 election is a significant increase in the fiscal powers 
given to the local Corsican authorities in order not only to establish local taxes on, for instance, 
holiday properties, but also to gain access to some of the resources that currently contribute to 
the French government’s budget (Corse Net Infos, 2014; Femu A Corsica, 2015; FranceInfo, 
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2017). This again, focuses on what Jean-Guy Talamoni described as the need to provide more 
balanced, sustainable economic development for the island. 
 The demand for further fiscal powers is particularly interesting: while it is undoubtedly 
an economic measure, the demand itself highlights the importance of institutional demands in 
addressing many of the other grievances brought forward by minority nationalists. Overall, in 
the case of Corsica, institutional grievances cannot be separated from identity-based or 
economic grievances: whereas institutional demands are well articulated in both Catalonia and 
Scotland, Corsican nationalists have adopted in recent years a more pragmatic approach to 
institutional reform, focusing on demands for a ‘negotiation’ with the French government to 
allow the Corsican executive to implement the decisions it seeks to implement (Collectivité 
Territoriale de Corse, 2015; Corse Matin, 2015; U Ribombu Internaziunale, 2015; 20 minutes, 
2017). While, undoubtedly, the institutional changes required to make the implementation of 
Corsican nationalist proposals legally possible are indeed significant and involve at least some 
degree of constitutional reform, institutional grievances in and of themselves do not occupy a 
major place in the rhetoric and actions of minority nationalists in Corsica. 
 There are several plausible reasons for this. Agents will act rationally (based on the 
information they have) to achieve their goals. It is quite possible that, acting rationally in the 
hope of securing the policy advances minority nationalists seek in Corsica, Corsican 
nationalists have a belief that it is more likely for the French central government to engage in 
a negotiated process if the subject of the process is small, targeted, policy-driven demands, as 
opposed to outright demands for institutional change. 
 Another likely explanation resides in the unique situation Corsican nationalism finds 
itself in today. Traditionally divided between radical and moderate branches (Olivesi, 1998), 
Corsican nationalists have, ahead of the second round of the 2015 elections, agreed to stand 
together as part of a coalition (Corsica Infurmazione, 2015a), which was then renewed at every 
subsequent election. As explained by Jean-Guy Talamoni in the interview I conducted, the 
process to secure the coalition between the two branches of Corsican nationalism was fraught 
with difficulty, and concessions were made on both sides to reach an agreement on a common 
electoral manifesto, broadly termed ‘prugettu cumunu’ (common project), as described in the 
introduction to this thesis (Corse Matin, 2015). Perhaps the most important concession in this 
case is the one made by Jean-Guy Talamoni and the radical branch of Corsican nationalism 
embodied by Corsica Libera: the commitment to not pursue independence for five years. Jean-
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Guy Talamoni argued, rather than a definitive end to the pursuit of independence, this allows 
Corsica and his coalition government with Gilles Simeoni to focus on building the required 
tools for Corsica to be a sustainable independent country which can be understood as 
implementing economic, social, linguistic and cultural policies to develop the Corsican 
economy and Corsican ‘peopleness’ further. It is difficult to make a prediction ahead of time, 
but it is possible that institutional grievances will reappear as a major point of (radical) Corsican 
nationalist rhetoric once the agreement to delay the pursuit of independence for five years 
expires in 2020. 
 
Common normative challenges, common solutions, common difficulties: self-
determination, and the rhetoric of minority nationalist parties. 
While the minority nationalist parties in Catalonia, Scotland and Corsica share similar 
grievances on economic, institutional and to some extent identity-based issues, these kinds of 
grievances per se are not exclusive to minority nationalist parties. Economic grievances can be 
found across most, if not all political parties’ policy platforms, and a significant number of 
non-nationalist parties also focus on institutional grievances, from the less radical desires to 
reform public institutions (such as the Liberal Democrats’ desire to reform the House of Lords) 
to radical attempts to reform, or even replace, codified constitutions  (as in the case of La 
France Insoumise or Podemos in France and Spain respectively) (La France Insoumise, 2017; 
Podemos, 2017; The Liberal Democrats, 2017). 
 However, there are other common points which are specific to minority nationalist 
parties and allow us to distinguish their grievances from those of other political parties in 
Europe. Minority nationalist parties emphasise self-determination as one of the driving factors 
(and a major solution) to many of the grievances they put forward, emphasising ‘peopleness’ 
in their rhetoric. Minority nationalist parties across Catalonia, Corsica and Scotland share, with 
the exception of one party in Corsica, a common solution to many of the grievances they put 
forward: external self-determination. 
 Despite the general dissatisfaction with internal self-determination as practised in their 
respective countries, the extent to which external self-determination is pursued by minority 
nationalists depends in large part on the political context within which such demands are 
promoted. As seen in the case of the SNP, the focus of the party’s rhetoric and action fluctuated 
between pushes for external self-determination (as in the period around the EU referendum) 
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and pushes for additional internal self-determination. The focus of the SNP on additional 
powers for the Scottish government and parliament in the aftermath of the 2014 independence 
referendum can be attributed to a number of reasons: firstly, the independence debate was 
broadly perceived as having been settled, at the very least in the short term, by the rejection of 
independence in that referendum. Secondly, the willingness of the UK government to consider 
additional devolved powers, notably through the appointment of the Smith Commission and 
the drafting of the Scotland Act 2016, provided a platform upon which the SNP could address 
some of the perceived shortcomings in the internal self-determination arrangements in the 
United Kingdom, by negotiating and pushing for additional powers that increased the extent of 
self-government being conducted by the Scottish authorities, providing more tools for the 
governing SNP  to implement other policy objectives and address other grievances on welfare 
or the economy. In comparison, similar minority nationalist grievances regarding the state of 
internal self-determination in Catalonia and Corsica were met with considerably less input from 
their central governments. In the case of Spain, the surge in Catalan nationalism is frequently 
seen as being caused by the continued refusal of the Spanish state to negotiate and implement 
new and broader autonomous powers for the Catalan authorities (Guibernau, 2013; de 
Laguérie, 2014). The refusal of the Spanish government to change or propose amendments to 
the internal self-determination arrangements granted to Spanish regions and Catalonia more 
specifically also led to a shift in policy by the CDC minority nationalist party, a party 
traditionally supportive of internal self-determination which had, by the time of this study, 
shifted its position in favour of independence (Junts Pel Sí, 2015j). In Corsica, while the 
moderate branch of the nationalist movement continues to support further internal self-
determination, growing frustrations with the perceived lack of progress in discussions with the 
French government over key elements of the nationalist policy platform (such as language 
recognition, fiscal devolution and limits on residential purchases) can, potentially, have the 
same impact as similar frustrations had on the stance of the CDC in Catalonia. This was hinted 
at by Jean-Guy Talamoni, representative of the radical branch of Corsican nationalism, in an 
interview conducted for this study (Appendix A, interview 3) 
Despite the differences in context and practice highlighted above however, all three 
cases can be understood as being at varying stages of the same process. To uncover this, I 
describe what I have termed a ‘normative chain’, or a set of interrelated norms that, in this case, 
need to be widely adopted by different critical agents to render minority nationalist demands 
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fully legitimate. The relevant normative chain, as well as the various critical agents relevant at 
each stage, are described in Table 1 below. 
 
Table 2: the normative chain followed by minority nationalist parties in Corsica, 
Catalonia and Scotland (where X represents each territory and its people). 
Stage Norm Critical Agents 
1 X should be recognised as a distinct people. Local electorate, central 
government. 
 
2 X, as a distinct people, should be allowed to 
exercise self-determination. 
Local electorate, central 
government, state-wide 
electorate (indirectly). 
3 X, as a distinct and self-determined people, should 
be considered as an equal partner in state-level 
policy discussions. 
 
Local electorate, central 
government, state-wide 
electorate (indirectly). 
4 The government representing X should have the 
fullest possible autonomy, or independence, to 
decide autonomously on as wide a range of policy 
options as desired by X. 
 
Central government, state-
wide electorate (indirectly). 
5 Country X, when independent, should be fully 
recognised internationally as a legitimate, new 
member of the international community and 
relevant international organisations. 
 
Central government, other 
independent states, 
international organisations. 
  
As is clear, all five norms (or stages) are closely interrelated and, in some cases, can 
even be understood as extensions, or detailed versions, of each other. However, as we have 
seen above, the normative challenge put forward by minority nationalist parties in each 
respective territory currently occurs at different stages, with accession to the next stage 
depending primarily on the widespread acceptance of the previous norm. 
 As an example, Corsican nationalists today, with their ongoing struggle for recognised 
‘peopleness’, are currently campaigning for the acceptance of the first norm in the table. This 
explains not only the predominance of identity-based grievances and discourse, but as we will 
see in the following chapter the focus of Corsican nationalists on the domestic, and even the 
sub-national, political arena.  
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In contrast, Catalan minority nationalists can be understood to be engaged in a normative 
struggle somewhere between ‘stage 2’ and ‘stage 3’, where a degree of self-determination is 
accepted but continues to exist in a sometimes coercively hierarchical political environment. 
Finally, the SNP, having secure peopleness, as well as an equal status in many respects with 
the UK government regarding political discussions on (excluding recent developments on the 
United Kingdom’s departure from the European Union), could be understood to be engaged 
simultaneously in a normative challenge at stages 4 and 5, seeking to continuously increase its 
autonomous power (as an alternative to independence) while arguing that, in the event of 
independence, Scotland could legitimately become a fully recognised member of the 
international community. Since the EU Referendum however, with the overall acceptance of 
the norms at stage 3 and, to an extent, stage 2 by all critical actors coming under scrutiny, the 
pursuit of independence was resumed and the emphasis of the SNP’s discourse shifted away 
from economic criticism of the UK central government towards institutional critiques of the 
perceived inadequate role given to the SNP in determining the nature of the UK’s post-EU 
relationship. 
 It is important however, to highlight a number of points that emerge from this analysis. 
While self-determination plays a central role in minority nationalist party policy and rhetoric, 
and in many cases these parties have been engaged in decade-long processes of gradual norm 
diffusion and challenging, the pursuit of self-determination is not an ‘infinite’ process requiring 
ever more self-determination and culminating in external self-determination. The case of the 
SNP’s approach to language policy, albeit a marginal issue in Scotland, highlights this well. 
Minority nationalist parties, in pursuing self-determination, desire the ability to implement 
what they perceive as best practice normative policies based on their own normative standpoint. 
While the inability to self-determine will often increase the salience of related grievances in 
minority nationalist discourse, issues similarly become less important to minority nationalist 
policy platforms when the degree of self-determination made available to their territory 
matches that of their own normative expectations. While the SNP has been able to significantly 
change the position of Gaelic in public life over recent years, it has done so with little to no 
desire to alter the normative framework established by the 2005 Gaelic Language Act. 
Comparatively to issues in which the access to self-determination remains unsatisfactory, 
language issues in the SNP’s rhetoric are undoubtedly secondary. While norms surrounding 
the place of language in a society are distinct from norms regulating self-determination strictly 
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speaking, the case of language policy in Scotland shows that, when there is little to no 
normative conflict over an issue, that issue tends to fade from public rhetoric. 
 Another important point is that, although there are a variety of critical agents at all 
stages of the norm chain described above, one of the most recurring and powerful critical agents 
remains the central government of the state within which minority nationalist parties operate. 
The example of language provides a first, strong example of this. The central government, in 
all three cases, remains the most important critical agent when considering whether attempted 
norm diffusion by minority nationalist parties will lead to norm cascading and wide-ranging 
institutional changes. In both Scotland and Catalonia, minority nationalist parties have been 
able to build upon an institutionalised normative consensus over the value of minority 
languages to push for further changes which have often enjoyed democratic and legal 
legitimacy. In Scotland, self-determination on the matter of language is broadly granted to 
devolved institutions, while in Catalonia the establishment of autonomous institutions coupled 
with the recognition of Catalan as an official language in Catalonia provided a strong 
institutional and normative baseline upon which minority nationalist party norms policies grew 
and were established legitimately. In the absence of any normative consensus between minority 
nationalists and the central government however, normative challenges brought about by those 
parties are often difficult, uncertain and limited in their reach relative to what parties in 
Catalonia and Scotland have been able to implement through established, legal institutions. 
 Similarly, on institutional questions and on matters relating to the recognition of self-
determination as a valid right with all that this implies politically, the central government has 
a significant role to play as an enabler, or a blocker, of normative and institutional change. As 
we will explore in further detail in the following chapter, the willingness of the United 
Kingdom central government to legitimise Scottish identity as a politically relevant category 
(most notably through devolution), and the willingness of the UK government to recognise the 
Scottish devolved authorities as an equal partner in negotiations on matters of self-
determination, has contributed significantly to the broad acceptance and normative 
internalization of stages 1, 2, 3 and the broad acceptance of stage 4, subject to democratic 
approval expressed in a referendum. In contrast, government opposition in Catalonia to the 
recognition of the norm at stage 4 in the table above represents a significant stumbling block, 
and the overall rejection of the norms regarding peopleness (stage 1) in Corsica represent an 
even bigger obstacle to minority nationalist party action. 
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In all cases however, we see how normative challenges are the basis of minority 
nationalist party activity, and how, depending on which norm is being challenged, minority 
nationalist parties will adjust their demands and discourse to reflect the reality that their 
demands, far from being isolated from one another, often rely on a ‘normative chain’, where 
each step or each norm legitimises the next one, until all the required norms have been accepted 
to legitimise the overall political goals of these parties. 
 
Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I began by highlighting the various ways in which academic literature 
has extended the concept of self-determination, by adding additional concepts to differentiate 
different types of self-determination and different elements important to self-determination as 
a concept. By highlighting ‘peopleness’ as well as a dichotomy between ‘internal’ and 
‘external’ self-determination, we give ourselves the tools to understand both the grievances and 
the solutions espoused by minority nationalist parties. 
 In the second part of the chapter, I highlighted three different forms of grievances 
displayed by most minority nationalist parties: economic grievances, focused on what is 
perceived as underdevelopment or poor living standards in the region these parties claim to 
represent; institutional grievances, focused on dissatisfaction surrounding existing devolved 
powers or institutional arrangements; and identity-based grievances, based on a feeling that a 
distinctive ‘peopleness’ is at best not sufficiently recognised, at worst actively repressed by the 
central government. The analysis showed that, depending on the extent to which ‘peopleness’ 
was recognised, and, depending on the extent to which minority nationalist parties clash with 
other actors in the same political arena, different grievances were emphasised in all three cases, 
with each case emphasising a particular kind of grievance depending on the degree of 
normative consensus between themselves and other critical agents within the same 
environment. 
 Finally, in the last part of the chapter, I highlighted that, despite these differences, self-
determination can be still be understood as the driving principle behind minority nationalist 
grievances, be they identity-based, economic or institutional. By developing the notion of a 
‘normative chain’, bringing together several interrelated norms into one, coherent whole which 
legitimises the aspirations of minority nationalist parties, I described how, although parties in 
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the three cases broadly aspire to the same goals, different levels of norm acceptance lead to a 
different discursive and policy emphasis. 
 Throughout the chapter, I have demonstrated the central place self-determination 
occupies in the political rhetoric and activities of minority nationalist parties. Whether it is 
access to self-determination or its implementation, minority nationalist parties across all three 
of my cases place the ‘people’, their recognition and their political and economic development 
at the heart of their rhetoric and policy platform. Identity grievances emerge as the most 
important kind of grievance when the ‘peopleness’ of a given population is politically claimed 
by minority nationalist parties, yet rejected by the central state. In cases where ‘peopleness’ is 
granted and recognised in political discourse, institutional grievances often emerge as minority 
nationalist parties seek to challenge existing constitutional frameworks to enable the expression 
of self-determination. Finally, when ‘peopleness’ is recognised both rhetorically and 
institutionally, minority nationalist parties continue to use the language of ‘peopleness’ and 
self-determination to justify a wide range of economic grievances, many of which focus on 
perceived hindrances placed by the central government’s economic policy on the economic 
development of the ‘people’ they claim to represent. At a fundamental level, all of the 
grievances are based on self-determination, and lead to normative challenges based on self-
determination and its pre-requisites. 
 Although the theoretical framework used here does lead to some significant differences 
in terminology, the findings in this chapter provide additional confirmation to many of the 
findings already established in literature on minority nationalist party analysis, and provides 
also some subtle differences. The idea that minority nationalist parties are underpinned by self-
determination is common in the existing literature (Keating, 2004; Guibernau, 2006; Hepburn, 
2008; Hoffbauer, 2011; Gillespie, 2015; Elias and Mees, 2017), and this chapter provides a 
clear and theoretically supported explanation as to how that is the case in practice. However, 
while self-determination is seen as one of the factors limiting the spectrum of possible policies 
a minority nationalist party can adopt, approaching this from a norm and norm diffusion 
perspective enables to us to argue that far from being a single factor, self-determination is 
perhaps the most important, and most powerful factor legitimising minority nationalist party 
policies on a very wide range of issues. In many ways, this echoes theories in the literature 
which argue that minority nationalist parties operate on a multi-dimensional scale, with 
territorial (self-determination) politics co-existing with traditional economic left-right policies. 
In giving self-determination such as central position, this theory provides additional 
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confirmation to the finding by Massetti and Shackel (2015) that minority nationalist parties 
link traditional left-right politics to territorial politics and subsume them. 
 While norms ‘underpin’ much of the policy platform adopted by minority nationalist 
parties, this does not contradict existing literature on minority nationalist party goals. This 
thesis shows, as per the literature, that minority nationalist parties will adopt, frame, promote 
and blur issues depending on how they decide to pursue their goals. Rather than invalidate the 
literature, this thesis provides an additional lens through which to understand how such 
different policy expressions can all stem from the same, normative bedrock. 
 While the discourse used by minority nationalist parties with regard to their grievances 
and ‘peopleness’ does, in some cases, already provide a challenge to fundamental norms of 
citizenship and territorial integrity within their respective countries, the most fundamental 
challenge to international and domestic norms occurs in the attempted implementation of 
external self-determination by minority nationalist parties. However, the inclusion of the 
dichotomy between external self-determination and internal self-determination allows to 
conceptualise that although the policies pursued by any given party can be very different at all 
times, this does not inherently mean that the norms underpinning those different policy 
positions are different: in short, there are many ways to pursue self-determination for a minority 
nationalist party. 
 Drawing on the reliance of minority nationalist parties on democracy as a legitimising element, 
the next chapter will focus on how minority nationalist parties attempt to implement self-
determination, the extent to which this undermines fundamental norms domestically and, 
perhaps, internationally, and finally the extent to which the critical junctures and norm changes 
attempted by these parties impact only domestic politics, or whether the normative impact is 
broader. 
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4. Minority nationalist parties, self-determination and 
democracy 
 
 In the previous chapter, I analysed the several different types of grievances that 
underpin the political rhetoric of minority nationalist parties in Catalonia, Corsica and 
Scotland. While the economic, institutional and identity-based grievances I identified are by 
no means unique to minority nationalist parties, the conceptual framework within which these 
parties interpret these grievances and the solutions they put forward are rooted in two key 
notions at the heart of ‘self-determination’ as a concept – peopleness, and, to a lesser extent, 
territory. 
 Understanding the nature of the grievances put forward by minority nationalist parties 
however does not, in itself, explain the ways in which minority nationalist parties attempt to 
implement the solutions they promote. In this chapter, I will focus on several related questions, 
highlighting first the issue of legitimacy, or how exactly minority nationalist parties attempt to 
legitimise their demands in the eyes of other, influential political actors within relevant political 
circles: the electorate within their domestic sphere, their national government, and indeed more 
broadly the international community in the shape of influential global leaders or activists. To 
understand this, I will draw on the extensive academic discussion surrounding the legitimacy 
of secession as an expression of national self-determination, drawing upon different theories 
and analysing to what extent these are expressed in the actions and rhetoric of minority 
nationalist parties. 
 As described throughout the thesis, the desire for significant political autonomy or, 
more frequently in the cases analysed here, political independence, is a highly contested 
political aim, colliding with sometimes significant political opposition and, in the case of 
France and Spain, constitutional norms that are broadly perceived as highly legitimate by 
political actors, the electorate and the international community alike. Drawing on social 
constructivist notions of rules and norm diffusion, as well as on historical institutionalist 
notions of ‘critical junctures’, I will analyse how minority nationalist parties attempt to 
undermine these highly stable norms and, through their rhetoric and actions, attempt to 
challenge the boundaries of legitimacy within the domestic, and the international political 
arenas. 
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 I will argue, in this chapter, that notions of ‘democracy’, and its practical 
implementation through domestic electoral procedures, play a central role in minority 
nationalist party attempts to challenge the institutional and political order of the states in which 
they currently operate. By emphasising the ‘democratic’ nature of their action, minority 
nationalist parties attempt to draw upon the widespread political legitimacy afforded by 
‘democracy’ as a principle to create ‘critical junctures’, or key moments in which an alternative 
norm openly challenges existing, established norms and rules and leads to a process of 
questioning as to where the boundaries of political legitimacy reside. Accordingly, electoral 
politics has played an essential role in the actions of minority nationalist parties (a new 
approach in a section of Corsican nationalism, less so in other cases), and all of the major 
challenges to state unity brought about by minority nationalist parties recently have stemmed 
from self-determination, supported by the notion of democratic legitimacy. 
 
Self-determination as an evolving normative and international norm 
 
Early understandings of self-determination: nationalism and Woodrow Wilson 
 The legitimacy of self-determination as a political principle has shifted numerous times 
since it emerged, inextricably linked to the simultaneous emergence of nationalism as a 
political force in the 19th century (Buchanan, 2003). Analysing both these historical 
developments and the various ways in which normative theorists have attempted to define and 
construct a legitimate conception of self-determination is essential to understand how the 
concept frames the rhetoric and policies of minority nationalist parties. 
 Crucial to understanding the history of self-determination as a political principle is the 
dichotomy highlighted in the previous chapter, between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ self-
determination, describing a measure of self-government within the framework of a state for the 
former and full, political independence in the latter case. While early understandings of self-
determination, as we shall see below, remain unclear as to whether internal or external self-
determination is perceived as legitimate, later developments gradually contributed to a 
narrowing of the legitimacy of external self-determination, first specifically to colonized 
populations, then later to populations in very specific political contexts – populations suffering 
from excessive and gross human rights abuses. For populations outside of these cases, ‘internal’ 
self-determination was perceived as the legitimate option. 
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Self-determination as a concept is closely tied to the emergence of nationalism as a 
major ideology of political and social organisation (Buchanan, 2003). Nationalist theories of 
self-determination are perhaps the oldest, and most sweeping conceptions of self-
determination, building upon 19th century nationalist political theory and establishing self-
determination as a universal right for national groups. These are broadly understood to rest on 
the notion that political and cultural boundaries ought to coincide – making the nation-state the 
preferred form of political organisation (Moore, 1998a). These theories also argue that there is 
fundamental, universal right for any national group or people to govern themselves, going as 
far as creating a state in which they can operate as the majority. Pushed to their limits, these 
theories create a universal right for a national group to secede from any state to either form an 
independent state or join another state (Norman, 1998).  
 While an older concept, discussions of self-determination as a relevant principle in 
international politics did not emerge until the First World War and its aftermath, when 
international leaders, and most notably United States President Woodrow Wilson, introduced 
and promoted the notion of self-determination as applying to all mobilized ‘national groups’ 
(Moore, 1998a; Sterio, 2013). This understanding of self-determination is best described by 
Wilson himself, in a 1918 address to Congress: 
National aspirations must be respected; peoples may now be dominated and governed 
only by their own consent. “Self-determination” is not a mere phrase. It is an imperative 
principle of actions which statesmen will henceforth ignore at their peril  (Wilson, 
1918) 
This conception, which emerged as a reaction to the collapse of multi-national and multi-ethnic 
empires in central Europe following the First World War, provides a strikingly wide basis for 
legitimate self-determination, seen by Wilson as one of the guarantees of peace in Europe. By 
arguing that ‘well defined national aspirations shall be accorded the utmost satisfaction that 
can be accorded to them’ (Wilson, 1918), Wilson proposed to establish populations, or 
‘nations’, as the fundamental unit of legitimate political organisation, as opposed to imperial 
states or ruling monarchical or imperial families. This in turn provided political legitimacy to 
a wide range of new ‘nation-states’, and remains a potent expression of what is broadly referred 
to in academia as the ‘nationalist theory’ of self-determination.  
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Post-Second World war narrowing: self-determination as decolonization 
Despite Wilson’s attempts to promote self-determination as a crucial principle of 
international politics, the notion itself was not retained as a core principle of the League of 
Nations, re-emerging instead as an international principle in the United Nations Charter 
following the Second World War (Sterio, 2013). While the definition of self-determination – 
and the extent to which it is legitimate – remained vague, a different conception of self-
determination emerged gradually following the Second World War that would build on, yet 
narrow, the focus of Wilsonian self-determination. While Wilsonian self-determination granted 
legitimacy to all mobilized national or ethnic groups with ‘national aspirations’, self-
determination understood as the right to secede from larger political units and form an 
independent state was broadly understood as being a right restricted to colonized people 
(Sterio, 2013). 
Several United Nations resolutions and Covenants throughout the 1960s and 1970s re-
established ‘self-determination’ as a legitimate principle applying to all peoples. United 
Nations General Assembly resolution 1514 in 1960 for instance, states that ‘all peoples have 
the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status 
and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development’ (United Nations, 1960a). 
The resolution however then specifically mentions ‘Non-Self-Governing territories or all other 
territories that have not yet attained independence’ as being the primary concern of the 
resolution, before stating that ‘any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national 
unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles 
of the Charter of the United Nations’ (United Nations, 1960a). This distinction established a 
clear dichotomy between self-determination as it applies to colonial territories, and self-
determination as it may apply to non-colonized people: while colonial territories are 
encouraged to ‘self-determine’ (understood, in resolution 1541, as either independence, free 
association with the colonial state or incorporation into another independent state) (United 
Nations, 1960b) non-colonized people are not perceived as being legitimate in attempts to 
challenge or undermine the territorial integrity of existing countries – restricting external self-
determination to colonized populations only (Sterio, 2013). 
 The notion of external self-determination as applying primarily to colonized 
populations was further reinforced in subsequent United Nations publications. The 1970 
Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations re-iterated both 
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the commitment to self-determination for colonized populations and the commitment to 
territorial integrity found in the 1960 resolution, further emphasising the importance of self-
determination to bringing a ‘speedy end to colonialism’ (United Nations, 1970). 
Further narrowing: self-determination as a ‘Remedial Right Theory’ 
 In the decades following the decolonization of most former colonial territories, the 
boundaries of legitimate self-determination shifted further. The collapse of the Soviet Union, 
followed by the break-up of Yugoslavia in the early and mid-nineties respectively, provided a 
significant number of potential case studies for self-determination, encouraging academic 
debate on what the conditions are, and ought to be, for a legitimate, unilateral, external self-
determination.  
 Responding to contemporary events, academics such as Buchanan developed what is 
broadly referred to as ‘remedial’ or ‘Remedial Right Only’ theories of self-determination 
(Moore, 1998b; Buchanan, 2003). While Buchanan’s approach attempts to satisfy a wide range 
of criteria as desirable (such as positive incentive creation with regard to decentralization and 
clarity on the question of territory), one of the major aims of the theory, and perhaps the most 
relevant for the legitimacy of external self-determination, is to ‘isolate and proliferate’ 
(Buchanan, 2003) – isolate external self-determination to exceptional cases, while proliferating 
intra-state autonomy and self-government (internal self-determination). 
 To isolate cases of external self-determination, Buchanan proposes to restrict unilateral 
secession to a number of clear, exceptional cases: grievous, systematic human rights abuses, 
unjust annexations, severe violations of intra-state autonomy agreements and secession from 
failed states in which human rights can no longer be guaranteed (Buchanan, 2003)(Moore, 
1998b). As indicated by his ‘isolate and proliferate’ idea, Buchanan therefore not only restricts 
external self-determination to exceptional circumstances for unilateral secessions or to 
negotiated, mutual consent secessions – but established internal self-determination, or intra-
state self-government and autonomy, as the primary norm of self-determination and first resort 
for peoples and national groups within other states (Buchanan, 2003). 
 In addition to this, Buchanan’s approach provides further clarity not just on the criteria 
that constitute legitimate causes for the pursuit of unilateral, external self-determination by 
peoples within another state, but also on the ways in which states and governments sustain, or 
lose, legitimate control over parts of their territory. Basing the legitimacy of states on their 
ability to treat citizens and groups within their territory justly and protect human rights 
Edward Walker – School of Government and International Affairs, Durham University 
145 | P a g e  
 
(Norman, 1998), Buchanan also provides a clear distinction between what legitimises the 
pursuit of unilateral self-determination and what legitimises an existing or a new state in the 
international system, adding an extra layer that does not particularly appear in the context of 
post-World War Two international law on self-determination (Buchanan, 2003). 
 In addition to academic normative theory creation, the idea of unilateral external self-
determination as being restricted to a remedial right only can also be found in international law. 
With academics frequently describing remedial secession as being the only legitimate form of 
secession in the international system today (Norman, 1998; Sterio, 2013). ‘Remedial Right 
Only’ approaches to unilateral external self-determination were also significantly drawn upon 
by the Canadian Supreme Court in its 1998 reference on the Secession of Quebec, in which the 
Canadian Supreme Court argued that Quebec had no legitimate right to unilateral secession 
insofar as it enjoyed extensive internal self-determination within Canada and suffered from no 
major human rights violations (CanLII, 1998).  
  
 As I have seen above, academic theorizing on self-determination as well as international 
law have evolved over time, shifting the conditions and grounds for legitimate, unilateral self-
determination from a general right granted to all national groups, to colonies, to specifically 
and systematically repressed people within a given state. However, in the current rhetoric of 
minority nationalist parties, self-determination as a concept is frequently supplemented and 
legitimised by another notion: that of democracy. 
 
Minority nationalist parties: democracy as legitimising process 
The central role played by democracy in providing legitimacy to minority nationalist 
aims in their rhetoric is twofold. Firstly, as we will see below, there is a clear understanding 
amongst all minority nationalist parties that a broad, majoritarian and explicit consensus is 
required for them to achieve their goals. However, once the existence of such a consensus 
appears to be established notably through victories or significant successes in elections, 
minority nationalist parties will argue that the mandate secured through elections is sufficient 
to legitimise sometimes wide-ranging changes or reforms to the political system in which they 
operate. In other words, minority nationalist parties across all three territories analysed are 
focused on constructing strong, majority support with the understanding that such majority 
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support will then legitimise at the very least far-ranging internal self-determination, and, in 
most cases, secession. 
During the period I analysed, the importance of securing a very broad and explicit 
support before pushing for significant change was exemplified notably by the attitude adopted 
by the SNP on the issue of Scottish independence. Despite overwhelming success in the United 
Kingdom general election in May 2015, the Scottish First Minister and leader of the SNP, 
Nicola Sturgeon, was notably keen to emphasise that the election success her party had enjoyed 
was not fundamentally a mandate for a second Scottish independence referendum, arguing that 
this had not been the issue for which people had supported the SNP in the general election. In 
a statement published shortly after the election, Nicola Sturgeon argued: 
It is no secret to anyone that the SNP supports independence – we always will. But I 
made clear during the campaign that this election was not about independence – it was 
about making Scotland’s voice heard at Westminster. I said clearly to people in 
Scotland that I would not take a vote for the SNP as an endorsement of independence 
or of a second referendum. And let me be absolutely clear that I stand by that. There 
will only be another independence referendum if the people of Scotland vote in a future 
Scottish Parliament election to have one. That is democracy. (Scottish National Party, 
2015h) 
The position highlighted in the quote above was reiterated almost word for word a year later, 
in the run up to the Scottish parliamentary elections in May 2016(O’Leary, 2016).  However, 
alongside these electoral achievements, the SNP also sought to build up support for 
independence and to create this explicit majority support for one of the party’s main aims. This 
campaign, which began in the aftermath of the EU membership referendum in 2016 , focused 
on persuading ‘a majority of our fellow citizens’ and creating a ‘strong and positive majority’ 
in favour of independence (Brooks, 2016a).  Both the SNP’s emphasis on election results and 
popular support and their refusal to treat any election success as a mandate for all of their core 
aims highlights the perceived necessity, by minority nationalists in Scotland, to secure explicit, 
majority popular support to provide legitimacy to some of their more far-reaching aims, of 
which independence is a strong example. 
 The importance placed on democratic support as a legitimising factor is not only 
obvious in the SNP’s approach to independence as an objective, but also in its approach to the 
other demands the party have made in the run up, and in the aftermath of the General Election 
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in 2015 and the Scottish Parliamentary elections in 2016. As an example, much of the SNP’s 
rhetoric in the aftermath of the May 2015 general election emphasised the need for SNP 
proposals to be treated seriously by the United Kingdom government. In a speech regarding 
government proposals for further devolution to the Scottish parliament, the Deputy Leader of 
the SNP, Stuart Hosie, directly correlated the SNP’s results in the May 2015 general election 
and the need for the British government to accept the SNP’s demands for further powers than 
those promised in initial proposals. Highlighting the extent of SNP support in Scotland (50%), 
Stewart Hosie argued that the SNP achieved those scores on a ‘manifesto that set out clear 
priorities for strengthening the Scotland Bill’ (Scottish National Party, 2015e). In a later 
speech, Stewart Hosie further likened what he perceived as shortcomings in government 
proposals for devolution to the government failing ‘the people of Scotland once again’. 
(Scottish National Party, 2015f). These two examples of rhetoric emphasise the idea that, due 
to the democratic mandate the SNP secured in elections, not only are the SNP’s demands 
legitimate, but opposition to them by the British government would, by extension, be 
illegitimate. A further example, drawn from a comment by the SNP House of Commons leader 
Angus Robertson, further evidences this: 
The Scotland Bill published by the UK government is woefully lacking – failing to 
meet even the limited powers set out in the Smith Commission and falling far short of 
the aspirations of people in Scotland as expressed so firmly at the General Election 
(Scottish National Party, 2015d) 
This further highlights the notion that a democratic mandate strongly legitimises minority 
nationalist party demands for wide ranging and major political, or in this case institutional, 
reform. Democratic support is understood to be a pre-condition for the achievement of the aims 
of the SNP, with this belief in turn informing the post-electoral success belief according to 
which reform is the only legitimate option available. 
  
 The comparatively tenser situation in Catalonia provides an even stronger example of 
these beliefs in action in minority nationalist parties. The discourse explaining the creation of 
the Junts Pel Sí (together for Yes), a pro-independence coalition composed of two major 
minority nationalist parties CDC and ERC as well as other independent politicians for the 
September 2015 autonomous elections also highlights the centrality of domestic democracy in 
the strategy of Catalan minority nationalist parties. In fact, minority nationalist politicians 
Edward Walker – School of Government and International Affairs, Durham University 
148 | P a g e  
 
argued very frequently throughout the period studied that the September elections were in fact 
plebiscitary elections akin to a referendum on independence. Indeed, a CDC social media post 
argued that the ‘plebiscitary elections on the 27th of September will allow us to count how many 
people are in favour of independence and how many are not’, (La Vanguardia, 2015b) with 
Raul Romeva, the lead candidate for the Junts Pel Sí electoral list, going as far as saying that 
the elections in September are ‘not autonomous elections, but an “all or nothing” plebiscite’ 
(Convergents - CDC, 2015h) and the ‘the independence referendum that the Spanish state 
refused to let us have’ (Esquerra Republicana, 2015l). 
The last quote highlights another important element used by Catalan minority 
nationalist parties to justify considering the September elections as plebiscitary elections: their 
perceived lack of national democracy in Spain, which provides an additional source of 
legitimacy for their pursuit of self-determination by introducing certain elements of remedial 
theory into their discourse. In a series of social media interventions, Raul Romeva argued that 
the reason why Junts Pel Sí were now pursuing a mandate for independence was because of 
the Spanish government’s unresponsiveness to majority demands from the Catalan population. 
In the process, he highlights a number of events that according to him, highlight the lack of 
democracy in Spain: the rejection of a referendum on independence organised by the Catalan 
government on the 9th of November 2014, the cancellation by Spanish courts of a new 
autonomy statute in 2010, and also the continued refusal to organise a referendum on 
independence despite overwhelming public opinion support for such a consultation (Romeva i 
Rueda, 2015e, 2015b, 2015d, 2015c). The idea that the Spanish government obliged Catalan 
minority nationalist parties to organise an independence referendum or plebiscite is a recurrent 
theme in their rhetoric throughout the period studied (Esquerra Republicana, 2015e, 2015m; 
Junts Pel Sí, 2015i). 
Echoing similar trends in Scotland, the notion of Catalan domestic democracy as 
legitimising self-determination continued to play a central role in minority nationalist discourse 
after the September elections, notably by allowing minority nationalist parties in Catalonia to 
present not only their demands as legitimate, but opposition to them as illegitimate. With an 
overall majority of 72 seats shared between Junts Pel Sí (62) and the far-left, pro-independence 
party Candidatura d’Unitat Popular – CUP (10), minority nationalists argued immediately that 
the Catalan electorate had granted them a strong mandate for independence (Vilaweb, 2015). 
Sergi Sabria, one of the newly elected Junts Pel Sí members of parliament, said shortly after 
the election results that ‘the elections were a referendum and we won; this is a victory for 
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enthusiasm and change. The next step is independence’ (Esquerra Republicana, 2015k). This 
sentiment was echoed by Artur Mas, who argued that ‘We now have democratic approval to 
continue with the process’ (Convergents - CDC, 2015b). He also went on to salute the 
September election results as a time where ‘Catalonia behaved as a nation, exercising the right 
to self-determination and the right to choose its own institutions’ (Convergents - CDC, 2015d). 
In the months following the 2015 elections, pro-independence members of parliament prepared 
and voted to establish an official roadmap towards independence, a significant step that was 
similarly justified in terms of the respect for domestic democracy (Esquerra Republicana, 
2015l; La Vanguardia, 2015a). 
One of the outcomes of this process towards independence was a decision to hold a 
unilateral referendum on independence on the 1st October 2017, an event which significantly 
heightened the tensions between minority nationalists in Catalonia and the central Spanish 
government. During and in the immediate aftermath of this event, the rhetoric of both sides 
focused on delegitimising the opposing side, with the Spanish government focusing primarily 
on the legitimacy of constitutional law and the minority nationalists, again, focusing on the 
legitimacy of democracy as a way to impose change. The referendum itself, which was marred 
by violence (Jones and Burgen, 2017), produced an outcome of over 90% of voters in favour 
of independence, which was understood by minority nationalists as a mandate for unilateral 
independence, with Catalan President Carles Puigdemont describing the result as ‘the people’s 
will for Catalonia to become an independent state’ (BBC News, 2017a). The Spanish 
government, on the other hand, argued that because the Spanish Constitution does not recognise 
referendums, the referendum itself was an ‘illegal act’ (Ortega Mayor, 2017), an argument 
which gradually became a complete denial that any sort of meaningful referendum had taken 
place in Catalonia (Noguer, 2017). Following the referendum, a ‘suspended’ declaration of 
independence was made by the Catalan Parliament (Badcock and Crisp, 2017) and, 
subsequently, the Spanish government suspended the Catalan parliament and government 
using article 155 of the Spanish Constitution, which allows the government to suspend the 
autonomy of a given region for ‘failing in its obligations under the Spanish Constitution’ or for 
‘acting against the interests of Spain’ (Cortes Generales, 2011). On the grounds that the 
decision suspended a democratically elected government, minority nationalist parties described 
the decision as a ‘coup’ (El Plural, 2017; Público, 2017; Torregrosa, 2017), again drawing on 
the idea that democracy remains a fundamental legitimising factor for self-determination, even 
if unilateral and in contradiction with other stable norms such as constitutional law. 
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 The centrality of democracy as a legitimising factor is also strongly visible in 
the case of Corsican minority nationalist parties. Long characterised by a split between 
moderate groups, focused on the political achievement of greater autonomy for the island and 
represented by the Femu a Corsica coalition, and radicals such as Corsica Libera, focused on 
sometimes violent action to achieve independence (Olivesi, 1998; Hepburn and Elias, 2011), 
the minority nationalist political family in Corsica underwent a significant shift with the cease-
fire announced by the FLNC in August 2014, and the mandating of radical nationalist political 
party Corsica Libera to pursue independence using peaceful political means (Corsica Radio, 
2015; U Ribombu Internaziunale, 2015). The legitimising force of democracy played an 
important role in motivating this process, as described by Jean-Christophe Angelini, one of the 
leading figures in Femu a Corsica: ‘when the majority [of Corsican nationalists] supported the 
clandestine struggle [of the FLNC], we were always accused of being a minority, anti-
democratic movement’ (Corsica Infurmazione, 2015b). This shift, saluted as a ‘new era’ by the 
leader of Corsica Libera Jean-Guy Talamoni (U Ribombu Internaziunale, 2015), was also 
widely praised by Corsican nationalists across the two main political parties as an 
unprecedented opportunity for nationalist electoral success and political action (Alta 
Frequenza, 2015b, 2015a; U Ribombu Internaziunale, 2015). Gilles Simeoni for instance, 
leader of Femu a Corsica, described the move away from violence in the following terms: ‘We 
are making, all together, the choice to build a future of hope for Corsica in a democratic way, 
to move away with dignity from a situation of conflict that has lasted for the best part of 50 
years’(Alta Frequenza, 2015c). 
In addition to this shift, at the start of the period of this data analysis, Corsican 
nationalists were in the process of proposing a series of measures, often reflecting long-
standing nationalist demands, to be put to a vote in the Corsican Assembly. In the years running 
up to 2015, under the influence of Corsica Libera representatives in the Corsican territorial 
assembly, a number of key policies, reflecting Corsican nationalist demands for many decades, 
were voted in by large majorities including moderate and radical nationalists as well as non-
nationalist representatives. An example of these key reforms would be for instance the 
recognition of Corsican as an official language in Corsica (Corse Matin, 2013; France 3 Corse 
Via Stella, 2013). The creation of a residency status was also voted by a large majority, so that 
people wishing to own property in Corsica will now require to have lived there for at least five 
years prior to purchasing property on the island (Corse Matin, 2014; Le Figaro, 2014b). Finally, 
the Corsican assembly also voted in favour of a number of fiscal reforms, asking for existing 
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fiscal powers to be transferred to the Corsican assembly and for the creation of specific fiscal 
arrangements to recognise local specificities (Corse Net Infos, 2014). The adoption of all these 
reforms by large majorities comprising both nationalist and non-nationalist elected 
representatives has led Corsica Libera to argue that some of the demands defended by the 
Corsican nationalist movement for the past few decades had now become supported by a 
majority of the island’s political actors and by a majority of Corsican society (Corsica Libera, 
2015; Corsica Radio, 2015; U Ribombu Internaziunale, 2015). These reforms have gone on to 
form the bulk of what Corsican nationalists now call the ‘prugettu cumunu’, or ‘common 
project’ around which both Corsica Libera and Femu a Corsica sought to build support for the 
December 2015 elections to the Corsican territorial assembly (Corse Matin, 2015).  
As in the case of Catalonia and Scotland, the importance of a broad based coalition of 
support for minority nationalist demands was central to the rhetoric of minority nationalist 
parties in Corsica. Talking at a political conference regrouping a variety of supportive political 
figures from within and outside the Corsican nationalist movements, Jean-Guy Talamoni 
described the need to expand support for the ‘prugettu cumunu’ to all political and civil society 
actors in Corsica, and to build on what he perceived as the very broad support for the reforms 
put forward by Corsican nationalists in Corsican society (Corsica Infurmazione, 2015c). Jean-
Marie Poli, an elected representative for Corsica Libera, similarly spoke of a desire of all 
Corsicans to unite in building a durable, peaceful political project, saluting the role of civil 
society in promoting and building support for the measures proposed by Corsican nationalists 
in the Corsican Assembly (Corsica Infurmazione, 2015d). As these two examples highlight, 
the notion of majority democratic support acts as a significant factor in establishing the 
legitimacy of minority nationalist political action in the eyes of minority nationalist parties 
themselves. 
Similarly to the two other cases, following the victory of Corsican nationalist parties in 
the French regional elections in December 2015 (Willsher, 2015), the role played by the 
concept of democracy in the rhetoric of Corsican nationalist leaders moved away from the 
necessity of building a broad support base towards the notion that the mandate obtained in the 
regional elections legitimises Corsican nationalist demands and renders what nationalist parties 
perceived as governmental opposition or unwillingness illegitimate. Speaking soon after the 
elections, Gilles Simeoni, newly elected chief of the Corsican regional executive (the 
governing body attached to the Corsican Assembly), established dialogue with the French 
government as an essential priority, arguing that: 
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Taking into account the decisive nature of the historic moment currently unfolding in 
Corsica, and taking into account the results of the territorial [regional] elections, and 
beyond the electoral result, taking into account the immense aspiration both to change 
and to the democratic life of our society expressed in Corsica in December 2015, it is 
essential that a real dialogue is opened with the [French] state. (Collectivité Territoriale 
de Corse, 2015) 
 Continuing from this quote, Simeoni added that the dialogue with the French state 
should not be restrictive, but should instead be open to all points and all issues (Collectivité 
Territoriale de Corse, 2015). Simeoni highlights the idea of democracy as providing legitimacy 
for wide ranging political and institutional reform, an idea that we highlighted previously in 
the rhetoric of both Scottish and Catalan minority nationalist political actors.  
 As negotiations faltered and Corsican nationalist parties became increasingly 
disillusioned with the process they had hoped to open with the French state, the tone of the 
Corsican nationalist rhetoric shifted and the emphasis on democratic legitimacy was further 
strengthened. Speaking about the early stages of the dialogue with the French government, 
Jean-Guy Talamoni regretted the rejection, by the French government, of all the reforms voted 
in the Corsican Assembly prior to the 2015 regional election, describing this position as 
‘unacceptable in today’s and tomorrow’s Europe’ (France 3 Corse Via Stella, 2016) and re-
stating that: 
We will never stop carrying the message for which we were elected, until the will of 
the people is realised. This is simply called democracy; we will carry out what we said 
we would do. […] We will continue to carry to voice of our people. We were elected 
for this and we will not fail in this task (France 3 Corse Via Stella, 2016) 
 
Such sentiment was later stated in a Corsica Libera newsletter in April 2016, calling 
upon the French government to ‘understand the historic political situation in which Corsica 
finds itself today, and to follow through with earlier commitments to open a dialogue on all of 
the Corsican Assembly’s reforms, including the reforms that require a revision of the 
constitution’ (Corse Matin, 2016). What Corsican nationalists perceived to be the illegitimacy 
of the French government’s positions in view of the electoral results achieved by them in the 
regional elections is further exemplified by the exasperated comment made by Gilles Simeoni 
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soon after a meeting with French government officials on the topic of institutional reform in 
Corsica: 
‘If the government seeks to impose [institutional reform] without taking into account 
any of the aspirations of Corsica, notably the wishes and demands expressed by the 
Corsican Assembly, it will be its choice, a unilateral choice at the polar opposite of a 
negotiated political solution. If the government persists in this position, it will prove 
that the unanimous votes of the Corsican Assembly are systematically ignored and 
dismissed. The historic political situation that emerged with the election of Corsican 
nationalists to positions of responsibility, representing the hopes Corsicans have for a 
change in the political system and in our relationship with the state, will remain 
unanswered by the government.’ (Corse net Infos, 2016) 
 
 As we have seen in all three cases, democracy and democratic legitimacy play a crucial 
role in the rhetoric, strategy and ideas of minority nationalist parties. Firstly, whether in 
Catalonia, Scotland or Corsica, these parties clearly perceive broad-based popular support as a 
requirement for the pursuit of their core aims, be it reform or independence. This belief in the 
necessity of popular support, when carried over into a context in which these parties secure 
significant electoral successes in their respective territories, forms the basis of the one of the 
key ways in which minority nationalist parties rely on the notion of democracy to legitimise 
their demands. Whether one looks at the demands for further devolution in Scotland, the 
demands for independence in Catalonia or the demands for widespread reform in Corsica, the 
democratic mandate these parties perceive to have secured in elections is frequently used as an 
argument to render illegitimate any form of significant opposition from national governments, 
whether one looks at the unsatisfactory devolution proposals made by the United Kingdom 
government or the far broader opposition provided by both the French and Spanish 
governments in response to minority nationalist demands within their own territory.  
 However, aside from their discourse, the importance placed upon democratic 
legitimacy by minority nationalist parties also influences strategic, electoral decisions made by 
these parties. As we will see in the following section, minority nationalist parties in Corsica 
and Catalonia, who have to contend with other competing minority nationalist parties, adopted 
similar strategies to maximise their chances of victory (and of securing clear democratic 
legitimacy) in the elections observed in 2015 and 2016.  
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Impact of democratic legitimacy on electoral strategy 
Minority nationalist parties in Catalonia, notably the CDC and ERC, developed a 
similar strategy to that of their Corsican counterparts by choosing to pursue outright electoral 
success through electoral coalition. By establishing the Junts Pel Sí coalition to contest the 
September 2015 Catalan autonomous elections (the elections to Catalonia’s autonomous 
parliament), both parties developed a common rhetorical platform to justify and pursue a shared 
aim of independence from the Spanish state (Convergents - CDC, 2015a; Junqueras, 2015a). 
This decision to join forces for a domestic election despite significant ideological differences 
between both the CDC and ERC (Junts Pel Sí, 2015f) highlights the importance both minority 
nationalist parties give to domestic electoral success to achieve the aim of independence.  
Although both the CDC and ERC joined forces under the Junts Pel Sí label for most of 
the period studied here, significant similarities in discourse, notably on the desirability and 
feasibility of independence, were apparent even prior to the official announcement establishing 
this common electoral platform. The period analysed in this thesis notably starts with the 
collapse and disappearance of the CiU party federation into two separate parties, CDC and 
Unió Democrática de Catalunya. The split was notably caused by what Unió called the 
abandonment of negotiations and the choice of unilateralism by the CDC’s leader and outgoing 
Catalan President Artur Mas (La Vanguardia, 2015b). Indeed, although Unió would go on to 
defend a more cautious approach centred on negotiation and constitutional reform under the 
slogan ‘La revolución del Seny’ (the revolution of prudence, of common sense), The CiU’s 
rhetoric on the necessity for independence had already become, by the start of the period 
analysed here, significantly closer to that already used by its main left-wing competitor, the 
ERC. Artur Mas for instance was quoted on CiU social media accounts as arguing that the 
‘Spanish constitution had, after 37 years, become a dead end for the democratic aspirations of 
the Catalan people’, highlighting that ‘prior to calling elections, the President has attempted all 
possible juridical, political and democratic options to agree to a referendum [on independence]’  
(CiU, 2015b, 2015a). This feeling was notably echoed by ERC leader Oriol Junqueras, who 
was quoted again in official social media accounts arguing that his main opponent was not the 
CDC, but ‘a state that tirelessly works against Catalonia and its citizens’, arguing the 
importance of ‘creating a pro-independence majority on the 27th of September, a majority that 
can sustain the creation of a new Catalan Republic’ (Esquerra Republicana, 2015j; Junqueras, 
2015a). 
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The absence of political violence at the heart of Corsican nationalism for the first time 
in almost forty years has created a situation where the totality of Corsica’s nationalist 
movement is now committed to a domestic-oriented, electoral strategy to achieve its aims. In 
the period studied, the campaign for the elections to the Corsican Territorial Assembly in 
December 2015 provided ample opportunity for Corsican nationalists from both Corsica 
Libera and Femu a Corsica to further detail their strategy and to provide further explanation 
of the ways in which they understand and seek to take advantage of the new political 
environment in which they now operate. 
Nationalist unity is undoubtedly one of the prominent features and discussion points of 
the campaign for the upcoming territorial elections. Jean-Christophe Angelini, one of the 
leading politicians in Femu a Corsica, highlighted in a radio interview the need for a ‘national 
convergence’ between the two ‘offers’ within Corsican nationalism (Alta Frequenza, 2015d).  
This feeling was notably echoed by veteran nationalist and Femu a Corsica politician Jean 
Biancucci, who argued in another radio interview that creating a nationalist coalition in the 
upcoming territorial elections is essential to create the conditions of a nationalist project able 
to secure a wide consensus (Alta Frequenza, 2015). Securing this wide consensus around a 
common nationalist project is something that Biancucci sees as essential for the prospect of 
securing nationalist achievements. In the same interview, he goes on to argue that creating 
nationalist unity for elections is the best way to: 
‘ensure that our project is the most stable and reliable and to ensure that it is a clear 
project in terms of people, ideas, and policies so that Corsicans can back us and ensure 
that we are, after the second round of the elections, a political force able to gather other 
ideas and other people around us’. (Alta Frequenza, 2015e) 
 
The commitment to a wide nationalist coalition is also something that permeates the rhetoric 
of Corsica Libera. Like Femu a Corsica, Corsica Libera defends the idea of a nationalist 
coalition to secure electoral victory at the territorial elections in 2015, reusing the term ‘national 
convergence’ (Alta Frequenza, 2015e) and promoting it as the only way to ensure that the 
reform package voted by the Corsican assembly is accepted and recognised by the French 
government. According to Jean-Guy Talamoni, the purpose of this election is to ensure a 
Corsican nationalist government able to negotiate with the French government to secure the 
reform package and enforce the acceptance of reforms, such as the granting of official status 
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to the Corsican language, that have been squarely rejected by the French government until now 
(AFP, 2013; Corsica Radio, 2015). 
This commitment to electoral unity further echoes the changed political circumstances in which 
Corsican nationalism operates today. From a political family which was considered by 
observers to be firmly divided between radicals and moderates (Olivesi, 1998; Hepburn and 
Elias, 2011). Corsican nationalists are now driven by a strategy in which unity and electoral 
success form a cornerstone. The commitment to unity at election time notably enabled minority 
nationalists in Corsica to accede to regional power for the first time in their history at the 
December 2015 elections (Willsher, 2015), a feat which was repeated two years later (Lamothe, 
2017). 
 
 The centrality of democratic legitimacy to minority nationalist discourse, as well as 
their varying ability to impose their demands on sometimes reluctant central governments, 
brings forward another essential question in the debate on self-determination: the question of 
mutual consent. In addition to this, although the commitment to democratic and electoral 
politics by minority nationalist parties in Scotland, Corsica and Catalonia can be perceived as 
opportunistic, social constructivist concepts such as mutual constitution, rules and norm 
diffusion provide us with the necessary tools to provide an analysis that moves beyond the idea 
of opportunism, to show how exactly minority nationalist parties are attempting, by providing 
a sustained challenge to their respective central governments and the legal or political norms 
they embody, to alter the political framework within which they operate in order to increase 
the perceived legitimacy of their demands and achieve their aims. 
 
 ‘Democratic’ self-determination: referendums and mutual consent 
 The electoral success of minority nationalist parties over the 2015-2017 period is clear. 
However, from the independence referendum in Scotland in 2014, hailed by some as a model 
for mutual consent self-determination (Levites, 2015), to the crisis in Catalonia in 2017 and the 
apparent lack of significant change in Corsica since 2015, the impact of the democratic 
legitimacy gained by these parties seems to vary across cases.  
 However, the importance of democratic legitimacy, and the reason why minority 
nationalist parties believe it to be essential to secure their aims, can be explained with reference 
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to both the context in which they operate, and social constructivist concepts such as rules and 
norm diffusion. 
 For a new norm to emerge and become broadly adopted (internalized), a ‘critical mass’ 
of relevant actors needs to be persuaded, to the point where the new norm is accepted and 
implemented by most critical actors. Depending on the aims of minority nationalist parties at 
any given time, who the critical actors are varies significantly: in the case of parties seeking 
unilateral independence, the necessary actors can be considered to be both domestic voters in 
the territory they claim to represent, and the international community. In this particular case, 
approval from the international community in the form of public support and recognition, as 
well as the support of a majority of the population, is deemed necessary to put forward a 
legitimate claim to unilateral independence. Within these characteristics, the remedial-only 
international norm of self-determination described above further restricts the ways in which 
minority nationalist parties can put forward a legitimate claim to unilateral independence: they 
would be required, for their claim to be perceived as legitimate, to demonstrate significant 
abuses, violations of internal autonomy or self-government agreements or unjust annexation.  
 However, an additional norm needs to be taken into account with regard to self-
determination and the international community: that of mutual consent. The norm can broadly 
be stated in those terms: ‘Secession, when conducted as the result of a mutual agreement 
between the state and the seceding territory, is legitimate’. Sterio argues that ‘had the 
Quebecois voted to separate from Canada in 1995, it is plausible to suggest that most of the 
outside world would have honoured the Canadian desire to split into two different states’, 
further stating that similar events took place relatively without controversy in the case of East 
Timor and, more controversially, in the case of Kosovo in 2008 (Sterio, 2013). The legal 
decision provided by the Supreme Court of Canada in Reference re Secession of Quebec in 
1998 is frequently cited as being a benchmark on the issue of both unilateral and mutually 
agreed secession, arguing that while no right to unilateral secession exists without significant 
human rights violations or obstacles to self-government and participation in government (a 
similar case made by Buchanan), the central government of Canada could not ignore, and 
would be compelled to negotiate, in the event of a significant vote in favour of secession in 
Quebec, legitimising secession as a potentially valid outcome of a negotiated process between 
a given territory and the central government (CanLII, 1998; Buchanan, 2003; Summers, 2013). 
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 However, while mutually agreed independence does significantly lower the bar for the 
acceptance of the international community, it also adds another critical actor to the process: the 
central government of the state within which the seceding territory finds itself. With respect to 
this point, minority nationalist parties in Scotland, Catalonia and Corsica have had different 
fortunes in attempting to secure the consent of the central government to either expand internal 
self-determination or secure external self-determination for several different reasons. 
 The first, and perhaps most practical reason, is that of geography. The respective size 
of Corsica, Catalonia and Scotland, and the political weight this provides to these territories in 
national political institutions, is insufficient for minority nationalist parties to impose their aims 
by acceding to power at the state level. Despite the SNP’s dominant display at the 2015 General 
Election, the number of seats secured (56) represents less than 10% of the total number of seats 
in the United Kingdom parliament. While the SNP played a vocal and sometimes influential 
role at the state level following this election, their position was still far short of being able to 
impose its preferred policy options and norms on the central government of the United 
Kingdom. Similarly, although minority nationalist parties in Catalonia (specifically the CiU) 
were occasionally able to wield strong political influence at the state level by playing the role 
of ‘kingmakers’ in coalition negotiations, minority nationalist Members of Parliament from 
Catalonia are, by virtue of the size of their territory and the number of parliamentary seats they 
contest, condemned to playing a small, minority role in Spanish state political institutions. The 
problem is further exacerbated in Corsica, where the island contributes four members of 
parliament to France’s 577-strong Assemblée Nationale. Even if politically dominant within 
Corsica, the chances of Corsican minority nationalists playing any role in the configuration of 
power at the French state level are remote. 
 Related to this issue is the one of the scope of minority nationalist party democratic 
legitimacy. While in all three cases, minority nationalist parties are strong, if not dominant, 
political forces within their respective territories (commanding significant electoral support), 
the extent to which this poses a problem to state-wide parties in terms of legitimacy or electoral 
support is questionable. Here again, the political context – and the norms that central 
governments commit to, either legally or politically, affect the extent to which minority 
nationalist parties are able to challenge state-level norms to legitimise and impose their aims. 
 In the context of Scotland, a number of historical and institutional factors come into 
play to strengthen the position of the Scottish government in relation to the central government, 
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while facilitating interactions between these two institutions. The nature of the Act of Union 
between England and Scotland, with the continued existence of several distinct Scottish 
institutions, contributed to the overall perception of the United Kingdom as a union of several 
equivalent ‘nations’, as opposed to a unitary state. The introduction of devolution in the late 
1990s further strengthened this perception, by creating a Scottish government and Parliament 
whose hierarchical position in relation to the central United Kingdom government varied across 
issues. While some powers remained reserved to the Parliament in Westminster, the Sewel 
Convention established after devolution states that, on matters under the purview of the 
devolved authorities, the United Kingdom would not legislate without the consent of the 
Scottish authorities, placing these ‘sub-national’ institutions on an equal footing with the 
central government on a wide range of issues. This notion of the Scottish government and 
Parliament as institutions to be negotiated with, as opposed to subnational authorities to be 
coerced hierarchically, permeated the run-up to the 2014 independence referendum and its 
aftermath, and strengthened the relevance of Scottish-based democratic success as an efficient 
way to wield influence and power at the United Kingdom level.  The success of the SNP in 
2011 on a clear pro-independence platform led the United Kingdom government to open up 
the possibility of a discussion, and potentially a referendum, on the constitutional future of 
Scotland. The discussions led up to the Edinburgh Agreement in 2012, which set out a joint 
commitment to organise an independence referendum for Scotland, and the steps required to 
render this legal under domestic, constitutional law (Casanas Adam, 2014; Levites, 2015). The 
agreement symbolised the commitment by both central government and SNP-led Scottish 
government to organise a legal, decisive referendum, and a commitment to respect and 
implement the result. The democratic mandate obtained by the SNP in 2011, followed by the 
agreement by the central government to allow and implement the result of an independence 
referendum, legitimised independence as a possible constitutional option for the future of 
Scotland. 
 In both Catalonia and Corsica, minority nationalist parties have to contend with strong, 
and constitutionally codified norms that establish sub-national authorities in a clear, 
hierarchical position of inferiority over the central government, which represents a unified 
‘nation’ (Cortes Generales, 2011; Assemblée Nationale, 2017). In both cases, sub-national 
authorities are not expected to execute or pursue any policy outside of their clearly defined 
legal and political purview, limiting the extent to which democratic success within those 
institutions grants direct, wieldable power at the state level. 
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 In both cases, minority nationalist parties in Corsica and Catalonia then rely on attempts 
to persuade relevant actors that their demands, and the norms that underpin them, are indeed 
legitimate. This however can be difficult for a number of different reasons in both territories. 
While Catalonia, for instance, is a significant enough territory to draw the attention of the rest 
of Spain, Corsican minority nationalists struggle to broadcast their aims and messages outside 
of their domestic, Corsican electorate. Corsican nationalists therefore are constrained in their 
ability to persuade relevant actors, in this case the French central government either directly or 
through its electorate, that they legitimately represent a national group with all the 
representative powers this entails (their norm) as opposed to yet another local authority with 
managerial powers (the constitutional norm in place at the state level).  
 In Catalonia, similar difficulties emerge. While the crisis in Catalonia and Catalonia 
itself are significant enough to occupy the political agenda of Spain as a whole, Catalan 
minority nationalists have struggled to legitimate their norms in the eyes of the Spanish 
government and its electorate in the rest of Spain. Although the Spanish government’s hostile 
response to Catalan claims remains unpopular in Catalonia, there are very little signs of this 
unpopularity spreading outside of the boundaries of Catalonia as a territory. As an example 
according to a poll, while 71% of Catalans support the idea of an independence referendum, 
61% of people in the rest of Spain oppose this (Masreal, 2017); in other words, there is very 
little domestic or electoral necessity for the Spanish government to review and change the norm 
according to which independence referendums in a given territory within Spain are not 
constitutionally legal. If anything, there would appear to be an electoral incentive for the central 
government to continue adopting a harder stance. 
 With very little immediate political incentive for mutual consent over secession and 
independence in both Corsica and Catalonia, minority nationalist parties have adopted two 
different approaches – the pursuit of critical junctures, and de facto policy implementation (as 
opposed to de jure implementation). 
 Minority nationalist parties in Corsica, have, since they acceded to the government of 
Corsica, pursued a de facto policy implementation, in areas where the French government 
seems reluctant or unable to enforce alternatives. There are two major, symbolic policy areas 
in which this has taken place: representation and language. With regard to representation, both 
the Corsican Executive Council President Gilles Simeoni (the executive leader) and Corsican 
Assembly President Jean-Guy Talamoni (representing the Corsican Assembly) have 
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established themselves as ‘representatives of the Corsican people’ both within Corsica and at 
the state-level in France. This position, although based on no legal basis, has at least been 
partially validated by the French government, by allowing several official visits by both 
Simeoni and Talamoni to Paris to discuss their demands. In interviews with both politicians 
conducted for the purpose of this thesis (Appendix A, interviews 2 and 3), both discussed and 
promoted their role as a ‘two-headed’ representation of Corsica, its people, and their 
aspirations, recognising that this went beyond the strict legal powers given to their respective 
positions. The other important and symbolic aspect where de facto policy implementation has 
taken place is language. While the Corsican language remains unrecognised as an official 
language within Corsica (AFP, 2013), minority nationalist actors within the Corsican 
administration and Assembly have gradually increased the visibility and role played by the 
language in public life, increasing its use in written communication within administrative 
circles as well as verbal deliberation within the Corsican Assembly. In doing this, and in the 
absence of any coercive rejection from the central French government, Corsican minority 
nationalists challenge existing norms (such as the status of Corsica as ‘one of the regions of 
France’ or the exclusive official status given to the French language) through day-to-day action. 
 In Catalonia, in the absence of any negotiated, mutual consent solution to the demands 
made by minority nationalist parties, minority nationalist parties seem to have adopted a 
strategy based on ‘critical junctures’ to undermine and challenge the constitutional and political 
norms that act as obstacles to their demands. Critical junctures, as defined in the first chapter, 
are moments in which existing, stable, historically established norms, are challenged and 
sometimes undermined by significant events or crises. Since attempts to organise an 
independence referendum in 2014, minority nationalist have enjoyed significant success in 
subsequent elections, culminating in a major political crisis brought about by the 2017 
independence referendum followed by the declaration of independence and the suspension of 
Catalan political autonomy. While the extent to which these events will benefit minority 
nationalist parties and their aims remains unclear at the time of writing, the crisis, which 
observers agree to characterise as the most significant in recent Spanish history (BBC News, 
2017b), has led to a growing discussion, both domestically and internationally, of previously 
unchallenged, established constitutional norms and rules.  
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Conclusion 
 Self-determination, as a concept, has varied and changed throughout its history. Closely 
tied to the 19th century emergence of nationalism as a significant political force, initial 
understandings of self-determination in international politics granted a right to statehood to all 
mobilized national groups, or groups with ‘national aspirations’. In the post-Second World War 
context dominated by decolonization, the right was understood as primarily applicable to 
colonized people, with little legitimacy given to non-colonized attempts at secession. Finally, 
with the wave of secessions and new states brought about by the collapse of the Soviet Union 
and Yugoslavia, a new approach was developed to restrict secession in virtually all cases, 
except those where significant violations of human rights have taken place. 
 While the rhetoric of minority nationalist parties in Scotland, Catalonia and Corsica 
draws to varying degrees on nationalist and remedial vocabulary, by far the most important 
legitimising factor of these parties’ attempts at self-determination is democracy. For minority 
nationalist parties, democratic success within the political institutions of their territory is 
understood as the single, most important way to legitimise and achieve aims that sometimes go 
far beyond the strict, legal competencies of the positions and institutions to get elected to. The 
importance of democratic politics has had significant consequences on both the rhetoric, and 
the strategy of minority nationalist parties over time. 
 Much of the existing literature on minority nationalist parties stems from the party 
competition and comparative party studies disciplines, which often assume that the primary 
purpose of a party is to win elections and secure power (Hepburn, 2009a; Elias and Tronconi, 
2011; Zuber, 2012; Elias, Szöcsik and Zuber, 2015). This thesis flips that relationship around, 
by arguing that parties, as one of the different types of norm entrepreneurs that can exist within 
a political system, are primarily concerned with promoting and implementing their normative 
preferences. Far from being the end-goal, elections are instead an extremely powerful 
legitimating tool minority nationalist movements can use to legitimate their demands in the 
eyes of other critical agents within the same political environment. While it is almost a 
universal tool in Western Europe, and one which carries a great deal of normative weight, 
minority nationalist movements need not inherently pursue electoral politics as a primary 
strategy, as the case of Corsica and the many political parties associated with the FLNC show 
(Olivesi, 1998; Poggioli, 2016). 
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 Also, while electoral success at the very least indicates that voters within these 
territories consider minority nationalist aims legitimate, this does not inherently translate into 
a similar perception of legitimacy outside the boundaries of their territory. With self-
determination requiring at least the legal support of the international community or the 
acceptance of the larger state (in addition to local support), minority nationalist parties have 
had varying degrees of success when trying to implement the policies and institutional changes 
they claim to have a mandate for. While in Scotland, historical and recent political 
developments means that the central government of the United Kingdom remained relatively 
open and flexible to address the demands brought forward by significant Scottish National 
Party electoral success, minority nationalist parties in Corsica and Catalonia have struggled to 
impose their demands and challenge strong, stable and recognised constitutional and legal 
norms. 
  In an attempt to do this, minority nationalist parties in both territories have 
adopted different strategies. In Corsica, minority nationalist parties have attempted to 
implement certain policy preferences without the legislative tools to provide a legal basis for 
them. Catalan parties have focused on creating ‘critical junctures’, or crisis moments during 
which established norms are perceived as under pressure or malfunctioning. Understanding 
their actions in this light allows us to analyse the rationale behind much of the brinkmanship 
that has characterised Catalan minority nationalist activity in the run-up and the aftermath of 
the October 2017 unilateral independence referendum and declaration. 
 In the following chapter, we will move away from the domestic focus of the last two 
chapters, focusing instead on one potential avenue for normative change that minority 
nationalist parties have attempted to engage with: European-level institutions and the European 
political arena. 
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5. Europe, Europeanisation and minority nationalist parties 
 
Self-determination drives the rhetoric and actions of minority nationalist parties, 
underpinning and legitimising most of their demands. Many of those demands, whether 
identity-based, institutional or economic, often involve the central government of the state or 
states these minority nationalist parties operate within. Consequently, as I have described in 
the previous chapter, the domestic political sphere is particularly relevant for these parties in 
their pursuit of political legitimacy and change. When considering the life cycle of the norms 
put forward by minority nationalist parties as a challenge to established state norms, electoral 
success of the kind achieved by these parties in all three cases potentially represents a tipping 
point towards norm cascading, a point where a sufficient number of critical agents, in this case 
both the parties and a majority of the local electorate, support the new emerging norm to 
encourage other actors to comply as a result.  
In some cases, as in Scotland in 2014, this is sufficient for minority nationalist parties 
to at least open up legal, state-sanctioned avenues for significant constitutional change. In other 
cases, however, despite perceived democratic legitimacy, minority nationalist parties struggle 
to either enforce the change they seek or to force the central government to consider the 
possibility of change. In these cases, despite the support of a majority of the electorate within 
their respective territories, minority nationalist parties were unable to secure enough support 
for their challenging norm, and were also unable to sufficiently weaken support for the 
established norm. 
The domestic political arena, however, is not the only political arena in which minority 
nationalist parties can act to secure support for their positions. Several studies of minority 
nationalism assess the phenomenon within the broader, European-level institutional, political 
and normative landscape, focusing on the growing role of the European Union in the action of 
these parties. While the domestic arena is, undoubtedly, the main field of action for minority 
nationalist parties in the period studied here, these parties have also sought to gather support, 
persuade and act at the European level to forward their aims. While domestic electorates, local 
governments and central governments are clearly critical agents in the case of minority 
nationalist norm diffusion, many of these parties have also considered European leaders and 
European-level institutions as important actors to legitimate their demands in the face of central 
government opposition. Europe, as a discursive, political, institutional and normative 
environment, continues to be relevant to these parties. 
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 The concept of ‘Europeanisation’ , despite the variety of interpretations and definitions 
associated with it (Olsen, 2002), provides an interesting starting point to analyse the emergence 
of ‘Europe’ as a relevant political area. While much of the literature on Europeanisation 
addresses the impact of the European Union on national and subnational governance, very little 
of it addresses minority nationalist parties specifically. However, a growing body of work has 
been built focusing on the relationship between the European Union and minority nationalist 
parties. It is from these two bodies of literature that I will draw for the analysis in this chapter. 
 In the second part of the chapter, drawing upon the example of the European Charter 
for Regional and Minority Languages (ECRML) but also on broader notions of the emergence 
of a European polity, I will explain how Europe, as a political space, is an all-encompassing 
and relevant arena for the challenging of rules and the pursuit of policy and political 
alternatives. Minority nationalist parties, although increasingly indifferent to the formal 
institutions of the European Union, remain fully invested in this European political space, 
through which they seek to legitimise their own demands while undermining continued state 
opposition to their demands. 
 Finally, in the third part of the chapter, I will analyse minority nationalist party rhetoric 
in Corsica, Catalonia and Scotland. I will focus on the extent to which Europe is present in day-
to-day rhetoric, the extent to which it is portrayed as a positive thing, and the extent to which 
this corresponds with previous understandings of minority nationalist party stance on Europe. 
Analysing this will provide additional important points regarding Europe as an avenue for 
change and a critical agent in the norm diffusion process. 
 
Europeanisation: a relevant concept? 
‘Europeanisation’, as a concept, describes a broad range of phenomena that relate to the 
emergence and consolidation of ‘Europe’, more specifically European-level political 
institutions, as a normatively influential political framework and actor. Sometimes considered 
to be too diverse and too broad to be conceptually useful (Olsen, 2002, p. 921), the term has 
been defined and understood in a variety of ways by European studies academics, ranging from 
narrow definitions covering a single type of phenomena to broader definitions establishing 
‘Europeanisation’ as a research perspective as opposed to a single concept.  
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Many understandings of Europeanisation, as is often highlighted in overviews of the 
concept, focus primarily on the impact of European Union policy, practices and integration and 
national or subnational political institutions (Borneman and Fowler, 1997; Featherstone and 
Radaelli, 2003; Delanty and Rumford, 2005; Headley, 2012), leading some academics to prefer 
‘Unionisation’ or ‘EU-Europeanisation’ (Kohler-Koch, 2000). This approach can, for instance, 
be clearly seen in studies related to the multi-level governance research agenda that focus on 
the impact of European integration and policy on domestic political systems, a research focus 
most notable in comparative works on the gradual ‘Europeanisation’ of sub-national 
government in response to the European-level rules and practices surrounding cohesion policy 
and regional funding (Dąbrowski, 2012; Adshead, 2014). Such studies, often drawing on 
comparative analyses, often highlight the extent to which bureaucratic procedures and 
institutions have changed or even emerged to respond to new incentives and emerging political 
opportunities as a result of European Union integration and policy-making.  
Other approaches however, adopt a broader understanding of Europeanisation. In his 
overview, Lenschow describes it as a ‘research perspective which brings into focus that Europe 
“matters” in the daily political life of national bureaucrats, politicians and the wider public 
(Lenschow, 2001). Borneman and Fowler distinguish between an ‘external’ and an ‘internal’ 
understanding of Europeanisation, with the ‘external’ understanding focusing on the growing 
importance of Europe as a form of identification and entity in the decades following the Second 
World War, and the ‘internal’ understanding focusing on the administrative and organisational 
power of the European Union (Borneman and Fowler, 1997). Other academics such as 
Aalberts, provide a constructivist understanding of Europeanisation, describing it as a process 
of construction, diffusion and ‘Europeanisation’ of rules, conventions, norms, beliefs and 
procedures which emerge first at the European level before seeping into the domestic level of 
politics (Aalberts, 2005, p. 11).  Similarly, Radaelli describes the process of Europeanisation 
as “processes of (a) construction (b) diffusion and (c) institutionalization of formal and 
informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’, and shared beliefs 
and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then 
incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and subnational) discourse, political structures 
and public policies” (Featherstone and Radaelli, 2003, p. 17), with Featherstone describing 
Europeanisation as addressing, among other things such as institutional adaptation and 
‘external’ policy impact  (understood as the impact of Europe on non-EU states), the emergence 
of ‘new, cross-national policy networks and communities’ as well as ‘shifts in cognition, 
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discourse, and identity affecting policy in response to European developments’. (Featherstone 
and Radaelli, 2003, p. 20). 
  
While, as we have seen above, academics such as Radaelli and Aalberts adopt a clear 
top-down perspective when defining Europeanisation, other academics such as Tarrow and 
Delanty provide a slightly different approach. Understood as social change, Tarrow highlights 
the importance of ‘Europeanisation’, understood broadly as the gradual spread of political 
decision-making power and legitimacy to European-level institutions at the expense of what 
had been a strong national-level monopoly over political action since the 18th and 19th centuries, 
and the impact this has had over what he terms the ‘politics of contestation’, or the political 
activities, rhetoric, forms of organisation of social movements, political parties and other 
components of what is understood as ‘civil society’ in democratic states (Tarrow, 1995; Imig 
and Tarrow, 2001). Similarly, Delanty and Rumford describe an emerging ‘European’ polity, 
in which societal forces (citizenship, civil society) play a crucial role in discursively shaping 
European Union dynamics and political developments (2005). This approach, linking 
Europeanisation with the emergence of a European polity that is both within but also extends 
beyond the strict institutional boundaries of the European Union, provides another broad 
approach on which Europeanisation can be studied. 
In an overview of Europeanisation as an academic concept, Featherstone and Radaelli 
identify up to eight different ways in which Europeanisation is used and understood in 
academic literature, a spectrum covering works on cultural diffusion, studies of the policy 
process at the European-level and studies on the foreign relations of European member-states 
(Featherstone and Radaelli, 2003, p. 6). Other academics, such as Olsen, highlight several 
forms of coexisting Europeanisation. Olsen identifies enlargement, institutional development, 
central penetration of national systems of governance, political organisation normative exports 
and political unification as different forms of Europeanisation. (Olsen, 2002) While not 
exhaustive, we see that Olsen’s categorisation of the different approaches to Europeanisation 
all describe phenomena which are primarily related to the development of European 
institutions, most notably those of the European Union. Whether one looks at the changes in 
external boundaries (driven by European Union enlargement) or the central penetration of 
national systems of governance, which also relates to the impact of European Union institutions 
on the forms of governance found at the national and subnational level, these forms of 
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Europeanisation are driven by, and occur through, European Union supranational political 
institutions.  
 The impact of these forms of Europeanisation, however, is not limited to European 
Union institutions. While not all dimensions of Europeanisation highlighted by Olsen impact, 
or are relevant to, minority nationalist parties, several have provided them with significant 
opportunities to pursue normative change at the European-level, helping them to bypass 
sometimes hostile domestic environments to promote normative change above the level of the 
domestic state. Perhaps the most important way in which minority nationalist parties could 
push for direct, significant normative change lies in the European-level political institutions 
themselves, to which we turn our attention now. 
 
European-level institutions 
 Identified as one form of Europeanisation by Olsen, and perhaps the most visible and 
structured form of Europeanisation, European-level institutions present a series of potential 
‘access points’ through which political parties, including the minority nationalist parties 
analysed here, can potentially yield influence at the European level. While political parties can, 
through European institutions, find a new arena in which normative legitimation or contestation 
can place, minority nationalist parties have frequently struggled to access European 
institutions, many of whom are broadly restricted to national governments. In this section, I 
focus on how minority nationalist parties have used, or failed to use, major European Union 
political institutions to put forward their normative and policy agenda. 
European institutions The European Union remains, in the words used by Gilles 
Simeoni (nationalist President of the Corsican Assembly’s Executive Committee) during an 
interview conducted for this thesis, a “Europe of States” – a perception of Europe echoed by 
many minority nationalist actors and by the liberal intergovernmentalist school of European 
integration studies (Moravcsik, 1998). The centrality of member state national governments is 
best illustrated by the European Council, bringing together the government heads of each 
member state and wielding significant influence on a wide range of European-level policy 
issues (Hooghe and Marks, 2001; Smith, 2003; Schimmelfennig and Moravcsik, 2009), and 
the Council of Ministers. 
Functioning primarily according to intergovernmental rules and regrouping ministers from all 
member state national governments (Rosamond, 2000), the Council of Ministers is broadly 
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recognised as a central institution within the European institution. Hooghe and Marks describe 
it as one of the three key institutions within the European Union competing for legislative 
power (alongside the Commission and the European Parliament) (2001). They also describe 
the Council of Ministers as the main avenue for collective national government control, or in 
others words the key institution through which national governments are able to impose their 
collective will on the European policy-process. Although their policy mandates are often quite 
flexible, allowing the Commission a great deal of leeway when designing and implementing 
policies, countries acceding to the presidency of the Council of Ministers often come with 
detailed and concrete policy proposals to advance during their term (Hooghe and Marks, 2001). 
 The Council of Ministers, being an institution built on intergovernmental rules and 
regrouping ministers from national governments, is at first sight one of the least favourable 
institutions for minority nationalist party involvement in the European policy process. Indeed, 
this would require minority nationalist parties to obtain positions within national governments, 
something beyond the reach of most minority nationalist parties, with the exception of parties 
enjoying significant levels of support enabling them at best to enter government through 
coalition agreements or, alternatively to influence national government formation, as in the 
case of Catalan party CiU in the 1990s (Guibernau, 2006). Alternatively, independence 
accompanied by European Union membership would appear to be the only (and highly 
hypothetical) alternative for minority nationalist parties to potentially secure full access to the 
European Council and Council of Ministers. As an avenue to legitimise and pursue the kind of 
institutional changes minority nationalist parties seek, the Council of Ministers is undoubtedly 
the least accessible for these parties. 
 
Short of direct access, Hooghe, Marks and Keating among others have argued that, 
since the Maastricht Treaty in the early 1990s, the Council of Ministers has opened itself in a 
limited way to subnational input. The treaty included a clause which allowed regional ministers 
to attend the Council of Ministers on behalf of their national governments on matters that affect 
regional interests. This opening, although limited, has led academics to argue that the Council 
of Ministers is no longer the sole preserve of national governments (Hooghe and Marks, 2001; 
Keating, 2004) In practice, this opportunity has only been granted, depending on the domestic 
context, to the most powerful regions in Europe. For instance, although Spanish regions are 
well established constitutionally and have significant resources, their access to the Council of 
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Ministers has been limited. Even when access is granted to a region, it cannot act on behalf of 
its own interests: it is limited to represented the overall regional interests of all regions 
throughout the member state they represent (Hooghe, 1995; Hooghe and Marks, 2001). Beyond 
this limited and conditional access, Keating has also argued that alongside the opening up of 
the Council of Ministers by the Maastricht Treaty, the expansion of the European Union’s 
powers to new areas since then has allowed national governments to regain control, through 
the Council of Ministers, on issues that were previously firmly within subnational purview 
(Keating, 2008a). 
 Another development in the practice of European Union policy-making further 
contributes to the limitations faced by minority nationalist parties attempting to contribute 
through the Council of Ministers. Academics have highlighted that although consensus 
decisions are still the norm within the Council of Ministers, this norm has been steadily 
weakening over time. According to Hooghe and Marks already in the 1990s, a quarter of 
decisions taken by the Council of Ministers overruled at least one member state government 
(Hooghe and Marks, 2001). Follesdal and Hix highlight the same phenomena after 
enlargement, arguing that policy contestation was increasingly a feature of the Council of 
Ministers (Follesdal and Hix, 2006). For minority nationalist parties that might gain access to 
the Council of Ministers, this means that there is no guarantee that their voice will be heard 
and incorporated into a policy consensus. It is increasingly likely for any participant in the 
policy-process to be bypassed should he find himself a clear minority amongst other national 
governments. Although this problem will remain somewhat theoretical for most minority 
nationalist parties, it is undoubtedly an additional difficulty that participants can face once they 
gain access to the Council of Ministers and to intergovernmental policy-making at the 
European Union level. 
 While the European Council and Council of Ministers remain particularly closed to 
minority nationalist party participation, other European institutions have proved more practical 
as access points for these parties to the European Union policy process. The European 
Parliament and the Committee of the Regions are two important examples of such access. 
 
The European Parliament is one of the institutions of the European Union that has been 
most strengthened over time. The European Parliament became a directly elected body with 
the first European elections in 1979, and it was increasingly consulted throughout the 1980s 
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before being granted a far greater role in European policy-making through the cooperation, 
assent and co-decision procedures introduced by the Single European Act and the Maastricht 
Treaty respectively (Hooghe and Marks, 2001, p. 20). This strengthening of the European 
Parliament, partly motivated by demands for greater accountability and transparency at the 
European level has taken place at the expense of other European institutions, who can no longer 
disregard the European Parliament during the policy-making process (Hooghe and Marks, 
2001, pp. 8–9). This affects especially the Council of Ministers, whose legislative proposals 
can be vetoed by the European Parliament (Hooghe and Marks, 2001, p. 21). 
 Today, the European Parliament is still undoubtedly one of the three main European 
institutions to contest legislative powers at the European level, similarly to when Hooghe and 
Marks made the same remark in 2001. For instance, the European Parliament has the right to 
request legislation from the Commission, although it rarely does so (Hooghe and Marks, 2001). 
After the Amsterdam Treaty, an equal proportion of provisions at the European level involved 
either the co-decision, consultation or exclusion of the European Parliament, highlighting its 
growing legislative role in Europe (Hooghe and Marks, 2001, p. 20). It therefore provides a 
direct platform for electorally successful parties to take part in European Union policy-making. 
Many regionalist parties have strong incentives to try and get access to the European Parliament 
(Lynch, 1998). Elections to the European Parliament are still widely considered to be second-
order elections, providing opportunities for smaller, less successful parties to secure election. 
Election to the European Parliament also provides significant financial incentives for smaller 
parties, and it provides a unique platform upon which to raise awareness of issues (Lynch, 
1998, p. 192). 
 One of the important ways in which minority nationalist parties have been active at the 
European level is through the European Free Alliance (EFA), a ‘europarty’ regrouping many, 
mostly Western European, minority nationalist parties into one European-level structure. The 
EFA was developed in 1979 in Bastia, Corsica, by nine separate minority nationalist parties. It 
was further strengthened at the European level by the Flemish party Volksunie, using their 
position and their strength in the European Parliament to establish the EFA. Initially, the EFA 
was established with four objectives in mind: increasing European parliamentary 
representation; increasing EFA membership; developing a common manifesto for European 
elections and also a wider common platform between member parties (Lynch, 1998).  
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 A few years after its establishment, member parties developed a constitution for the 
EFA, formalising the organisation and establishing a few requirements for membership. Parties 
seeking membership were expected to be non-violent, democratic and electorally active. The 
1983 constitution also included a limit of one party per region, to foster alliance-making at the 
local level, and established an observer membership alongside its formal, full membership. A 
reform in 1991 reinforced the electoral activity requirement, while also introducing a 
requirement for member parties to actively produce and distribute a newspaper or any other 
political literature (Lynch, 1998). These requirements, although unproblematic in the case of 
Scottish nationalism, have proven to be far more problematic in territories with divided 
nationalist movements (as in Catalonia), and in territories with a history of political violence, 
excluding parties that have traditionally supported or continue to support violence (as in 
Corsica). While membership of the EFA has been steadily growing from 9 in 1981, to 19 in 
1983, 21 in 1992, 31 in 2007 and 43 today (Lynch, 1998; Lynch and De Winter, 2008; 
European Free Alliance, 2018), minority nationalism in two of our case studies, Catalonia and 
Corsica, remains partially represented, with major nationalist party PDeCAT in Catalonia and 
Corsica Libera in Corsica remaining outside of the EFA, undermining the EFA’s ability to 
form a parliamentary group and its claim to be the voice of minority nationalism in Europe 
(Lynch, 1998; Lynch and De Winter, 2008).  
 
 Gaining European Parliament representation has generally been a challenge for the 
EFA. The EFA has never been able to create its own parliamentary group, resorting to alliances 
to create a sustainable parliamentary group. In 1979, the EFA was part of the ‘Technical Co-
Ordination Group’, an extremely diverse group of parties whose primary purpose was to 
provide access to the benefits of being a member of a European parliamentary group. The 1984 
elections saw the emergence of the Rainbow Group, which was one of the many iterations of 
the EFA coalition with Green Parties at the European Parliament. Despite promising electoral 
results in 1989, the Rainbow Group split and the EFA was left just short of being able to form 
a parliamentary group (Lynch, 1998, pp. 199–200). The 1994 elections saw a significant fall 
in EFA representation within the European Parliament, with EFA numbers falling to four MEPs 
(Lynch, 1998). The 1999 elections remain a high point for the EFA, with the re-emergence of 
the coalition between minority nationalists and Green parties and the formation of the 
Greens/EFA group, of which the EFA was the largest part (Lynch and De Winter, 2008). In 
2004 however, the disappearance of the Volksunie as a single party crippled the EFA, whose 
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numbers fell to 5 MEPs out of a Greens/EFA group composed of 37 MEPs  (Lynch and De 
Winter, 2008). EFA representation slightly increased after the last European elections in 2014, 
rising to 7 MEPs as part of a fifty-strong Greens/EFA group (European Free Alliance, 2015). 
 The disparity in size between EFA member parties also significantly affects the EFA’s 
parliamentary representation and its influence at the European level. For instance, after 2004 
elections, only three member states had EFA member party MEPs, with only seven parties 
gaining representation (Lynch and De Winter, 2008). In the current parliament, five EFA 
member parties have secured representation, with a number of other minority nationalist 
associating with the EFA group despite not being member parties themselves. This 
representation is limited to four member states: Belgium, the United Kingdom, Latvia and 
Spain (European Free Alliance, 2015).  Despite the continuously growing number of members, 
the EFA does not seem to be able to attract parties that a significant prospect of winning 
representation in European elections, crippling their ability to form an independent group and 
limiting the impact of many of these parties at the European level.  
  The European Parliament represents a clear opportunity for minority nationalist 
parties to get engaged with the European policy-making process and to raise awareness of their 
issues and their claims. However, most minority nationalist parties are not electorally strong 
enough to secure representation in the European Parliament. The existence of the European 
Free Alliance helps to alleviate some of these difficulties, by providing a platform for many 
smaller parties to remain connected with the European Parliament and with larger parties that 
can broadly be understood as being in the same ‘political family’. (Keating, 2004; Elias, 2008b; 
Lynch and De Winter, 2008). However, despite helping to reinforce and sustain these 
transnational ties, the influence of the EFA on the overall European policy process remains 
small. 
 The weakness of minority nationalist voices within the main European Union 
institutions, while an obstacle in ‘normal’ times, can become a significant handicap for 
minority nationalists in times of critical juncture, where European institutions and other 
European states are drawn into a major ongoing normative challenge and crisis. This was partly 
visible in the context of the Scottish independence referendum in 2014, and evident in the 
context of the attempted Catalan referendum in 2017. Discussions over the European Union 
membership or Scotland in the event of a ‘Yes’ vote in the 2014 independence referendum 
were central to the independence debate, and, while the SNP maintained that European Union 
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membership would be an automatic right for Scotland post-independence, many key political 
actors at the European level, such as European Commission President José-Manuel Barroso 
and European Parliament President Martin Schulz, expressed doubts or refused to confirm or 
deny whether the SNP’s claims were valid (Carrell, 2012; Duncanson, 2014; Leask, 2014). 
While, due to the victory of the ‘No’ campaign in the independence referendum, the issue of 
Scotland’s membership of the European Union never moved beyond the kind of discussions 
highlighted here, the crisis following Catalonia’s attempted independence referendum in 2017 
followed by its aborted declaration of independence provide another case to analyse the 
influence of minority nationalists at the European level. 
The topic of Europe’s attitude in relation to Catalan aspirations for independence, 
negotiated or unilateral if necessary, was one of the major topics discussed with Catalan MEP 
Ramon Tremosa i Balcells in an interview (Appendix A, interview 8). When confronted with 
the example of Scotland and the reservations expressed by European officials around the time 
of the Scottish independence referendum, Ramon Tremosa expressed optimism, describing his 
own experience of awareness-raising for Catalan demands in Europe, a process which, 
according to him, draws significant sympathy from a range of officials including ambassadors, 
European Union officials and fellow Members of the European Parliament. More importantly, 
Ramon Tremosa highlighted a belief that appears to have been shared across Catalan minority 
nationalists as the process towards the 2017 independence referendum began: the notion that, 
in a crisis, other European countries and the European Union itself, in the interests of the 
economy and stability, would side with the Catalan government against what he described as a 
potential excessive response from the Spanish government. 
 Although it is clear that the exact form in which the independence referendum and 
ensuing political crisis occurred was difficult to predict, the crisis in October 2017 provides a 
serious test for such a belief, and a serious case study for the real impact of awareness-raising 
and the normative engagement of minority nationalist parties at the European level. Despite 
widespread anger at the Spanish government’s response to the independence referendum on 
the 1st of October 2017 both domestically (Jones and Burgen, 2017) and internationally 
(Human Rights Watch, 2017), European-level responses to the independence referendum and 
subsequent declaration of independence were almost unanimously in support of the Spanish 
government’s stance. Major European figures, such as Commission President Juncker, 
criticised the Catalan government heavily (Pérez, 2017; Solletty, 2017), and other leaders from 
major European countries expressed clear support for the Spanish government (Pérez and 
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Abellan, 2017). Other European-level statements, such as the statement published on behalf of 
the European Parliament President, described the Catalan declaration of independence as a 
‘breach of the rule of law, the Spanish Constitution and the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia, 
which are part of the EU’s legal framework’  (Corazza, 2017). Statements by European 
Parliament political group leaders were almost unanimously opposed to the Catalan 
government’s position, with the single exception being the speech by German MEP Ska Keller 
on behalf of the Greens/European Free Alliance group, which cautiously supported the right to 
self-determination and called for further negotiations to put an end to the crisis (European 
Parliament, 2017).  
 Overall, while not definitive, the 2017 Catalan crisis appears to cast some doubt on the 
effectiveness of minority nationalist party engagement with the major institutions of the 
European Union. Faced with a critical juncture, very few European-level actors provided 
support for the normative challenge brought forward by Catalan minority nationalists. 
 
The Committee of the Regions (CoR), although rarely considered as a major institution 
in the European Union framework, also provides an alternative venue for subnational actors, 
including minority nationalist parties, to participate in the European policy-making process and 
to make their voice heard at the European level.  
The CoR was introduced as by the Maastricht Treaty in the early 1990s as a body 
attached to the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) institutionally and 
financially, with no specific or distinct position or role in the emerging inter-institutional 
consultation process (Hooghe, 1995; Hooghe and Marks, 2001; Domorenok, 2009). Despite 
what has been characterised by some as a ‘difficult inception’, the initial hopes around the CoR 
were that it would eventually grant subnational actors a central role in the European policy-
making process (Elias, 2008a; Domorenok, 2009). Members of the CoR are appointed by their 
national governments, and although it was open to all, the Treaty of Nice in 2001 restricted 
membership to elected subnational officials, excluding MEPs (Carroll, 2011). The powers of 
the CoR are mostly restricted to advisory powers, leading many academics to argue that it relies 
solely on persuasion and lobbying to achieve its aims  (Hooghe, 1995; Hooghe and Marks, 
2001; Keating, 2004). The scope of issues on which the CoR can exercise its powers is equally 
limited, being restricted to five key issues: education, health, culture, trans-European networks 
and economic and social cohesion. Aside from these issues however, the CoR is free to publish 
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‘own-initiative’ opinions on any other topic (Hooghe, 1995; Hooghe and Marks, 2001; Carroll, 
2011). 
  
 Despite early promise, the Committee of the Regions has broadly been a 
disappointment to minority nationalists (Hooghe and Marks, 2001; Keating, 2004; Domorenok, 
2009). From its inception, it has suffered from a wide range of difficulties, ranging from 
financial limitations to internal divisions to a lack of influence. Firstly, as I have seen the CoR’s 
powers remain limited, and the resources it benefits from to exercise these powers are equally 
limited. Secondly, the CoR is built upon a principle of equal representation, providing equal 
importance to all subnational actors ranging from regions to municipal governments (Keating, 
2004). This has led to significant internal divisions between local and regional authorities, as 
well as a split between Northern European and Southern European subnational entities on the 
basis of different practices and resource inequalities (Hooghe, 1995; Hooghe and Marks, 2001; 
Domorenok, 2009; Carroll, 2011). Whether for strong regions or for territories with a distinct 
identity and minority nationalist activity, being represented on an equal footing with municipal 
governments that share almost none of these characteristics represents a significant frustration, 
and does little to satisfy the demands for cultural and political recognition that characterise 
minority nationalist parties. 
 
 Some academics have also highlighted the limited impact of the CoR on the European 
Union policy-making process. Hooghe and Marks argue that the CoR wields little influence, 
and certainly does not frame any significant debates at the European level. Going further, they 
argue that not only the CoR has little impact, it is also rarely taken seriously outside of its 
opinions on cohesion and regional policy, which would indicate that even in areas where the 
CoR has formal powers, its voice is rarely taken into account adequately (Hooghe and Marks, 
2001; Domorenok, 2009). Keating adds that the CoR has had very little to show in terms of 
concrete results following its actions or the publication of an opinion, although Domorenok 
argues that it is not simple to isolate the impact of the CoR in a legislative environment 
composed of multiple, interrelated institutions  (Hooghe and Marks, 2001; Domorenok, 2009). 
Finally, another significant frustration for minority nationalist parties is the CoR’s 
unwillingness to try and modify domestic territorial relations, instead focusing on the 
implementation of multi-level governance across all states equally regardless of their 
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constitutional set up (Carroll, 2011). In other words, the CoR has done little to provide 
recognition, let alone constitutional change, to territorial minorities and minority nationalist 
parties who seek these changes first and foremost. Ever since the Treaty of Nice and the 
establishment of an electoral requirement, membership of the CoR has become closed to many 
minority nationalist parties who lack the electoral strength even to win local electoral mandates. 
 An analysis of the membership of the CoR originating from three subnational territories 
that interest us in this thesis (Catalonia, Corsica and Scotland) reveals a mixed picture for 
minority nationalist party presence in the CoR. In May 2015 (at the time of the data collection 
for this study), Corsica was only represented by one alternate member, Emanuelle de Gentili, 
who is now deputy mayor of Bastia and was elected on a minority nationalist list led by Gilles 
Simeoni of the party coalition Femu a Corsica (Le Figaro, 2014a; Committee of the Regions, 
2015a). Catalonia on the other hand had one full member, Nura Marín Martinez from the Partit 
dels Socialistes de Catalunya (the territorial branch of the Spanish socialist party PSOE), and 
two alternate members including Roger Albinyana i Saigí of the CDC (now PDeCAT) the then 
Catalan government secretary to External Affairs and the European Union, and Jordi San Jose 
i Buenaventura, a member of the Incitiativa per Catalunya Verds (ICV), a left-leaning ecologist 
party (Committee of the Regions, 2015b). Finally, Scotland had the most representatives in the 
CoR of the three cases analysed here, with five full members and one alternate member. Of the 
six members in total, two are affiliated with the SNP (Anthony Buchanan and Stewart 
Maxwell), two with Scottish Labour (Corrie McChord and Patricia Ferguson), one with the 
Conservatives (Barbara Grant) and one finally with the Liberal Democrats (Jim Hume) 
(Committee of the Regions, 2015c). Although minority nationalist parties have representation 
in each of the territories analysed above, they remain a small part of their overall national 
delegations and an even smaller part of the overall membership of the CoR (Carroll, 2011). 
Despite the negativity surrounding the role and impact of the CoR in the European 
institutional environment, other academics argue that the CoR has been underestimated in 
academia (Domorenok, 2009, p. 144). Domorenok for instance recognises that during the first 
few years, the opinions published by the CoR were often bland and built on very low common 
denominator consensus. However, she argues that despite this initial critique over the quality 
of CoR opinions, there has been as marked and recognised improvement in the overall quality 
of CoR publications over time (Hooghe and Marks, 2001; Domorenok, 2009). Domorenok 
makes a similar point with regards to the domains in which the CoR publishes opinions. 
Hooghe and Marks, in their evaluation of the CoR, highlight that during the first two years, 
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75% of the CoR’s published opinions were ‘own-initiative’ opinions, which would tend to 
indicate that the CoR’s efforts were scattered and often unsolicited by the other European 
Union institutions (Hooghe and Marks, 2001). Since these early years however Domorenok 
describes how pressure was put on the CoR by the Commission to focus on mandatory and 
optional opinions, and also to produce fewer, but higher quality opinions. Consequently, 
mandatory and optional opinions have increased significantly, and ‘own-initiative’ opinions 
have similarly decreased over time (Domorenok, 2009). 
Domorenok also argues that the position of the CoR within the European Union 
institutional framework has been strengthened since its early days. According to her, the CoR 
was gradually ‘institutionalised’ with gradual changes to its relationship with and position in 
relation to other European institutions (Domorenok, 2009). The CoR for instance has 
developed a strong relationship with the European Commission, which acknowledges or acts 
upon the overwhelming majority of CoR opinions (Carroll, 2011). Relations with other 
institutions such as the European Parliament or the Council of Ministers continue to be limited, 
although Domorenok argues that they are improving notably through a growth in networking 
between MEPs and CoR members (Domorenok, 2009). 
The CoR has also developed a new  role as a guardian of the principle of subsidiarity 
in the European Union, adopting a charter for multi-level governance in 2014 calling for 
systematic involvement of subnational actors in the development and implementation of any 
policy affecting regional interests (Lebrun, 2014). This new focus on subsidiarity, perceived 
by some to be a reaction to the perception of a democratic deficit within the European Union 
has allowed subnational authorities within the CoR to bring some of the pressures and the 
impact of European policy on subnational administrations and resources to the attention of 
other European policy-makers in other institutions (Carroll, 2011).   
 Although the Committee of the Regions undoubtedly provides an arena for minority 
nationalist parties to express their concerns and share their aims and proposals, it is still clear 
however that, in defending the overall interests of subnational authorities, the CoR cannot focus 
specifically on the cultural and constitutional aims of most minority nationalist parties. With 
domestic electoral success being a prerequisite for any significant representation within the 
CoR, its design tends to replicate and amplify the minority position within which minority 
nationalist parties find themselves at the domestic level. As an arena to secure legitimacy for 
their demands, the CoR similarly fails from the perspective of these parties insofar as its 
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influence on the European-level policy process is limited. The reduction of own-initiative 
opinions also means the likelihood of having minority nationalist concerns emerge as part of 
policy recommendations or policy reports from the CoR appears remote at best. 
 
Political unification and central penetration of national systems of governance. 
 Europeanisation as a process of political unification of Europe is, from the perspective 
of minority nationalist parties, faced with the same limitations and severe constraints as 
participation within the European-level institutions that form the building blocks of a potential, 
politically unified European Union. 
 While generally supportive of the European Union in principle, minority nationalist 
parties have grown increasingly sceptical of the direction taken in recent years of European 
construction (Hepburn, 2008; Keating, 2008a). Current stances on the European Union from 
minority nationalist parties in Scotland, Catalonia and Corsica range from cautious but strong 
support from the SNP arguing in favour of many aspects of European policy such as freedom 
of movement or European funding, while admitting the need for further reform and opposing 
the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) (Scottish National Party, 2016d, 
2016a), to the indifference and moderate critiques found within both Corsican and Catalan 
minority nationalist parties. Throughout the data collection conducted for this study, the 
European Union was virtually absent from the rhetoric of Catalan minority nationalist parties, 
with the exception of discussions around the role of the European Union in hindering (or 
validating) a potential independence process (Martínez, 2015; Nardelli and Arnett, 2015). 
Similarly, European Union politics played little role in Corsican nationalist rhetoric, with the 
European Union very much reduced to occasional questions of regional funding and economic 
support. 
 With limited institutional participation prospects and continued indifference or 
dissatisfaction with more or less broad aspects of European Union policy, it seems unlikely 
that minority nationalist parties will be able to contribute significantly to Europeanisation 
understood as the political unification of Europe, and any satisfactory outcome (from the 
perspective of minority nationalist parties) would rely heavily on stronger, more influential 
political parties and national government leaders who might or might not share the aims and 
objectives of minority nationalist parties. With constraints on participation and no immediate 
prospect of a continent-wide convergence around minority nationalist ideas, it is likely that 
Edward Walker – School of Government and International Affairs, Durham University 
180 | P a g e  
 
minority nationalist parties will continue to be indifferent to a form of Europeanisation they 
can do little to influence in the short term. 
 
 The question of the impact of European Union policy and practice on national (and 
subnational) governance has been central to the multi-level governance research agenda as well 
as many empirical studies on the impact of regional policy in various European countries 
(Hooghe and Marks, 2001; Czernielewska, Paraskevopoulos and Szlachta, 2004; Dąbrowski, 
2012; Adshead, 2014). While studies highlight the uneven and often case-specific impact of 
European policy on national and subnational practices, Olsen highlights two key ways in which 
Europeanisation acts in this context: through competitive adaptation, and through experiential 
learning (Olsen, 2002). While competitive adaptation is relevant, particularly in the context of 
subnational authorities adopting best practices in order to secure competitive structural funds 
and other grants (Dąbrowski, 2012), experiential learning is particularly important in the 
context of minority nationalist parties in Europe. Both the interview process and the data 
collected for this thesis revealed a clear concern by minority nationalist parties for 
developments in other territories with similar political parties and similar political divisions 
and debates. All minority nationalist political figures interviewed emphasised ties with other 
similar parties in Europe, ranging from formal ties through institutions such as the EFA to more 
informal ties built on regular interactions and exchanges, such as the participation of Corsican 
nationalists as observers for the unofficial independence referendum held by Catalan minority 
nationalists in 2014 highlighted by Corsican Assembly President Jean-Guy Talamoni in an 
interview. Further informal ties, such as the presence of ‘international delegations’ at 
nationalist protests, were also observed during a protest organised by a nationalist civil society 
group in Corsica in September 2016, and continue to be a feature of many minority nationalist 
public protests across Europe.  
 These ties, which are located primarily outside of any formal institutional setting, allow 
for significant opportunities in terms of experiential learning. Evidence of such learning was 
rife throughout the electoral campaign leading up to the territorial (subnational) elections to 
the Corsican Assembly in 2015, where both moderate and radical Corsican nationalists 
highlighted the importance of political unity at elections, pointing to the recent example of 
electoral success gained by a coalition of nationalist parties in Catalonia in September 2015 
(Alfonsi, 2015; Mari, 2015). Similarly, Catalan nationalist parties drew heavily on the example 
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of the Scottish independence referendum in 2014 to both formulate their demands for a similar 
vote in Catalonia and undermine the legitimacy of Spanish governmental opposition to the 
demand (Esquerra Republicana, 2015g). 
  
 As we have seen in the above sections, the different approaches to Europeanisation 
highlighted by Olsen vary in their relevance and in the extent to which minority nationalist 
parties engage with them. While engagement with European-level institutions remains relevant 
for minority nationalist parties, significant restrictions on access to policy making and 
continued reservations on the current political direction of the European Union mean that, 
broadly speaking, minority nationalist parties in Scotland, Catalonia and Corsica are unable to 
yield significant influence at the European level. This, however, does not limit minority 
nationalist parties to domestic politics – minority nationalist parties continue to adopt a 
distinctly European outlook, showing concern for the success and failures of similar parties in 
other European territories and building wide ranging bilateral and multilateral ties both within 
and outside formal European-level institutions, leading to experiential learning and a degree of 
convergence between the rhetoric and strategies of minority nationalist parties in these 
territories. 
 A closer look at (and a slight modification of) the final form of Europeanisation 
suggested by Olsen, the exportation of European forms of political organisation, will allow us 
to highlight ways in which minority nationalist parties draw upon European and sometimes 
global principles and treaties to influence the political organisation of both their territories and 
the states within which they are located.  
 
Exporting European norms to Europe: European principles challenging national 
policies. 
 Olsen, describing this form of Europeanisation as the ‘spread of European forms of 
political organisation beyond the European territory’ (Olsen, 2002), describes what has been 
broadly conceptualised as the notion of ‘soft power Europe’, in which Europe is seen as an 
important normative promoter not only within its own immediate neighbourhood but globally 
(Delanty and Rumford, 2005; Gstöhl, 2015). Minority nationalist parties within Europe 
however still draw upon European-level documents, principles and charters to challenge and 
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sometimes successfully change the policy stances of national governments on issues such as 
recognition and, where relevant, minority language rights and promotion. In that respect, 
minority nationalist parties are engaged in a process of ‘exportation’ of European-level norms 
to European countries themselves, challenging the legitimacy of established national state 
practices and drawing upon principles enshrined at the European level to push issues they see 
as key up the agenda within their respective national states. 
 To analyse this, the example of the ECRML will be used. The ECRML is a European-
level charter providing a framework for the protection and promotion of minority and regional 
languages to be adopted and adapted by each signatory state  (Committee of the Regions, 
2017a). The charter, which does not provide an official recognition for minorities as a group, 
instead provides a platform for the recognition, protection and promotion of regional language 
use within the territories where a given language is traditionally spoken (Locatelli, 2002).  
 The Charter was established in 1992 and entered into force following ratification by 
five Council of Europe member states in 1998 (Keating, 2004)(Committee of the Regions, 
2017b). At the time of writing, 28 countries have signed and ratified the Charter (including the 
United Kingdom and Spain), while 8 countries have signed but not ratified the Charter 
(including France). This highlights what can be seen as the first weakness in the ECRML 
framework. While countries that sign and ratify the charter do fall under the remit of a three-
year continuous monitoring process, whereby the Council of Europe produces reports assessing 
the state of minority language rights in a given country, there is very little forcing countries to 
sign and ratify the charter in the first place. While ratification of the Charter is repeatedly 
discussed and attempted within France, continued opposition from all sides of the political 
spectrum as well as concerns over compatibility with the French constitution have prevented 
the ratification, and therefore implementation, of the charter in France. (Blanchet, 2002; 
Locatelli, 2002; Giordan, 2008) (Rédaction France Info, 2015). 
 The format of the Charter itself, built as a framework with many possible degrees of 
implementation and many different optional measures, provides an opportunity for a variety of 
regional language protections ranging from extensive to limited. Signatory countries for 
instance need only implement thirty-five paragraphs within Part III of the Charter, which 
covers up to sixty-four concrete policy measures to protect regional languages (Kraus and 
Kazlauskaitė-Gürbüz, 2014). This, in addition to ratification and enforcement limitations, has 
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led to some observers describing the Charter as having little impact on the further recognition 
and protection of minority languages in Europe (Elias, 2008b). 
  
Despite these issues however, the Charter provides an important starting point for 
minority nationalist parties arguing for further recognition and protection for their respective 
‘regional’ languages. While many minority nationalists and others, including French Member 
of Parliament and long-time activist in favour of regional and cultural autonomy for Brittany 
Paul Molac, see the Charter as insufficient, support for its core ideas and for its implementation 
remains high (Olivesi, 1998). The Charter, through its very existence as a document setting out 
principles and policies states are encouraged to ratify and implement, provides minority 
nationalist parties with a reference point to legitimise linguistic demands and delegitimise 
government opposition to these demands.  
Drawing upon the terminology of Onuf’s constructivism further clarifies this point. 
Assuming the existence of a broadly accepted rule, which could be stated as ‘international 
agreements are relevant, and matters in political decision-making’, a further rule can be stated 
saying that the ‘institution’ (understood as a set of rules and practices) (Onuf et al., 2013) of 
international agreements, and the rules that this creates, are relevant factors in the behaviour 
and decision making of individual and collective political agents (if not legally, then ethically 
or ‘morally’). Assuming this rule holds broadly across political actors within Europe at the very 
least, the existence of the ECRML provides an important tool for minority nationalist parties 
to promote some of their key demands in terms of cultural and linguistic recognition and 
protection. By providing alternative rules, or ‘statements that tell people what we should do’ 
(Onuf et al., 2013, p. 4), at the European level that states should ratify and implement, 
documents such as the ECRML significantly challenge the legitimacy of alternative approaches 
to minority languages at the national and subnational level.  
This does not necessarily lead to a change in the condition of rule, understood as the 
condition whereby some actors are perceived as more legitimate than others to enforce and 
shape rules (Onuf, 1989; Onuf et al., 2013). States, as we have seen above and as the signatories 
of the Charter, still enjoy a degree of flexibility in the implementation of the Charter, and can, 
as in the case of France, simply not implement the Charter within their national legal systems. 
The existence of the Charter however, and its implementation by twenty-eight European 
countries, does however increasingly undermine the legitimacy of states refusing to implement 
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it. Minority nationalists and other observers of the Charter in France frequently point to the 
ratification of the Charter by other European countries to criticise France’s inability to do the 
same (Giordan, 2008). In interviews, France’s stance on minority languages was often 
characterised as ‘backward’ by minority nationalist actors, and was frequently compared 
negatively with neighbouring countries. While this, in itself, does not force any policy changes, 
the ECRML and the European-level rules it promotes act as powerful legitimising influences 
that minority nationalist parties can draw upon to secure public support for some of their 
demands. 
 
 The example of the ECRML is particularly important to highlight and understand the 
potential impact of minority nationalist party actions and rhetoric on the political environment 
in which they operate, and by extension on the opportunities these parties have to achieve their 
aims. While there are no legal obligations to ratify and sign the ECRML, and only limited 
enforcement powers once the Charter has been signed, the adoption of the Charter by some 
European countries places pressures on countries who have yet to ratify the document. Minority 
nationalist parties are able, on the grounds of what should be done, to push for changes within 
their own territory based on the ‘ethical’ (as opposed to legal) precedent set by other countries 
in the same European political space. This precedent, although it does not oblige states to adopt 
certain policies, allows minority nationalist parties to challenge established rules by drawing 
upon alternative rules that have been implemented or accepted in other states – states which 
are perceived as similar and relevant due to their presence within a shared European political 
space.  
  
 It is crucial, however, not to reduce this phenomenon to formal charters and documents 
established at the European-level through institutions such as the European Union or the 
Council of Europe. Drawing on the broader understandings of Europeanisation described at the 
beginning of this chapter, I also argue that Europeanisation, understood as the emergence of a 
European polity (as per Delanty and Rumford, 2005) and as the emergence of new, cross-
national policy networks and shifts in cognition, discourse and identity (as per Featherstone 
and Radaelli, 2003), provides a broader basis on which to understand the ‘Europeanisation’ of 
minority nationalism and how minority nationalist parties take advantage and draw upon the 
idea of a European polity to further their own domestic aims. 
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Minority nationalists and Europe 
 
 While, as we have seen, European-level institutions do appear to be a fruitful arena for 
the creation, legitimation and diffusion of alternative norms, the question still remains as to 
what extent Europe forms a crucial part of minority nationalist party rhetoric, and to what extent 
minority nationalist parties share a clear commitment to Europe, simply perceive Europe as a 
utilitarian resource in their domestic political struggle, or see European-level institutions as 
another critical agent in the process of diffusing norms on self-determination. 
 The literature focusing on the relationship between minority nationalist parties, as 
individual parties, and the European Union, is relatively small. While a common assumption 
made in the literature is that minority nationalist parties are broadly supportive of the European 
Union and its institutions, many studies also highlight that characterising minority nationalist 
parties are being exclusively supportive mischaracterises the ‘complexity of the diverse ways 
in which they react European integration’. (Elias, 2008a, p. 576). Many other studies highlight 
different broad stages of minority nationalist support of the European Union. In a study of three 
minority nationalist parties in Scotland, Sardinia and Bavaria, Hepburn identifies three major 
stages: nationalist or left-wing scepticism until 1990, followed the emergence of a consensus 
over the positive nature of the Europe of Regions project, followed by disillusionment with the 
progress made by the idea and reversal back to a state-centric focus and strategies. (Hepburn, 
2008). Keating, in his assessment of the Europe of Regions project, also agreed that the project 
had fallen far short of minority nationalist expectations, depriving them of a direct relationship 
with the European Union or of many other tools that may have helped them in the pursuit of 
their goals (Keating, 2008a). Similarly, Elias identifies four different possible stances adopted 
by minority nationalism: euro-enthusiasm, euro-rejects, euro-scepticism, and euro-pragmatism 
(Elias, 2008a). According to this framework, parties are either fully supportive (euro-
enthusiasts), opposed and strongly critical (euro-rejects), committed to the principle of Europe 
but dissatisfied with current developments (euro-sceptics) or supportive of the EU on purely 
pragmatic grounds (euro-pragmatists). This is echoed in Elias’ book on minority nationalist 
party attitudes to Europe, which analyses that minority nationalist party opinions of Europe 
vary both across cases and across time significantly (Elias, 2008b). 
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 Before analysing the extent to which Europe or the European Union played a part in 
minority nationalist party rhetoric in the three cases and during the time period analysed here, 
a brief overview of each case’s historical trajectory is necessary.  
 As we have said above, like many minority nationalist parties, the SNP’s relationship 
with Europe has evolved and changed significantly over time. Initially, the SNP remained quite 
critical and sceptical of the European Union in the period surrounding the United Kingdom’s 
entry in 1973. While initial concerns focused on the European Communities’ as a centralist and 
elitist organisation within which Scotland would have no voice, the late 1980s saw a shift in 
stance from this initial scepticism to a broad support for the notion of independence within 
Europe, which understood Europe as a framework for self-determination (Hepburn, 2006; 
Hepburn and Elias, 2011). Even as disillusionment grew surrounding the concept of Europe of 
Regions, the SNP remained committed to independence within Europe as a primary policy goal 
(Keating, 2008a). 
 The analysis conducted for this thesis did capture a substantial amount of EU-related 
rhetoric by the SNP, although this needs to come with a number of important points. First and 
foremost, there is little to indicate, even today, that the SNP has shifted away from the ‘euro-
enthusiast’ position it gradually adopted in the late 1980s and 1990s.  Secondly however, the 
extent to which the SNP discusses Europe in its rhetoric, rather than evidence of its support, 
was skewed significantly by the centrality of the United Kingdom’s departure from the EU in 
public opinion and public discourse. While the SNP’s opinion of the European Union in 
rhetoric is almost exclusively positive, and although this echoes with previous studies showing 
SNP support for the European Union, the impact of a significant external crisis in the shape of 
Britain’s departure from the European Union had a non-negligible impact on SNP rhetoric on 
Europe. 
 There were two broad ‘periods’ with regard to SNP rhetoric on the European Union in 
the data analysed for this thesis. The first period, which pre-dates the European Union 
referendum in June 2016, focuses primarily on SNP opposition to UK central government plans 
to hold a referendum on EU membership. SNP rhetoric at that period is also unequivocally in 
favour of Scottish membership of the European Union: Fiona Hyslop for instance, criticised 
the EU referendum Bill put forward by the UK government, arguing that a ‘double majority’ 
system should be in place, through which only a majority vote in Scotland and the rest of the 
United Kingdom could be considered legitimate (STV, 2015), in effect putting forward a 
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‘peopleness’ argument that Scotland’s people should be distinguished from the rest of the 
United Kingdom as a fully ‘self-enclosed’ demos with its own democratic rights. The SNP also 
re-stated its commitment, numerous times, to campaign for Scottish membership of the 
European Union (Scottish National Party, 2015r; Sky News, 2015), arguing that not only there 
was a probably democratic majority in favour of European Union membership (Scottish 
National Party, 2015a), but also EU membership was vital to Scotland as a country. Drawing 
on this notion of Scottish ‘peopleness’ and its existence as a distinct democratic demos, SNP 
MEP Alyn Smith went slightly further, arguing that a vote for leaving the European Union, 
most notably if this was against the will of the majority in Scotland, would legitimise 
independence as a political solution to Scotland’s desire to stay within the European Union 
(Appendix A interview 7, Barbiere, 2015). 
 Scotland’s position on the European Union only marginally shifted following the 2016 
EU referendum in the UK. Highlighting that Scotland would be taken out of the European 
Union ‘against its will’, Nicola Sturgeon argued, echoing Alyn Smith, that a second 
independence referendum was ‘highly likely’ as a result of the UK’s decision to leave the 
European Union (Carrell and Brooks, 2016). Despite this initial reaction however, SNP rhetoric 
quickly shifted slightly towards pursuing continued Single Market membership within the UK, 
without which independence would become a legitimate option.  The SNP 2017 General 
Election Manifesto for instance makes multiple mentions of Europe across a wide range of 
subject areas, highlighting the importance of cooperation, single market membership and 
European environmental policy (Scottish National Party, 2017). Similarly, the SNP’s own 
policy statement on the European Union emphasises the necessity to stay a member of the 
Single Market, without which employment and wages would drop significantly (Scottish 
National Party, 2016c). 
 Of the three cases analysed here, the SNP can most likely be described as ‘euro-
enthusiast’. In opposing the UK’s departure from the European Union prior to the referendum 
and in opposing Scotland’s own departure following the referendum, the SNP adopted a 
strongly pro-European Union rhetoric, highlighting the benefits of European Union 
membership for Scotland and the potential damage caused by a departure. Coupled with a 
‘peopleness’ argument positing the Scottish people as a distinct ‘demos’ with its own right to 
majority democratic decision making, the SNP in effect continued to argue for ‘independence 
in Europe’, by arguing that departure from the European Union and the Single Market without 
the approval of the Scottish people would be considered a legitimate reason to pursue 
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independence again. In many respects therefore, the SNP’s stance on Europe is not only 
consistent with existing studies, but also remarkably stable across time. 
 
 Unlike the SNP, both major minority nationalist parties in Catalonia have traditionally 
held relatively supportive views of the European integration process and the European Union, 
at the very least in principle. The CiU, rooted in a tradition of anti-Francoism that saw Europe 
as a bulwark against dictatorship (Giordano and Roller, 2002), looked to the European Union 
as a legitimising factor for its own nationhood. There are two major elements related to the 
CiU’s traditional stance on European integration: the idea that Europe, with its multilateral 
decision-making, contrasts significantly with the Spanish state and provides a much stronger 
avenue for autonomy, decision-making and the fulfilment of Catalonia’s national aspiration 
(Ehrlich, 1997; Giordano and Roller, 2002). Secondly, that European integration is perceived 
as a significant step towards modernisation, which justified a strong commitment for Catalonia 
to ‘enter the European mainstream’ (Ehrlich, 1997).  
 Alternatively, the ERC’s stance towards Europe appears closer to that espoused by 
other minority nationalist parties and can be understood to broadly follow the pattern described 
by Hepburn above. After espousing the notion of a Europe of Regions for the better part of the 
1990s and early 2000s, the ERC’s stance shifted subtly towards the notion of a ‘Europe of 
Peoples’, which would grant further rights to national groups as opposed to sub-national 
authorities per se (Giordano and Roller, 2002). More recently, with growing disillusionment 
regarding the realisation of a Europe of Regions or a Europe of People’s the ERC has adopted 
a stance that can be characterised as ‘euro-scepticism’ as described above: a continued 
commitment to European integration, but a growing scepticism of the extent to which European 
integration is serving the interests of minority stateless peoples as opposed to serving the 
interests of member states (Giordano and Roller, 2002). 
 Although the few previous studies on Catalan minority nationalist attitudes towards 
Europe to lean towards a characterisation of Catalan nationalism as either euro-enthusiast or 
midly ‘euro-sceptic’, the data analysed in this study points to a position with regard to Europe 
that is very firmly ‘euro-pragmatic’. There are two major periods during which Europe appears 
in the rhetoric of minority nationalist parties in Catalonia: the run-up to the October 2015 
parliamentary election, where scrutiny over Catalonia’s continued European Union 
membership after independence brought the subject the forefront of debates, and October 2017, 
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where Europe’s reaction to the Catalan referendum crisis triggered a brief wave of discontent 
against the European institutions. 
 In the run up to the 2015 elections, the notion that Catalan independence would lead to 
the nation taking its ‘rightful’ place as a European state alongside all the other European states 
is still very present in discourse, echoing the historical focus of the CiU on European 
integration as a legitimising factor for Catalan nationhood. Several major minority nationalist 
parties reiterated the idea that Catalan independence would lead to Catalonia becoming a new 
‘European country’ or a new country ‘in Europe’. For instance, Raul Romeva described the 
Junts Pel Si manifesto for the October 2015 election to be a ‘manifesto that enables to begin 
the journey towards normality, to a normality deserving of a European state’ (Esquerra 
Republicana, 2015a). Junts Pel Si described its own manifesto as ‘guaranteeing the transition 
towards becoming a new European state’ (Junts Pel Sí, 2015l), and other minority nationalist 
leaders such as then-Catalan President Artur Mas described the population of Catalonia as 
‘European citizens’ (Junts Pel Sí, 2015h). 
 However, the vast majority of mentions of Europe in the campaign for the October 2015 
Catalan parliamentary elections were related to Catalonia subsequent membership of the 
European Union following a hypothetical independence. Different minority nationalist leaders 
adopted different stances to justify Catalonia’s continued membership after independence. 
Representatives such as Raul Romeva highlighted in various Twitter messages at various times 
during the campaign that Europe would inevitably accept a democratic mandate in favour of 
independence, and would negotiate (Junts Pel Sí, 2015g, 2015a; Romeva i Rueda, 2015a). The 
view was echoed by other leading minority nationalists, such as Oriol Amat, who argued that 
should the democratic mandate for independence be clear, independence would be inevitable 
and Europe would have no choice but to negotiate (Junts Pel Sí, 2015e). Other minority 
nationalists also highlighted repeatedly that Europe would accept Catalan membership of the 
European Union, but drew on different arguments. Carme Forcadell argued that Europe is 
‘pragmatic, and the most practical option is that Catalonia should continue as European 
member state’ (Junts Pel Sí, 2015b). Others, such as Artur Mas, echoed that sentiment, arguing 
that Europe is pragmatic and would not expel Catalonia and its European citizens (Junts Pel Sí, 
2015h). Finally, other leaders such as Oriol Junqueras put forward a legalistic argument, 
arguing that no treaty or directive existed that could result in Catalonia being expelled from the 
European Union in the event of independence (Esquerra Republicana, 2015f), while the CDC 
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argued online that the European Union would want an ‘innovative, open state committed to the 
welfare state’ (Convergents - CDC, 2015g). 
 The very wide range of arguments put forward in favour of continued European Union 
membership by Catalan minority nationalists in the campaign prior to the October 2015 
election all share a common element: unlike the SNP’s 2015 and 2016 rhetoric, none of the 
arguments put forward highlight the benefits of European Union membership for Catalonia, 
and focus instead on the possibility of remaining a member after independence. While the data 
gathered is not sufficient to provide a definitive answer as to why, two potential interpretations 
can be offered. First and foremost, many of the responses put forward by Catalan nationalists 
were in response to opponents using the loss of European Union membership as an argument 
against independence, which led minority nationalists to argue not about the benefits of 
European Union membership, but their potential right to remain a member. Secondly, it is clear 
from the otherwise marginal role played by Europe in the rhetoric of Catalan minority 
nationalists during the campaign and, even more strikingly, outside of the campaign, that 
Catalan minority nationalists had adopted a very strong ‘euro-pragmatic’ stance, using the 
European Union as a legitimising tool for the primary goal of self-determination.  
 The ‘euro-pragmatic’ stance adopted by minority nationalists in Catalonia becomes 
increasingly supported when one considers the second period during which Europe re-emerged, 
albeit briefly, as part of Catalan nationalist rhetoric. Following the independence referendum 
crisis in 2017 and the rejection by the European Union of Catalan nationalist demands and 
norms (Reuters, 2017), there was a brief, albeit strong reaction against the European Union 
from Catalan minority nationalists, with the most notable and violent example being now-
former President Carles Puigdemont. In the aftermath of the Catalan referendum crisis, Carles 
Puigdemont criticized the European Union violently, accusing of ‘collaborating’ with ‘Spanish 
fascism’ by legitimising the ‘coup’ carried out by the Spanish state against Catalan sub-national 
institutions (Suanzes, 2017). Puigdemont followed on, suggesting that a referendum on Catalan 
membership of the European Union may be an option (Rico and Julve, 2017). In the face of 
growing criticism from other minority nationalist figures, Puigdemont retracted some of his 
criticism and reiterated that ‘Catalanism was undoubtedly pro-European’, asking for the 
establishment of a ‘more democratic’ Europe in which ‘people have more power and states 
less’ (OkDiario, 2017). Although critical of Puigdemont’s stance, the ERC’s stance on the 
European Union appeared significantly less enthusiastic, with representatives putting forward 
the view that the European Union ‘needed to be changed’, albeit it rejected the idea of leaving 
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it as a fruitful solution (El Periódico, 2017). As we can see here, if euro-pragmatists support 
Europe only insofar as its serves or legitimises another purpose, it is perhaps unsurprising that 
Catalan nationalists adopted a less enthusiastic approach to Europe in their rhetoric following 
the Catalan independence referendum crisis, in which they held the European Union at least 
partly complicit.  
 
 The case of Corsica provides us with a third, different approach to Europe. While the 
SNP enthusiastically defended Europe in the context of its pursuit of ‘independence in Europe’ 
and in response to the UK’s decision to leave the European Union, and the Catalans engaged 
strongly with Europe as pragmatic tool to forward their pursuit of nationhood, Corsican 
nationalists did not address Europe in their day-to-day rhetoric during the period analysed. 
Only a few comments on Europe were recorded.  
 Historically, the divisions between Corsican radicals and Corsican moderates within 
the nationalist movement are also reflected in the different sides’ stances on Europe and 
European Integration. In the few studies analysing Corsican nationalist opinions on Europe, 
Corsican moderates (represented today by Femu a Corsica) are described as being traditionally 
favourable to the European Union. Moderate Corsican nationalists understand that, by virtue 
of its insular nature, Corsica requires integration with Europe, and Europe provides a strong 
platform for the promotion of ideas through links with other, like-minded political parties 
within Europe (Hepburn and Elias, 2011). Moderate Corsican nationalists, who remained 
‘remarkably constant’ in their support for European integration according to Elias, supported 
the 1992 Maastricht Treaty and the 2005 European Constitutional Treaty enthusiastically 
(Elias, 2008b, p. 137; Hepburn and Elias, 2011).  
 Contrarily to Corsican moderates, radical minority nationalists have often maintained a 
more sceptical position of the European Union. While the FLNC rejected European integration 
wholesale, later political embodiments of the Corsican radical nationalists maintained a mild 
support for the European Union, notably insofar as it was perceived as a provider of resources 
for the island (Hepburn and Elias, 2011). This ‘clientelist’ approach to European integration, 
in which party interest in the European Union is limited to the resources it can provide to the 
island, is described as one of the reasons why Corsican radical nationalists continue to take 
only a marginal interest in European integration and European politics (Elias, 2008b, p. 138).  
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 The lack of a European election within the period studied, and the virtual absence of 
any Europe-related rhetoric during that period, confirms some well established findings in the 
existing literature. Hepburn and Elias in 2011 explain that references to European integration 
are confined to European elections, and Elias in 2008 also describes European issues as 
‘marginal’ in the day-to-day political rhetoric of Corsican minority nationalism, confirming 
findings from a previous study on the salience of European issues in Corsica conducted fifteen 
years earlier (Elias, 2008b; Hepburn and Elias, 2011). 
 In addition to the explanations regarding the marginality of European issues within 
Corsican nationalism, the framework of this thesis allows us to put forward an additional 
hypothesis that could form the basis of a future body of research. As we analysed in chapter 3, 
Corsican nationalism is continuing to focus primarily on the achievement of ‘peopleness’, 
securing recognition as a distinct identity with France with political rights. As we saw however, 
the critical agents for the diffusion and adoption of such a norm are the local electorate, central 
government and, indirectly, the state-wide electorate. In this context, Corsican nationalists, 
regardless of fundamental ideological positioning on European integration, appear to have very 
little to gain right now in the pursuit of a strong, European policy. While this is particularly 
helpful for Scotland and Catalonia in their attempts to establish their nationhood as legitimate 
in the eyes of the broader international community, there appears to be little need for Corsican 
nationalists to address Europe either way, except in a context where Europe provides resources 
that are useful for domestic policy-making. It is important to note that this hypothesis need not 
clash with pre-existing understandings of the reasons behind low European salience in Corsican 
nationalism; in many respects, the hypothesis developed above and rooted in norm diffusion 
can be understood as reinforcing other elements of context that lead to low European salience 
in Corsican nationalism. 
  
 Aside from the stance of minority nationalist parties on Europe itself, we also analysed 
previously that Europe as a political space is becoming increasingly relevant. Do minority 
nationalists use that political space to develop common ground and common identities? While 
less frequent in public party communication and rhetoric, the idea of a shared identity between 
minority nationalists in various territories is a recurring, yet uneven theme in the rhetoric of 
minority nationalist parties. During interviews conducted in Corsica, both Gilles Simeoni and 
Jean-Guy Talamoni, representing the two branches of Corsican nationalism (moderate and 
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radical, respectively), frequently referred to transnational interactions between minority 
nationalist parties (Appendix A, interviews 2 and 3). Referring to Corsican nationalism’s new-
found status as a governing force following electoral success in December 2015, Simeoni 
remarked that Corsican nationalists ‘frequently travelled to other territories and regions to 
learn’, while today Corsican nationalism is ‘seen, when delegations from other regions and 
other minority nationalist parties are welcomed to Corsica, as leading model in Europe’. One 
of the very few mentions of Europe by Corsican minority nationalists during the period 
analysed was by Corsican radical youth group Ghjuventu Indipendentista, that described a 
particularly fruitful journey to Brussels where representatives of the group were able to meet 
with several European officials and representatives from other minority nationalist parties 
(Cuscenza, 2015). As in the case of Catalonia, the group primarily uses the openness of 
European-level officials and other minority nationalist parties in contrast to the perceived 
unwillingness by the French government to engage in any meaningful dialogue. Similarly, 
David Grosclaude, vice-President of the European Free Alliance and veteran activist for 
linguistic and regional rights for Occitania (a historical region covering much of Southern 
France), highlighted the important role of strong, established minority nationalist parties in the 
Spanish Basque Country or Catalonia as models to shape and illustrate the demands of weaker 
counterparts in France and across Europe (Appendix A, interview 6). 
 Similarly, in Catalonia, minority nationalist parties often look towards Scotland as an 
example to follow, drawing upon the legitimacy of the SNP’s case to argue for the legitimacy 
of their own. In several cases, Spain’s intransigence was contrasted with what was presented 
as an open and democratic spirit in the United Kingdom (Esquerra Republicana, 2015h). This 
was echoed in the interview of Ramon Tremosa, who explained that if Scotland decides to 
pursue independence unilaterally, this would be ‘very good’ for Catalan nationalists as their 
circumstances are so similar (Appendix A, interview 8). While I have encountered little 
evidence that this transnational link goes beyond social and inspirational ties and the 
legitimising of their own demands by shaming the Spanish government, it is clear from this 
example and from the example of Corsica that minority nationalists do ‘look outwards’ to draw 
inspiration from, learn and use the experiences of other minority nationalist parties in Europe 
in similar situations. 
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 While widespread, the central role played by transnational ‘learning’ and the 
development of shared beliefs and norms among minority nationalist parties is not equally 
spread across all parties in all territories in Europe and is not unlimited. In an interview with 
Christian Allard, former Member of the Scottish Parliament until 2015, very little mention was 
made of other minority nationalist parties in other territories, with Mr. Allard going as far as 
emphasising the importance of ‘non-interference’ in other states’ affairs with regards to the 
regional, cultural and linguistic policies implemented by other states in other territories with 
minority nationalist claims (Appendix A, interview 5). This reluctance to comment on the 
political situation of other regions and other minority nationalist parties in Europe, echoes the 
relative absence of any significant mention of other minority nationalist parties in the public 
rhetoric of the SNP more broadly. Similarly in Corsica, while social and ‘ideological’ ties with 
other minority nationalist parties are frequent, there is a pronounced reluctance, expressed by 
Gilles Simeoni in my interview, to draw direct lessons for their own case from other situations 
around Europe (Appendix A, interview 2).  
  
 However, despite the uneven presence of notions of shared beliefs, interests and identity 
within minority nationalist discourse, and an uneven and sometimes low willingness to engage 
too comprehensively in transnational actions and discussions, the emergence of shared beliefs 
alongside a sense of ‘common identity’ illustrated by formal institutions such as the EFA and 
by bilateral or multilateral informal interactions between minority nationalist parties provides, 
similarly to the precedent described above set by formal documents and charters, an arena in 
which minority nationalist parties can learn from each other’s experiences, develop shared 
norms, practices and beliefs, and use them to challenge or reinforce established rules, norms, 
beliefs and practices at both the European and national levels. While these practices are 
infrequently referred to in public rhetoric and do not form a significant part of the identity of 
the larger minority nationalist parties studied here, these represent an opportunity for norm 
alignment between similar parties in similar political situations. Again, rather than providing 
them with strict legal or institutional power to enforce demands, the existence of such an arena 
allows them to challenge rules understood as what can legitimately be done by whom. This is 
most explicitly seen in the minority nationalist pursuit of institutional changes providing 
greater autonomy, or even independence, to their respective territories. As highlighted above, 
while this alone does not alter the ‘condition of rule’ in which these parties operate, it does 
provide an alternative framework through which minority nationalist parties can legitimise 
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their demands, not only by presenting charters or legal principles other states might have signed 
as the policies and principles that should be implemented within their own state, but also by 
emphasising political practices in other neighbouring or similar states and delegitimising 
opposition to similar practices in their own state (the notion of self-determination referenda or 
regional autonomy are two strong examples of this). 
 
Conclusion 
Minority nationalist parties, despite their local or subnational focus, are influenced by 
European-level politics. Their formal participation in European Union politics is problematic 
and limited by a number of factors including limited access to policy-making arenas and the 
difficulties faced by minority nationalist parties in developing a strong, coherent representation 
at the European level. Such difficulties, and the limitations placed on minority nationalist party 
action at the European level by the Union’s current institutional set up, have led academics to 
describe minority nationalist parties as disillusioned, indifferent, or even critical of the 
European Union, preferring a renewed focus on domestic politics to pursue and achieve their 
political aims. 
 While these limitations are clearly significant, as has been highlighted by the 2017 
Catalan crisis, minority nationalist parties need not abandon Europe as a politically relevant 
space altogether. While the formal institutions of the European Union remain broadly out of 
reach for these parties, they continue to perceive Europe as a relevant political space to 
challenge the rules and policies they oppose, most notably in terms of linguistic or 
constitutional policies. The density of European-level institutions, the partial (and fragile) 
political unification of Europe and the influence of European-level practices on national and 
subnational governance contribute to creating a European political space where principles and 
policies are discussed, challenged, and alternatives to established political arrangements are 
established and legitimised. In this chapter, we analysed the particular example of the ECRML. 
Although a ‘legal’ text in name, there is little in the way of enforcement, and no way to coerce 
members into ratifying the Charter in the first place. The ECRML, in that respect, represents a 
set of principles, of rules governing the use, protection and promotion of minority and regional 
languages within Europe, a set of rules whose challenge to established policies at the national 
level, rather than legal, remains fundamentally political and discursive. 
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 Minority nationalist parties have drawn upon the ECRML, and its growing adoption by 
European countries, as an argument to delegitimise opposition to the Charter’s policies within 
national states, most notably France. Regional languages and the ECRML are not the only 
domain in which minority nationalist parties invoke the example or the ‘ethical precedent’ set 
by European countries as an argument to legitimise their own demands: similar attempts have 
been made around constitutional demands, most notably demands for independence referenda, 
and demands for durable political settlements following periods of minority nationalist political 
violence. 
 Despite the existence of Europe as a potential political space, minority nationalist 
parties have, for the most part exhibited a remarkable stability in their stance towards European 
integration. In our analysis, the SNP has shown no signs of shifting away from the pro-
European desire for ‘independence within Europe’ that it embraced in the 1990s, and Corsican 
nationalists appear to be as indifferent to Europe as ever. Finally, Catalan minority nationalists, 
whose traditional stance on Europe can be understood as ‘euro-pragmatic’, have continued to 
embrace that approach, supporting European integration for the best part of the period analysed 
here but shifting towards more sceptical positions in response to Europe’s rejection of their 
demands in 2017.  
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Conclusion 
 The behaviour of political agents is rule-driven, and minority nationalist parties are no 
different in this respect. Unlike many other parties however, the normative preferences of 
minority nationalist parties frequently clash with the fundamental institutional, legal and 
constitutional framework of the state or states in which they operate. Even when these parties 
accede to positions of power within that framework, the ‘fit’ is often imperfect and the 
relationship with the central government often marked by tensions and disagreements. 
 The first question this thesis sought to address was the question of principles driving 
minority nationalist party action and rhetoric. In the third chapter, I determined that self-
determination could be understood as the fundamental principle underpinning most, if not all, 
minority nationalist rhetoric and action in all three of our cases. Understood as a right 
applicable to ‘peoples’, minority nationalist parties most frequently attempt to establish, and 
diffuse, norms legitimising the population of their territory as a distinct ‘people’ deserving of 
recognition and able to exercise the right to self-determination. With peopleness understood as 
a pre-requisite for the exercise of self-determination, minority nationalist parties in all three 
cases were understood to be at different stages in a normative chain, in which a series of norms 
build on each other to legitimise the exercise of self-determination for a given people within a 
given territory. 
 Of all three cases, Corsican minority nationalists were the only case in which the very 
‘peopleness’ of Corsicans was not accepted by all critical agents within their domestic sphere. 
While Corsican nationalists were broadly able to promote, through several decades of political 
and cultural activism, a distinct notion of Corsican identity which they have then politicised, 
Corsican ‘peopleness’ remains unrecognised and does not benefit from any institutional 
recognition, whether at the local or state level in France. 
 Consequently, identity-based grievances play a central role in Corsican nationalist 
rhetoric. With ‘peopleness’ at stake, Corsican nationalists focus significantly on establishing, 
and defending, a distinct identity which deserves access to self-determination.  
 In both other cases, in Catalonia and Scotland, ‘peopleness’ is not at stake, at the very 
least not in the way it is in Corsica. Both Scots and Catalans are institutionally recognised as a 
distinct ‘people’, with their own identity, languages and extensive sub-national political 
autonomy to govern themselves on a wide range of issues. As a result, both Catalan and Scottish 
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people focus directly on grievances related to what they perceive as insufficient self-
determination.  
 In Catalonia however, while ‘peopleness’ itself is not particularly challenged by the 
Spanish state, the right to self-determination is. From the perspective of the Spanish state, 
distinct ‘peopleness’ does not, inevitably, lead to an ever-extensible right to political 
sovereignty and self-determination. As a result, much of the rhetoric of minority nationalist 
parties and the tensions between these parties in government and the central Spanish 
government focus on institutional grievances. With the extent of internal self-determination 
granted to Catalonia falling short of minority nationalist party normative demands, and with 
little prospect of the Spanish state accepting internal self-determination along the lines desired 
by these parties, the debate for them has shifted towards external self-determination, or 
independence, as the preferred option. This demand for independence, which is it at the root of 
most tensions witnessed in Catalonia during the period of this study, is an excellent illustration 
of how self-determination drives minority nationalist parties: with self-determination being the 
fundamental aim, these parties attempt to secure it within the boundary of the state in which 
they find themselves and, failing this, attempt to secure it outside of those boundaries. 
 Of all three cases, the Scottish case is the one in which self-determination is least 
problematic. It is the only case studied here in which the notion of self-determination as a result 
of Scottish ‘peopleness’ is accepted by most, if not all, critical agents within the British 
domestic political sphere. Building on democratic legitimacy, the SNP were able to pursue 
external self-determination in a British government-supported referendum, held in 2014. 
Following the failure of this referendum, the SNP have campaigned continuously for the 
extension of internal self-determination, drawing primarily upon economic grievances to 
justify further institutional changes in favour of greater autonomy for the devolved authorities 
in Scotland. As a result of the EU membership referendum in 2016 however, the SNP has 
reverted to demanding external self-determination, this time with no support from the British 
government. These recent developments have, in a similar way to Catalonia, brought back 
institutional grievances to the forefront of SNP rhetoric.  
 In analysing the main minority nationalist grievances through a constructivist and norm 
diffusion lens, this thesis contributes in several important ways to the existing literature. The 
notion that self-determination is a ‘touchstone’, or an important ideological factor upon which 
minority nationalist parties base their policy decisions, is confirmed here. Similarly, the idea 
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that minority nationalist parties will operate on a two-dimension political scale, with territorial 
politics and traditional economic politics co-existing, is also reinforced, although this thesis 
would argue that traditional economic politics are often subsumed and completely subservient 
to the self-determination-driven territorial politics. Finally, this thesis allows us to 
conceptualise the centrality of self-determination without undermining findings in the literature 
which state that parties frequently frame issues in different ways, or emphasise issues in 
different ways, for strategic purposes. As we have seen in chapter 3, a wide variety of positions, 
including different forms of self-determination, can still all be considered to stem from the 
same norm or normative chain. 
 With this in mind, one of the main contributions of this thesis is to provide an additional 
level of analysis, with a strong conceptual toolbox used to analyse it. It provides fruitful ground 
for the further study of devolution or autonomy policies and the impact they have on the 
electoral and political fortunes of minority nationalist parties. It can also provide a strong 
opportunity to study, through a different theoretical lens, why the ‘territorialisation’ of state-
wide parties can sometimes be problematic for minority nationalist parties who often 
monopolise the political space surrounding centre/periphery grievances within a given territory 
(Gillespie, 2015) , as shown by Hepburn in the case of Sardinian minority nationalism t 
(Hepburn, 2009a). 
 Minority nationalist parties are driven by self-determination. As rules-bound agents, to 
what extent are minority nationalist parties impacted by the domestic and international 
normative, legal, constitutional and political environment in which they operate? Is this a one-
way relationship, or are minority nationalist parties, as agents, engaged in a process of mutual 
constitution with the rules they operate under? To what extent, then, do minority nationalist 
parties affect and change the political environment? 
 Fundamentally, the commitment of minority nationalist parties to self-determination 
expresses itself as a series of normative demands these parties make. As ‘norm entrepreneurs’, 
minority nationalist parties seek, through a process of norm diffusion, to spread their norm and 
persuade a sufficient number of ‘critical agents’ to trigger norm cascading, a point where a 
given norm becomes widely adopted by agents, who regardless of the merits of the individual 
norm, begin adopting it to comply with other agents around them. The widespread acceptance 
of the legitimacy of the Scottish referendum, despite opposition to the idea of Scottish 
independence itself, is a good example of a norm, which can be stated as ‘The Scottish people 
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should be entitled to external self-determination if they democratically express a wish for it’, 
cascading through agents within the UK domestic sphere. 
 The extent to which minority nationalist parties have been able to change the 
institutional, legal and political environment in which they operate varies across cases. In 
Scotland for instance, the SNP has been able to use its position in government to secure a 
legitimate independence referendum, resulting in a further deepening of Scottish devolved 
powers in its aftermath. Other achievements include the undeniable expansion of the role of 
Gaelic within Scottish politics and society, where once again the SNP was able to use its 
position in government to implement a range of changes by drawing upon the existing 
institutional and legal framework surrounding language in Scotland. 
 In the other two cases, changes have been harder for minority nationalist parties to 
achieve. While, for instance in Catalonia, changes surrounding the status and place of the 
Catalan language in society, politics and education have been successfully implemented by 
minority nationalist parties in government, changes to the institutional and constitutional order 
have most frequently been met with staunch opposition from the Spanish state. Similarly in 
Corsica, Corsican nationalists have met with significant opposition when attempting to 
challenge institutional and constitutional norms in France. While they have been able, once in 
government, to alter the de facto practice of sub-national power in the French context, the 
balance of power embodied in the institutional framework of Corsica has not been changed 
significantly. Whether it is the de facto co-official status of the Corsican language that Corsican 
nationalists have attempted to implement or the understanding of sub-national government as 
a ‘representative’, rather than ‘administrative’ institution, most of these changes have occurred 
outside of the formal, legal boundaries of the institutions which they now govern. These 
changes, by virtue of the legal and institutional uncertainty that surrounds them, are fragile at 
best. 
 One of the major contributions of this thesis, and of the constructivist and norm 
diffusion theoretical framework, is that it theorises a number of major phenomena that can be 
identified within contemporary minority nationalism. First and foremost, understanding 
minority nationalist action as a process of norm diffusion highlights one of the fundamental 
points of constructivism: change is immensely difficult to secure, especially against long-
established and highly legitimate institutions and norms. This can provide further fruitful 
discussion in any subsequent case where minority nationalist party achievement falls short of 
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minority nationalist party rhetoric both before and after the election. This, in turn, contributes 
an alternative explanation to changes perceived in minority nationalist party stance and policy-
making once in government: from the evidence presented in this thesis, it is incredibly unlikely 
that a minority nationalist party will be able to implement the totality of its self-determination 
agenda without facing severe and often insurmountable difficulties. 
 Minority nationalist parties, despite often pursuing change in the political, legal and 
institutional framework within which they operate, are also undeniably affected by it. In many 
respects, this reflects much of the findings of existing literature on minority nationalist party, 
which frequently emphasises the importance of context and of a very wide range of exogenous 
elements affecting the overall rhetoric and stance of minority nationalist parties. The relevance 
of context in all its forms, be it political, economic, ideological, cultural, historical or social, is 
perhaps one of the most consensual elements established across the literature on minority 
nationalist parties. This is visible across wide sections of the literature,  such as studies on 
minority nationalism and immigration (Hepburn, 2009b), minority nationalism and its 
relationship with Europe (Hepburn, 2008; Hepburn and Elias, 2011), minority nationalist party 
strategy (Elias, Szöcsik and Zuber, 2015), ideology (Elias, 2009) and even more general 
overviews of minority nationalism in Western Europe (Álvarez Pereira, Portos and Vourdas, 
2018; Anderson, 2018).  
First and foremost, although minority nationalist parties are all driven by self-
determination as a fundamental principle, there are significant differences when one observes 
the focal points of their rhetoric and aims. Throughout the thesis, I have sought to prove that 
these differences can broadly be ascribed to differences in political, legal and constitutional 
context. There are several elements that come into consideration when determining to what 
extent a given issue will become salient or not within minority nationalist discourse. The first 
one is conflict. Throughout this thesis, I have shown that the more normative conflict exists 
between minority nationalist parties and other critical agents around them, the more likely a 
given issue is to be an important focal point in party rhetoric and action. This is particularly 
obvious in the case of institutional grievances in Catalonia and identity-based grievances in 
Corsica. Secondly, the more aligned a given normative framework surrounding an issue is with 
their own normative expectations, the less likely it is for minority nationalist parties to focus 
on that given issue. Although this may seem obvious in that few parties actively campaign on 
issues they do not want to see changed, this occurs at a more fundamental level for minority 
nationalist parties. Even on issues where these parties would implement different policies given 
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the chance, so long as the institutional framework allows them to implement these policy 
preferences, the issue tends to subside in party rhetoric. In other words, insofar as self-
determination on a given issue is possible, parties will tend to focus on areas where self-
determination is not. 
 
 Another important question addressed in this thesis is the question of change. How do 
minority nationalist parties secure change? How do they legitimise it? 
 To understand normative change and norm diffusion, it is important to analyse who, in 
any given context, are the critical agents norm entrepreneurs will need to persuade for the norm 
to be broadly accepted at some point in the future. This thesis has highlighted at least three 
major critical agents. One of the most important, and more relevant critical agents is the central 
government of the state in which the minority nationalist parties operate. The importance and 
power of the central government in affecting these parties’ ability to implement significant 
normative change cannot be overstated. In the case of Scotland, the UK government’s support 
for an independence referendum and for subsequent extensions to the devolved powers of 
Scottish governmental institutions was instrumental in facilitating changes desired by the SNP. 
Comparatively, similar changes sought by Catalan minority nationalists have been rendered 
impossible by the staunch opposition of the Spanish state, with tensions peaking at the time of 
the attempted independence referendum in 2017. Similarly in Corsica, while as we saw above 
Corsican nationalists have been able to implement a few changes in the way political power is 
exercised in the Corsican sub-national institutions, few of the institutional demands put forward 
by minority nationalists have been legally and institutionally implemented. 
 While minority nationalist parties are often highly critical of government refusals to 
implement the changes they seek, these parties are highly aware of the crucial role played by 
central government as a critical agent in norm diffusion. As a result, minority nationalist parties 
across all three cases have adopted a strategy of delegitimization to encourage central 
governments to at least open up the possibility of normative and institutional change. A crucial 
part of this process of delegitimization is democracy and electoral politics, which plays a key 
role in the strategy of minority nationalist parties in all three cases. Electoral politics however, 
introduces a second critical agent for minority nationalist parties seeking change at the 
domestic level: the electorate within the territory they seek to represent (or their own ‘people’, 
so to speak). 
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 Across all three cases, minority nationalist parties have been extremely successful at 
persuading their local electorate to support the normative changes they seek to implement. This 
fact, illustrated by repeated electoral successes across all three cases and throughout the period 
studied, has enabled these parties to use democratic legitimacy as a tool to delegitimise 
opposition to their policy platform. 
In securing repeated significant electoral successes since 2007, the SNP were gradually 
able to legitimise the possibility of independence and, consequently, delegitimise state 
opposition to a referendum. Arguing that the ‘Scottish people’, a relatively uncontroversial 
notion within British politics, had repeatedly expressed a wish for an independence 
referendum, the UK government as a critical agent accepted and endorsed the norm according 
to which, broadly, ‘the right to self-determination should apply to the Scottish people’. The 
result of this, an independence referendum and subsequent institutional reform, enabled the 
SNP to implement many of its core institutional demands. 
Comparatively, the use of democratic legitimacy to convince the central state as a 
critical agent to accept at least some minority nationalist demands has been less successful in 
Catalonia and Corsica. In Catalonia, the democratic legitimacy gathered by minority 
nationalists has done little to soften central government opposition. Even in 2017, when 
democratic legitimacy was used to create a critical juncture in the form of a major constitutional 
crisis, the central Spanish government did not alter its stance, instead using its legal legitimacy 
to coerce Catalan minority nationalist parties into stepping back from their immediate pursuit 
of unilateral independence. 
Similarly in France, Corsican minority nationalist successes have done little to change 
the stance of the French central government on major relevant issues. Despite initial hope that 
electoral legitimacy would force the French government to engage in a dialogue with governing 
minority nationalists, this process has had a little impact and most of the major demands put 
forward by minority nationalist parties, including all of those put forward in the ‘prugettu 
cumunu’ which formed the basis of their electoral success, remain unrealised. 
While minority nationalist parties have relied heavily on democratic legitimacy to 
legitimise their own demands and delegitimise opposition to them, parties have encountered 
limited success in achieving their aims. This in turn, can be explaining by introducing several 
other critical agents, namely the state-wide electorate, and European level institutions and 
leaders.  
Edward Walker – School of Government and International Affairs, Durham University 
204 | P a g e  
 
Minority nationalist parties have traditionally neglected the electorate outside of the 
territory they seek to represent. However, this electorate is crucial insofar as it provides 
democratic legitimacy to another critical agent, the central government, which can then be 
opposed to the democratic legitimacy minority nationalists claim within their own territory. As 
I argued in the case of Catalonia, despite the democratic legitimacy gathered by minority 
nationalists within Catalonia, the Spanish government felt little incentive to alter its position 
insofar as it maintained broad support for its approach across the rest of Spain. This 
phenomenon is amplified in Corsica, by virtue of the territory’s peripheral nature and small 
size relative to the rest of the France.  
Another set of critical agents that minority nationalist parties have not neglected, 
however are European-level critical agents, including European institutions and European 
leaders. Despite strong attempts to campaign for and legitimise their aims at the European level, 
the limited access given to minority nationalists to major European institutions, coupled with 
the relative strength of states and national governments within these institutions, have limited 
the impact of minority nationalists at the European level. While much of this remained 
theoretical until 2017, the Catalan crisis highlighted that, faced with a critical juncture, 
European-level critical agents almost unanimously supported the Spanish state, despite 
continuous and sustained attempts by Catalan minority nationalists to raise awareness and 
support for their demands at the European level. 
However, despite difficulties at the European-level, this thesis confirms the existing 
notion that minority nationalist parties have not abandoned the European-level arena entirely, 
despite in many cases retreating back to the domestic sphere as their primary sphere of action. 
The fifth chapter in the thesis highlights some of the limitations, as well as some of the 
opportunities made available by European-level institutions and connections in the context of 
a normative contest. The empirical findings of the chapter also highlight that minority 
nationalist party stances have remained relatively stable, with all three cases echoing previous 
findings in the literature. The relative absence of any European-level discussion within day-to-
day minority nationalist rhetoric in Corsica observed in this thesis echoes the indifference and 
occasional scepticism described in previous studies (Elias, 2008b; Hepburn and Elias, 2011) . 
The enthusiasm displayed by the SNP in favour of European-level political participation and 
institutions appears to be a continuation of a general trend towards pro-European positioning 
started in the late 1980s (Keating, 2004; Hepburn, 2006, 2008) while Catalonia’s pragmatic 
perception of European-level institutions as an important source of values and as a valuable, 
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albeit flawed, arena through which to promote their ideas, echoes previous studies on the place 
of Europe in Catalan minority nationalism (Ehrlich, 1997; Giordano and Roller, 2002; Borgen, 
2010). 
 
The thesis and its findings raise important questions for the future. Considering the 
relative failure of democratic legitimacy in forcing through major institutional changes, to what 
extent will minority nationalist parties in government focus on operating within existing 
institutions as opposed to focusing on change? To what extent will the democratic legitimacy 
of minority nationalists be hampered by their inability to implement most of the changes they 
aspired to? Future electoral performance will be crucial to understand whether minority 
nationalists retain a strong degree of democratic support within their own territories, or whether 
recent events have damaged their credibility to an extent. The potential for future mutual 
constitution between minority nationalist parties and the institutional framework within which 
they operate is strong, but the question is which ‘direction’ this mutual constitution is mostly 
likely to occur in the immediate future. 
As identified in the literature, minority nationalist parties have gradually become more 
suspicious and more indifferent towards the promise of European-level institutions as a new 
arena for them to legitimise and implement their changes. The question remains whether the 
Catalan example, and the failure of European Union institutions and European leaders to assist 
Catalan minority nationalists, will further reinforce the apathy and suspicion felt by minority 
nationalist parties towards the European-level political arena. 
Finally, the thesis provides a strong basis upon which to analyse further cases in 
different areas. While the conceptual tools used here appear highly fruitful in explaining 
minority nationalist activity and rhetoric, further research would be useful to determine whether 
these tools apply across all cases in very different contexts, or whether it applies primarily to 
minority nationalist movements within democratic societies in Europe. While it is reasonable 
to assume that minority nationalist parties engage in processes of mutual constitution, further 
research would analyse and highlight which tools minority nationalists in non-democratic 
societies can use to legitimise their own demands and secure changes. Despite significant 
tensions surrounding minority nationalist attempts to enforce their own normative preferences, 
it would be important to determine whether the relatively peaceful nature of minority 
nationalist party activity within the three cases is a consequence of the minority nationalist 
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parties themselves, or a broader consequence of the democratic societies within which they 
operate and to which they are committed. 
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Appendix A – List of interviews conducted for this study. 
 
1. Paul Molac – Member of Parliament for the 4th constituency of Morbihan (Brittany) 
La République en Marche (formerly Union Démocratique Bretonne)  
Interview conducted by telephone on the 5th July 2016. 
 
2. Gilles Simeoni – President of the Executive Council of the Collectivité Territoriale de 
Corse 
Pè a Corsica 
Interview conducted at the Collectivité Territoriale de Corse, Ajaccio, 21st September 
2016. 
 
3. Jean-Guy Talamoni – President of the Corsican Assembly. 
Pè a Corsica 
Interview conducted at the Collectivité Territoriale de Corse, Ajaccio, 21st September 
2016. 
 
4. Max Zañartu – President of the European Free Alliance Youth (EFAy) 
Joventuts D’Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya 
Interview conducted by telephone on the 28th September 2016. 
 
5. Christian Allard – Former Member of the Scottish Parliament (MSP) for North East 
Scotland (2013-2016). 
Scottish National Party 
Interview conducted by telephone on the 13th December 2016. 
 
6. David Grosclaude – Former regional councillor of the Aquitaine region (2010-2015) 
Partit Occitan 
Interview conducted by telephone on the 17th January 2017. 
 
7. Alyn Smith – Member of the European Parliament (MEP) for Scotland 
Scottish National Party 
Interview conducted at the European Parliament, Brussels, 21st March 2017. 
 
8. Ramon Tremosa i Balcells – Member of the European Parliament (MEP) for Spain 
Partit Demòcrata European Català 
Interview conducted at the European Parliament, Brussels, 21st March 2017. 
 
9. Jill Evans – Member of the European Parliament (MEP) for Wales 
Plaid Cymru 
Interview conducted at the European Parliament, Brussels, 21st March 2017. 
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Topics covered in semi-structured interviews 
 
• Self-determination as a principle, and its relevance to the action of minority nationalist 
parties (all interviews). 
• The importance of minority languages (all except interviews 5 and 7). 
• The importance of electoral politics in achieving political goals (all interviews). 
• The question of political violence (interviews 2 and 3) 
• Historical development of minority nationalist party demands and positions (interviews 2, 3, 
8 and 7)  
• The relationship between minority nationalist parties and its relevance (all interviews). 
• The relevance of Europe as a political space for minority nationalist parties (interviews 1, 5, 
6, 7, 8 and 9). 
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